Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.     

Age differences in emotional reactions: arousal and age-relevance count

Recent findings suggest positivity effects in older adults' attention and memory, but few studies have examined such effects on the level of emotional reactivity. In this study, 52 young and 52 older adults rated 172 pictures of the International Affective Picture System, differing in arousal and age-relevance, in terms of valence and discrete emotions. Age differences in the ratio of pleasantness reactions to pleasant pictures vs. unpleasantness reactions to unpleasant pictures as well as age differences in absolute levels of unpleasantness and pleasantness reactions suggest that positivity effects in older adults' subjective emotional reactions are reduced under high arousal. There is also evidence that positivity effects may be restricted to stimuli with low relevance in old age.     

Effects of US‐based franchising in the developing world: a middle‐eastern consumer perspective

• This paper investigates the impact of US‐based franchising in the Middle Eastern context of Egypt. In a review of the franchise literature, micro‐ and macro‐level effects are identified and categorized across social, economic, cultural, political, and marketplace dimensions. A qualitative analysis using focus groups of Middle Eastern consumers was conducted. Clear evidence of “consumer agency” as a transformative force in the globalization process is revealed. In addition to confirming consumer agency findings from previous research, this study also indicates a sequential progression of product adoption over time along Eckhardt and Mahi's (2004) consumer agency categories. Managerial and theoretical implications are discussed.

Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On Identification and Non-normal Simulation in Ordinal Covariance and Item Response Models

Psychometrika - A standard approach for handling ordinal data in covariance analysis such as structural equation modeling is to assume that the data were produced by discretizing a multivariate...     

MORAL CONTEXTUALISM AND MORAL RELATIVISM

Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds.     

Interaction between mother and pre-term infant at 34 weeks post-conceptional age

The impact of premature birth and perinatal medical status on early mother–infant interaction was assessed in 75 dyads with pre-term infants divided into three groups. Infants' gestational age at birth and need for neonatal intensive care intervention differentiated the groups: group 1, 23–31 weeks with intensive care; group 2, 32–35 weeks with intensive care; group 3, 32–35 weeks with no intensive care. The methodological approach was based on observations of the dyads performed when the infant reached a post. conceptional age of 34 weeks (4 weeks before estimated due date of delivery). The observations were conducted in the neonatal nursery during cleaning, face-to-face and feeding interactions. Significant group differences were found in infant distress, maternal sensitivity to the infant and dyadic behaviours of positive interaction. Group 1 dyads showed higher scores or more desirable performance than dyads of group 3. Group 2 dyads usually achieved intermediate scores and performed better than dyads of group 3, especially during the feeding situation. We suggest that, in addition to a possible emergence of maternal compensatory mechanisms in the higher-risk groups, the amount of dyadic experience after birth affects the quality of mother–infant interaction at this early stage.