Examining relations among attachment, religiosity, and new age spirituality using the Adult Attachment Interview

This study was the first to examine relations between attachment and religion-spirituality in adults using a developmentally validated attachment assessment, the Adult Attachment Interview. Security of attachment was expected to be linked to a religiosity-spirituality that is socially based on the parental relationships and reflects extrapolation of attachment experiences with sensitive parents to perceived relationships with a loving God. Insecurity of attachment was expected to be related to religiosity- spirituality via emotional compensation for states of insecurity. Participants (N=84; 40% men; mean age=29 years) were drawn from religious-spiritual groups. Religiousness-spirituality was assessed with questionnaires. Results generally supported the hypotheses (ps<.05). Estimates of parental loving were linked to socially based religiosity, loving God images, and gradual religious changes occurring at early ages and in life contexts indicating a positive influence of close relationships. Estimates of parental rejection and role reversal were related to New Age spirituality and sudden-intense religious changes occurring in life contexts of turmoil. Current attachment state of mind was generally unrelated to traditional religiosity, but current preoccupation, unresolved- disorganized, and cannot classify states were associated with New Age spirituality.     

A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE

The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended‐mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. This type of view was defended, for example, by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. After drawing this distinction and clarifying the notions of causal influence and constitution, I defend the second weaker hypothesis with respect to procedural knowledge and knowledge of action and show why this sort of view supports what we might call a ‘situationist‐friendly virtue epistemology’.     

Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem

The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge. Lewis has suggestedthat contextualism so construed can be used both to ward off the skeptic and tosolve the Gettier problem. A person knows P, he says, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the domain of `every' is determinedby the context. Lewis provides a list of rules that can tell us, for a given context,which not-P possibilities must be eliminated and which can properly be ignored.But his account entails, counterintuitively, that knowledge can truly be attributedeven to a person in a Gettier situation provided only that the attributor is ignorantof the fact that the person is gettiered. It has been criticized on those grounds byS. Cohen. In this paper I shall argue that most other forms of contextualism sufferthe same fate as Lewis's. The allies of contextualism haven't yet shown us whethercontextualism can succeed in maintaining a notion of ordinary knowledge whileresisting the absurdity that knowledge can be a matter of sheer good luck. At theend of the paper I shall suggest a possible solution to the problem by showing howCohen's line of criticism leads to a modified conception of what sort of justificationa belief must have to count as knowledge in ordinary contexts.     

Risk Perception,Worry and Satisfaction Related to Genetic Counseling for Hereditary Cancer

In this multi center study, genetic counseling for hereditary cancer was evaluated by assessing patients’ worry, perceived risk of developing cancer and satisfaction with genetic counseling. An overall aim was to identify characteristics of vulnerable patients in order to customize genetic counseling. In addition, agreement between patients’ and counselors’ scores was measured. A total of 275 Norwegian patients were consecutively recruited, and 213 completed questionnaires before and after genetic counseling. Patients’ perceived risk decreased after the genetic counseling session. There was incongruence between risk perception expressed as a percentage and in words. Patients were significantly less worried after counseling. Higher levels of worry were predicted by low instrumental satisfaction with counseling, high degree of perceived risk of developing cancer and younger age. In conclusion, counselors met the patients’ psychological needs to a satisfactory degree during counseling. However, patients did not fully understand their risk of developing cancer.     

Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.     

Emotional support from parents early in life, aging, and health

The purpose of this study is to estimate the relationship between receiving emotional support from parents early in life and an individual's health in adulthood. Analysis of data from a nationally representative sample of adults ages 25-74 years suggests that a lack of parental support during childhood is associated with increased levels of depressive symptoms and chronic conditions in adulthood. These associations between early parental support and adult health persist with increasing age throughout adulthood. Personal control, self-esteem, and social relationships during adulthood account for a large portion of these long-term associations. These findings underscore the importance of adopting a life course perspective in studying the social determinants of health among adults.