A Censored Mixture Model for Modeling Risk Taking

Psychometrika - Risk behavior has substantial consequences for health, well-being, and general behavior. The association between real-world risk behavior and risk behavior on experimental tasks is...     

The Significance of a Non-Reductionist Ontology for the Discipline of Physics: A Historical and Systematic Analysis

An overview of the history of the concept of matter highlights the fact that alternative modes of explanation were successively employed. With the discovery of irrational numbers the initial conviction of the Pythagorean School collapsed and was replaced by an exploration of space as a principle of understanding. This legacy dominated the medieval period and had an after-effect well into modernity—for both Descartes and Kant still characterized matter in spatial terms. However, even before Galileo the mechanistic world view slowly entered the scene—the world as chaos, particles in motion. Elevating movement to become the guiding principle in our understanding of matter dominated the main tendency of modern physics until the (end of the) 19th century. The discovery of irreversible processes (radio-activity for example) directed 20th century physics towards an exploration of the meaning of energy-operation. It turned out that even within 20th century physics long-standing legacies prevailed, because an account of the nature of matter continued to be torn apart by atomistic and holistic views—confronted by the problem of constancy and change (radical transformability versus persistence). Concrete, material reality exceeds the scope of any single mode of explanation—an insight that also serves a better understanding of the wave-particle duality.     

The relationship of three measures of childhood depression to academic underachievement

Clinical features of depression (short attention span, lethargy, poor memory and shortened task persistence) appear to be incompatible with effective learning. This has led several investigators to suggest that depression is a significant cause of academic underachievement. The most adequate test of this hypothesis (Tesiny, Lefkowitz, & Gordon, 1980), however, found only small correlations between depression and academic achievement when neither IQ nor socioeconomic status were controlled. In the present study, three measures of childhood depression (Peer Nomination Inventory for Depression, Children's Depression Inventory, and an ad hoc teacher rating) were correlated with scores from the Peabody Individual Achievement Test and the Stanford Achievement Test. IQ was statistically controlled to provide a direct measure of underachievement and analyses were conducted separately for males, females, and the combined sample in a sample that was homogeneous for socioeconomic status. Although intercorrelations among the variables indicated that the sample was appropriate to test the hypothesis, only a few significant correlations were found. These findings suggest that if depression causes academic underachievement, it is a weak or uncommon effect.     

Color preferences change after experience with liked/disliked colored objects

How are color preferences formed, and can they be changed by affective experiences with correspondingly colored objects? We examined these questions by testing whether affectively polarized experiences with images of colored objects would cause changes in color preferences. Such changes are implied by the ecological valence theory (EVT), which posits that color preferences are determined by people’s average affective responses to correspondingly colored objects (Palmer & Schloss, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107, 8877–8882, 2010). Seeing images of strongly liked (and disliked) red and green objects, therefore, should lead to increased (and decreased) preferences for correspondingly colored red and green color patches. Experiment 1 showed that this crossover interaction did occur, but only if participants were required to evaluate their preferences for the colored objects when they saw them. Experiment 2 showed that these overall changes decreased substantially over a 24-h delay, but the degree to which the effect lasted for individuals covaried with the magnitude of the effects immediately after object exposure. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar, but weaker, effect of affectively biased changes in color preferences when participants did not see, but only imagined, the colored objects. The overall pattern of results indicated that color preferences are not fixed, but rather are shaped by affective experiences with colored objects. Possible explanations for the observed changes in color preferences were considered in terms of associative learning through evaluative conditioning and/or priming of prior knowledge in memory.