Existential issues in group psychotherapy

Existential issues in group psychotherapy derive from existential thought both as a philosophy and as a value system. Its origins derive from the weakening of traditional values and the growing alienation of man from himself. The unique features of existentialism can be applied to all forms of therapy. These features are universal to humankind. They are finiteness, aloneness, guilt, responsibility, and freedom. In including existential concerns as part of group psychotherapy, therapist and patients move more closely to bilateral relationships and subjective interactions.     

Confirmatory factor analysis of parents' and teachers' ratings of DSM-IV symptoms of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder in a Spanish sample

Confirmatory factor analysis examined the factor structure of DSM IV Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder symptoms and analyzed the differences in informants' ratings of ADHD symptoms by children's age and sex. A sample of 1,018 Spanish school children, 574 girls and 444 boys, ages 4 to 12 years, was rated by teachers and parents. Confirmatory factor analysis showed a similar fit for the three-factor model of Inattention, Hyperactivity, and Impulsivity (teachers: CFI = .976, RMR = .041, % of total variance = 83.2; parents: CFI = .969, RMR = .037, % of total variance = 82.7) and for the two-factor model of Inattention and Hyperactivity Impulsivity (teachers: CFI = .958, RMR = .044, % of total variance = 79.3; parents: CFI = .961, RMR = .038, % of total variance, 79.9). The two-factor model was selected as a parsi monious representation of the teachers' and parents' ratings of ADHD symptoms. Analyses of variance indicated significant differences in teachers' and parents' mean ratings across sex and school grades of children.     

Subjective experience is probably not limited to humans: the evidence from neurobiology and behavior

In humans, conscious perception and cognition depends upon the thalamocortical (T-C) complex, which supports perception, explicit cognition, memory, language, planning, and strategic control. When parts of the T-C system are damaged or stimulated, corresponding effects are found on conscious contents and state, as assessed by reliable reports. In contrast, large regions like cerebellum and basal ganglia can be damaged without affecting conscious cognition directly. Functional brain recordings also show robust activity differences in cortex between experimentally matched conscious and unconscious events. This basic anatomy and physiology is highly conserved in mammals and perhaps ancestral reptiles. While language is absent in other species, homologies in perception, memory, and motor cortex suggest that consciousness of one kind or another may be biologically fundamental and phylogenetically ancient. In humans we infer subjective experiences from behavioral and brain evidence. This evidence is quite similar in other mammals and perhaps some non-mammalian species. On the weight of the biological evidence, therefore, subjectivity may be conserved in species with human-like brains and behavior.     

Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals

The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness is a major biological adaptation in mammals. We suggest more than a dozen additional properties of human consciousness that may be used to test comparative predictions. Such homologies are necessarily more remote in non-mammals, which do not share the thalamocortical complex. However, as we learn more we may be able to make "deeper" predictions that apply to some birds, reptiles, large-brained invertebrates, and perhaps other species.     

Neural Darwinism and consciousness

Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the 'dynamic core'). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well.     

Tool-use learning in Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana)

The transmission of tool use is a rare event in monkeys. Such an event arose in a group of semi-free-ranging Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) in which leaning a pole against the parks fence (branch leaning) appeared and spread to several males. This prompted us to test individual and social learning of this behavior in seven young males. In the first experiment, three males learned individually to obtain a food reward using a wooden pole as a climbing tool. They began using the pole to retrieve the reward only when they could alternatively experience acting on the object and reaching the target. In a second experiment, we first tested whether four other subjects could learn branch leaning after having observed a group-mate performing the task. Despite repeated opportunities to observe the demonstrator, they did not learn to use the pole as a tool. Hence we exposed the latter subjects to individual learning trials and they succeeded in the task. Tool use was not transmitted in the experimental situation, which contrasts with observations in the park. We can conclude that the subjects were not able to recognize the target as such. It is possible that they recognized it and learned the task individually when we alternated the opportunity to act upon the object and to reach the reward. This suggests that these macaques could then have associated the action they exercised upon the pole and the use of the pole as a means to reach the reward.     

The future of the American Group Psychotherapy Association: whither we goest?

The author describes his perspective about what the future holds for the American Group Psychotherapy Association (AGPA). Utilizing Nitsun's (1996) construct of the "anti-group" as an organizing metaphor, he delineates the destructive forces both within and outside the organization that are currently affecting it, and then describes how they can be transformed into instruments for positive development. He suggests that the AGPA can and must continue to provide a "holding environment" (Winnicott, 1960) for professionals interested in working with people in groups. In addition, he asserts that the organization will build upon its remarkable response to the September 11, 2001 debacle in the United States to expand its services to those who have been traumatized. Beyond this, he underscores the importance of the AGPA consolidating and expanding its various educational offerings into a coherent package that will meet the needs of any and all who are interested in learning about how to work effectively with groups. In these and other ways, he contends that the AGPA will thereby confirm Nitsun's assertion that anti-group forces can be transformed, and that organizations that confront these forces constructively can not only survive but thrive.