Further thoughts on memory: replies to Schechtman,Adams, and Goldberg

This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, “Memory and Identity”, Fred Adams, “Husker Du?”, and Sanford Goldberg “The Metasemantics of Memory”.     

Knowledge From Forgetting

This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.     

Knowing The World By Knowing One's Mind

This paper addresses the question whetherintrospection plus externalism about mental contentwarrant an a priori refutation of external-worldskepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestionis that if thought content is partly determined byaffairs in the environment and if we can havenon-empirical knowledge of our current thoughtcontents, we can, just by reflection, know about theworld around us – we can know that our environment ispopulated with content-determining entities. Afterexamining this type of transcendental argument anddiscussing various objections found in the literature,I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledgeunderlying this argument presupposes that we canlearn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughtsare propositional attitudes rather than contentlessstates. If, however, externalism is correct andthought content consists in the systematic dependencyof internal states on relational properties, we cannotknow non-empirically whether or not we havepropositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (apropositional attitude) is consistent with us lackingthe ability to rule out, via introspection, thepossibility that we don't have any propositionalattitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledgeof what is in our minds, but not that we haveminds. Hence, the combination of externalism with thedoctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allowfor an a priori refutation of skepticism and istherefore unproblematic.     

Self-Knowledge and the Bounds of Authenticity

This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form ‘I believe that p’ qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p, is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p. Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity.

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Assessing implicit motives with an online version of the picture story exercise

An online version of a Picture Story Exercise (PSE) was administered to 180 participants to assess implicit motives for achievement, affiliation, and power. First, data were analyzed with respect to different aspects of participant behavior (dropout, writing time, story length, setting). Second, online data were compared with data collected in the laboratory (n = 93). Results regarding motive density, internal consistency, picture profiles, and position effects were comparable among samples and consistent with previous research (Pang and Schultheiss in J Person Assess 85:280–294, 2005; Schultheiss and Brunstein in J Person Assess 77: 71–86, 2001). In addition, online participants completed self-report measures assessing explicit motives and the Big Five personality factors. Explicit motives showed no substantial overlap with PSE motive scores, replicating previous research. Personality factors revealed gender differences in correlates: men with a high implicit power motive reported less agreeableness and conscientiousness. Results suggest that administering the PSE online yields reliable and valid data.     

Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism

This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.     

Précis of memory: a philosophical study

This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, “Memory and Identity”, Fred Adams, “Husker Du?”, and Sanford Goldberg “The Metasemantics of Memory”.     

Implicit Theories About Willpower Predict Subjective Well‐Being

Lay theories about willpower—the belief that willpower is a limited versus nonlimited resource—affect self‐control and goal striving in everyday life (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010). Three studies examined whether willpower theories also relate to people's subjective well‐being by shaping the progress they make toward their personal goals. A cross‐sectional (Study 1) and two longitudinal studies (Studies 2 and 3) measured individuals’ willpower theories and different indicators of subjective well‐being. Additionally, Study 3 measured goal striving and personal goal progress. A limited theory about willpower was associated with lower subjective well‐being in a sample of working adults (Study 1, N = 258). Further, a limited theory predicted lower levels of well‐being at a time when students faced high self‐regulatory demands (Study 2, N = 196). Study 3 (N = 157) replicated the finding that students with a limited theory experienced lower well‐being in phases of high self‐regulatory demands and found that personal goal progress mediated this relationship. Results suggest that the belief that willpower is based on a limited resource has negative implications not only for self‐control but also for personal goal striving and subjective well‐being.