Control of stimulus-response translation in dual-task performance

In contradiction to stimulus-response- (S-R-) translation bottleneck models of dual-task control, stimulus processing in a primary task is affected by its compatibility with the response in a secondary, later performed task (Hommel, 1998a)- an indication of parallel S-R translation. Here we show that this backward-compatibility effect is independent of working-memory load, whether this is induced by an extra memory task (Experiment 1) or by increasing the number of S-R alternatives in the primary task (Experiment 2). However, backward effects occur even when the secondary task is no longer carried out (Experiment 3) and they are strongly affected by the inconsistency of previously used S-R mappings (Experiment 4). These findings suggest that S-R translation is (or can be) capacity-independent and automatic even under multiple-task conditions, and that it is mediated by direct S-R associations that emerge after only little practice.     

Dynamic factor analysis of nonstationary multivariate time series

A dynamic factor model is proposed for the analysis of multivariate nonstationary time series in the time domain. The nonstationarity in the series is represented by a linear time dependent mean function. This mild form of nonstationarity is often relevant in analyzing socio-economic time series met in practice. Through the use of an extended version of Molenaar's stationary dynamic factor analysis method, the effect of nonstationarity on the latent factor series is incorporated in the dynamic nonstationary factor model (DNFM). It is shown that the estimation of the unknown parameters in this model can be easily carried out by reformulating the DNFM as a covariance structure model and adopting the ML algorithm proposed by Jöreskog. Furthermore, an empirical example is given to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed DNFM and the analysis.     

Bodily experience between selfhood and otherness

In opposition to traditional forms of dualism and monism, the author holds that our bodily self includes certain aspects of otherness. This is shown concerning the phenomenological issues of intentionality, of self-awareness and of intersubjectivity, by emphasizing the dimension of pathos. We are affected by what happens to us before being able to respond to it by acts or actions. Every sense, myself and others are born out of pathos. The original alienness of our own body, including neurological processes, creates shifting degrees of nearness and remoteness, and allows for pathological deviations such as depersonalisation, paranoia or trauma. Such a phenomenology of body crosses the borderlines of different disciplines.     

Beitrag der Neurowissenschaften zur forensischen Psychiatrie

Forensic psychiatry is a subspecialty dedicated to the interface between psychiatry and law. It uses paradigms and knowledge from general psychiatry for diagnostics, assessment, therapy and research under consideration of the special requirements of legal aspects and framework conditions; therefore, scientific development in forensic psychiatry is substantially dependent on scientific progress in psychiatry and thus nowadays also in neurosciences. Neurobiological hypotheses on the neuronal foundations of psychiatric diseases have been established, for example the dopamine hypothesis for schizophrenia, in a manner that led to important therapeutic advances in the treatment and long-term quality of life for affected persons. Analogous advances should not be withheld from forensic psychiatric patients, who are doubly affected by the disease and the accompanying limitations in their rights to freedom, which is why research in this field must be driven forwards. Clear advances in knowledge of the neurobiological foundations of forensic psychiatric illnesses have, for example, already been made in the field of pedophilia and psychopathy. Based on studies of investigation populations, such neuroscientific knowledge on the neurobiological principles of forensic psychiatric diseases, however, requires a carefully concerted communication with respect to dissemination in the media as well as in the interpretation of individual cases, for example in court. This is of great importance in order to prevent simplifying misconceptions and to avoid a subsequent loss of trust in the scientific process. Therefore, training of the new generation of forensic psychiatrists in the understanding and communication of scientific methods of modern forensic psychiatric neuroscience is of great importance for the societal impact and further advancement of the discipline.     

Investigating moral intensity with the world-wide web: A look at participant reactions and a comparison of methods

This paper reports the results of a vignette- and questionnaire-based research project over the World-Wide Web investigating the influence of moral intensity (MI) on decision making in a business context. A qualitative analysis of the feedback in terms of e-mail communications was used to provide insights into the reactions and responses of participants to both the research method and the topic of research. Implications are discussed, and some methodological recommendations are derived. Second, analysis of the quantitative results of the Web-based questionnaire administration indicated that three of the six MI components were particularly important determinants of several outcome variables. This pattern of results essentially replicated findings yielded by a previous mail administration of the survey, even though a smaller amount of variation in the outcome variables was accounted for. Neither occupational background nor the region of origin of participants measurably influenced the results.     

How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? *

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN‐account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context‐sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context‐sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context‐sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail.     

The subject of “We intend”

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind (“I intend”) and the plural kind (“we intend”) are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective.