Common marmosets (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Callithrix jacchus</Emphasis>) do not utilize social information in three simultaneous social foraging tasks

Social foraging is suggested to increase foraging efficiency, as individuals might benefit from public information acquired by monitoring the foraging activities of other group members. We conducted a series experiments with captive common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) to investigate to what extent marmosets utilize social information about food location when foraging simultaneously with conspecifics. Subjects were confronted with dominant and subordinate demonstrators in three experiments which differed in the amount of information about food location available to the demonstrators. In all three experiments, the focal subjects’ performance in the social condition was not enhanced in comparison to a non-social control condition. Because we could rule out kleptoparasitism and aggressive displacements as explanations, we argue that the subjects’ tendency for scramble competition by avoiding others and dispersing over the foraging area seems to inhibit or mask the acquisition of social information about the location of rewarded patches.     

Films for eliciting emotional states in children

Standardized sets of films have been shown to be effective for eliciting emotional states in adults, but no comparable validated stimuli are available for children. We therefore examined the effects of three pre-selected film clips each of 3-min duration in eliciting a pleasant, neutral and unpleasant emotional state in 297 children aged between 6 and 12 years. After the films were presented on a video projector, affective ratings were obtained with the Self-Assessment-Manikin on the emotional dimensions of valence and arousal. Increasing pleasure ratings were observed from the unpleasant to the neutral to the pleasant film. Associated arousal ratings were stronger for the unpleasant and pleasant films compared to the neutral film. Overall, results showed successful elicitation of targeted emotional states only marginally influenced by age, gender or prior experience with the films. The use of these films is therefore suggested for future studies on emotions in children.     

Direct evidence for a role of working memory in the attentional blink

Theories of selective attention often have a central memory component, which is commonly thought to be limited in some way and is thereby a potential bottleneck in the attentional process. There have been only a few attempts to validate this assertion, and they have produced mixed results. This study presents a specific examination of the link between working memory and attention by engaging active rather than passive memory operations. Two experiments are reported that provide evidence for the involvement of working memory in the attentional blink (AB) phenomenon. Memory loads of increasing size had a detrimental effect on attentional performance within the blink-sensitive interval, but not beyond. Speeded response requirements proved to modulate the AB, but were independent from the memory load effect. Theoretical implications for current models of selective attention are discussed.     

Dynamic factor analysis of nonstationary multivariate time series

A dynamic factor model is proposed for the analysis of multivariate nonstationary time series in the time domain. The nonstationarity in the series is represented by a linear time dependent mean function. This mild form of nonstationarity is often relevant in analyzing socio-economic time series met in practice. Through the use of an extended version of Molenaar's stationary dynamic factor analysis method, the effect of nonstationarity on the latent factor series is incorporated in the dynamic nonstationary factor model (DNFM). It is shown that the estimation of the unknown parameters in this model can be easily carried out by reformulating the DNFM as a covariance structure model and adopting the ML algorithm proposed by Jöreskog. Furthermore, an empirical example is given to demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed DNFM and the analysis.     

The subject of “We intend”

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind (“I intend”) and the plural kind (“we intend”) are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective.