Criteria for consciousness in humans and other mammals

The standard behavioral index for human consciousness is the ability to report events with accuracy. While this method is routinely used for scientific and medical applications in humans, it is not easy to generalize to other species. Brain evidence may lend itself more easily to comparative testing. Human consciousness involves widespread, relatively fast low-amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical core of the brain, driven by current tasks and conditions. These features have also been found in other mammals, which suggests that consciousness is a major biological adaptation in mammals. We suggest more than a dozen additional properties of human consciousness that may be used to test comparative predictions. Such homologies are necessarily more remote in non-mammals, which do not share the thalamocortical complex. However, as we learn more we may be able to make "deeper" predictions that apply to some birds, reptiles, large-brained invertebrates, and perhaps other species.     

Neural Darwinism and consciousness

Neural Darwinism (ND) is a large scale selectionist theory of brain development and function that has been hypothesized to relate to consciousness. According to ND, consciousness is entailed by reentrant interactions among neuronal populations in the thalamocortical system (the 'dynamic core'). These interactions, which permit high-order discriminations among possible core states, confer selective advantages on organisms possessing them by linking current perceptual events to a past history of value-dependent learning. Here, we assess the consistency of ND with 16 widely recognized properties of consciousness, both physiological (for example, consciousness is associated with widespread, relatively fast, low amplitude interactions in the thalamocortical system), and phenomenal (for example, consciousness involves the existence of a private flow of events available only to the experiencing subject). While no theory accounts fully for all of these properties at present, we find that ND and its recent extensions fare well.     

Tool-use learning in Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana)

The transmission of tool use is a rare event in monkeys. Such an event arose in a group of semi-free-ranging Tonkean macaques (Macaca tonkeana) in which leaning a pole against the parks fence (branch leaning) appeared and spread to several males. This prompted us to test individual and social learning of this behavior in seven young males. In the first experiment, three males learned individually to obtain a food reward using a wooden pole as a climbing tool. They began using the pole to retrieve the reward only when they could alternatively experience acting on the object and reaching the target. In a second experiment, we first tested whether four other subjects could learn branch leaning after having observed a group-mate performing the task. Despite repeated opportunities to observe the demonstrator, they did not learn to use the pole as a tool. Hence we exposed the latter subjects to individual learning trials and they succeeded in the task. Tool use was not transmitted in the experimental situation, which contrasts with observations in the park. We can conclude that the subjects were not able to recognize the target as such. It is possible that they recognized it and learned the task individually when we alternated the opportunity to act upon the object and to reach the reward. This suggests that these macaques could then have associated the action they exercised upon the pole and the use of the pole as a means to reach the reward.     

Distance estimation in a dynamic simulated environment: a visual field dependence problem?

Egocentric distance estimation implies that the subject perceives his own location in the environment. In a simulated environment, subjects have to transpose perceptively their own observation point in order to assume their virtual body position. As only visual information specifies this position, their ability to perceive the camera viewpoint should be linked to the field dependence independence factor (FDI). Field-independent subjects underestimated the mid-distance between their own virtual body position and a far-located target; their bisection was located between the projective (2-D) and the simulated (3-D) mid-distance which indicates their difficulty in considering the in-depth simulated spatial references. High correlations between the vertical estimation in the rod-and-frame test and the egocentric-distance-estimation task (with shifted camera) suggest a similar perceptive process in both tasks. This result is confirmed by the better performances of the field-dependent subjects in this condition. In conclusion, we discuss the relationship between FDI and the sense of presence in virtual environments.     

Index of suspicion: feeling not believing

Throughout the U.S., state laws require professionals who work with children to report cases of suspected child abuse to child protection services. Both practically and conceptually, however, significant problems arise from a lack of clarity regarding the threshold that has been set for reporting. Specifically, there is no consensus as to what constitutes reasonable suspicion, and little direction for how mandated reporters should gauge their legal and professional responsibilities when they harbor suspicion. In this paper we outline the context of the problem, discuss the nature and scope of its conceptual underpinnings, and offer recommendations for moving towards a concrete, practical solution.