Self-reported parental stress was investigated in three samples of mothers with small children, using a Swedish version of the Parenting Stress Index (PSI). Dimensionality in experienced stress using items from six PSI Parent Domain subscales and eight new items was examined in factor analyses of data from a nationwide representative sample. Cross-validation proved the chosen factor pattern to be stable. Based on an oblique 5-factor solution new subscales were constructed. A second order factor analysis indicated influence from a higher order factor, seen as a general parental stress construct. High alpha coefficients revealed that homogeneous subscales had been formed. Test-retest correlations indicated good stability over a mean time period of 30 days. Influences from maternal background variables were found, but no relation to child age or gender. Global estimates of parental stress, reported child problems, mothers' scoring on the Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale and two measures of social support all correlated significantly with overall parental stress, and with some subscales. The justification of the subscale approach to parental stress was discussed. It was concluded that the PSI in its present form could be used as a reliable and valid instrument for measuring experienced parental stress in mothers of young children. 相似文献
Integration information theories posit that the integration of information is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. In this paper, we focus on three of the most prominent information integration theories: Information Integration Theory (IIT), Global Workspace Theory (GWT), and Attended Intermediate-Level Theory (AIR). We begin by explicating each theory and key concepts they utilize (e.g., information, integration, etc.). We then argue that the current evidence indicates that the integration of information (as specified by each of the theories) is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness. Unlike GWT and AIR, IIT maintains that conscious experience is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness. We present empirical evidence indicating that simple features are experienced in the absence of feature integration and argue that it challenges IIT’s necessity claim. In addition, we challenge IIT’s sufficiency claim by presenting evidence from hemineglect cases and amodal completion indicating that contents may be integrated and yet fail to give rise to subjective experience. Moreover, we present empirical evidence from subjects with frontal lesions who are unable to carry out simple instructions (despite appearing to understand their meaning) and argue that they are irreconcilable with GWT. Lastly, we argue that empirical evidence indicating that patients with visual agnosia fail to identify objects they report being conscious of present a challenge to AIR’s necessity claim.
I argue that strong representationalism, the view that for a perceptual experience to have a certain phenomenal character
just is for it to have a certain representational content (perhaps represented in the right sort of way), encounters two problems:
the dual looks problem and the duplication problem. The dual looks problem is this: strong representationalism predicts that
how things phenomenally look to the subject reflects the content of the experience. But some objects phenomenally look to
both have and not have certain properties, for example, my bracelet may phenomenally look to be circular-shaped and oval-shaped
(and hence non-circular-shaped). So, if strong representationalism is true, then the content of my experience ought to represent
my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. Yet, intuitively, the content of my experience does not
represent my bracelet as being both circular-shaped and non-circular-shaped. The duplication problem is this. On a standard
conception of content, spatio-temporally distinct experiences and experiences had by distinct subjects may differ in content
despite the fact that they are phenomenally indistinguishable. But this undermines the thesis that phenomenal character determines
content. I argue that the two problems can be solved by applying a version of an idea from David Chalmers, which is to recognize
the existence of genuinely centered properties in the content of perceptual experience. 相似文献
Relativism offers an ingenious way of accommodating most of our intuitions about ‘know’: the truth-value of sentences containing ‘know’ is a function of parameters determined by a context of use and a context of assessment. This sort of double-indexing provides a more adequate account of the linguistic data involving ‘know’ than does standard contextualism. However, relativism has come under recent attack: it supposedly cannot account for the factivity of ‘know’, and it entails, counterintuitively, that circumstances of evaluation have features that cannot be shifted by any intensional operator. I offer replies to these objections on behalf of the relativist. I then argue that a version of contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds. 相似文献
It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived from other experiences such as bodily sensation, inner awareness, sensory perception, memory, and imagination. On this basis, we argue that dogmatism about emotional justification is an untenable position, regardless of whether the special feature of an immediate justifier that makes it an immediate justifier is its presentational phenomenology or its evidence insensitivity. 相似文献
Disabling tinnitus in 27 patients was treated in an experimental setting with two different types of therapy aiming at the development of coping behaviour. One was focused on behavioural control procedures, while the other aimed at more cognitive control methods such as distraction. The results of the two forms of therapy were compared with each other and with observations of the untreated control subjects. Assessments of subjective loudness, discomfort from tinnitus and controllability were made on analogue scales and at a questionnaire follow-up. Psychoacoustic measures such as personal loudness units (PLU) were used in connection with these self-recordings and for evaluation of treatment effects. The results confirmed favourable reports on behavioural methods in tinnitus. However, no differences were found between therapies. The results are discussed in the light of the coping and adaptation theory. 相似文献
The purpose of this study was to examine the relations between various aspects of social support and maternal and infant outcome variables in a group of families having infants showing food refusal compared to a control group. In the case of early food refusal, the results indicated that access to emotional support and satisfaction with support were related to maternal psychosomatic health. The relationships were interpreted as showing that social support has moderating effects on negative outcomes of food refusal. 相似文献