Attachment,religiousness, and distress among the religious and spiritual: links between religious syncretism and compensation

Using the Adult Attachment Interview, we explored differences in attachment, distress, and religiousness among groups of traditionally religious, New Age spiritual, and religiously syncretistic (high on both) participants (Ps) (N?=?75). Religiously syncretistic Ps showed a preponderance of insecure attachment and were raised by non-religious parents, who were estimated as relatively insensitive. Moreover, religiously syncretistic Ps perceived a personal relationship with God and had experienced increased religiousness/spirituality during difficult life periods, but did not suffer elevated distress. New Agers often mirrored the religiously syncretistic, but had a more even secure–insecure attachment distribution, typically did not perceive a personal relationship with God, and did suffer elevated distress. Traditionally religious Ps were low on distress and raised by religious parents, estimated as relatively sensitive. We conclude that religious syncretism may often express religion/spirituality as compensation. Finally, we speculate that a perceived relationship with God may attenuate distress among those at risk.     

Remarks on counterpossibles

Since the publication of David Lewis’ Counterfactuals, the standard line on subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents (or counterpossibles) has been that they are vacuously true. That is, a conditional of the form ‘If p were the case, q would be the case’ is trivially true whenever the antecedent, p, is impossible. The primary justification is that Lewis’ semantics best approximates the English subjunctive conditional, and that a vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification derives from the classical lore than if an impossibility were true, then anything goes. In this paper we defend non-vacuism, the view that counterpossibles are sometimes non-vacuously true and sometimes non-vacuously false. We do so while retaining a Lewisian semantics, which is to say, the approach we favor does not require us to abandon classical logic or a similarity semantics. It does however require us to countenance impossible worlds. An impossible worlds treatment of counterpossibles is suggested (but not defended) by Lewis (Counterfactuals. Blackwell, Oxford, 1973), and developed by Nolan (Notre Dame J Formal Logic 38:325–527, 1997), Kment (Mind 115:261–310, 2006a: Philos Perspect 20:237–302, 2006b), and Vander Laan (In: Jackson F, Priest G (eds) Lewisian themes. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). We follow this tradition, and develop an account of comparative similarity for impossible worlds.     

Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?

David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action‐related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception‐related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for perception with a tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. The combination excluded by the tripartite division is the possibility of conscious vision for action. But are there good grounds for concluding that there is no conscious vision for action? There is now overwhelming evidence that illusions and perceived size can have a significant effect on action ( Bruno & Franz, 2009 ; Dassonville & Bala, 2004 ; Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008 ; McIntosh & Lashley, 2008 ). There is also suggestive evidence that any sophisticated visual behavior requires collaboration between the two visual streams at every stage of the process ( Schenk & McIntosh, 2010 ). I nonetheless want to make a case for the tripartite division between unconscious vision for action, conscious vision for perception, and unconscious vision for perception. My aim here is not to refute the evidence showing that conscious vision can affect action but rather to argue (a) that we cannot gain cognitive access to action‐guiding dorsal stream representations, and (b) that these representations do not correlate with phenomenal consciousness. This vindicates the semi‐conservative view that the dissociation hypothesis is best understood as a tripartite division.     

MORAL CONTEXTUALISM AND MORAL RELATIVISM

Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like 'right' and 'wrong'. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can account for the same data as relativism without relativizing sentence truth to contexts of assessment. This version of moral contextualism is thus preferable to relativism on methodological grounds.     

Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem

The contextualist epistemological theories proposed by David Lewis and othersoffer a view of knowledge which awards a central role to the contexts ofknowledge attributions. Such contexts are held to determine how strong anepistemic position must be in order to count as knowledge. Lewis has suggestedthat contextualism so construed can be used both to ward off the skeptic and tosolve the Gettier problem. A person knows P, he says, just in case her evidenceeliminates every possibility that not-P, where the domain of `every' is determinedby the context. Lewis provides a list of rules that can tell us, for a given context,which not-P possibilities must be eliminated and which can properly be ignored.But his account entails, counterintuitively, that knowledge can truly be attributedeven to a person in a Gettier situation provided only that the attributor is ignorantof the fact that the person is gettiered. It has been criticized on those grounds byS. Cohen. In this paper I shall argue that most other forms of contextualism sufferthe same fate as Lewis's. The allies of contextualism haven't yet shown us whethercontextualism can succeed in maintaining a notion of ordinary knowledge whileresisting the absurdity that knowledge can be a matter of sheer good luck. At theend of the paper I shall suggest a possible solution to the problem by showing howCohen's line of criticism leads to a modified conception of what sort of justificationa belief must have to count as knowledge in ordinary contexts.     

The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ Argument, and The Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts

Russell’s new theory of denoting phrases introduced in “On Denoting” in Mind 1905 is now a paradigm of analytic philosophy. The main argument for Russell’s new theory is the so-called ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument, which purports to show that the theory of denoting concepts (analogous to Frege’s theory of senses) promoted by Russell in the 1903 Principles of Mathematics is incoherent. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument rests on the premise that if a denoting concept occurs in a proposition, then the proposition is not about the concept. I argue that the premise is false. The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument does not exhaust Russell’s ammunition against the theory of denoting concepts. Another reason Russell rejects the theory is, as he says, that it cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts. In the last section of the paper, I argue that even though Russell was right in thinking that the theory of denoting concepts cannot provide an adequate account of non-uniquely denoting concepts, Russell’s new theory does not succeed in eliminating the occurrence of all denoting concepts, as it requires a commitment to the existence of variables that indirectly denote their values. However, the view that variables are denoting concepts is unproblematic once the ‘Gray’s Elegy’ argument is blocked.     

Interaction between mother and pre-term infant at 34 weeks post-conceptional age

The impact of premature birth and perinatal medical status on early mother–infant interaction was assessed in 75 dyads with pre-term infants divided into three groups. Infants' gestational age at birth and need for neonatal intensive care intervention differentiated the groups: group 1, 23–31 weeks with intensive care; group 2, 32–35 weeks with intensive care; group 3, 32–35 weeks with no intensive care. The methodological approach was based on observations of the dyads performed when the infant reached a post. conceptional age of 34 weeks (4 weeks before estimated due date of delivery). The observations were conducted in the neonatal nursery during cleaning, face-to-face and feeding interactions. Significant group differences were found in infant distress, maternal sensitivity to the infant and dyadic behaviours of positive interaction. Group 1 dyads showed higher scores or more desirable performance than dyads of group 3. Group 2 dyads usually achieved intermediate scores and performed better than dyads of group 3, especially during the feeding situation. We suggest that, in addition to a possible emergence of maternal compensatory mechanisms in the higher-risk groups, the amount of dyadic experience after birth affects the quality of mother–infant interaction at this early stage.     

Implicit biases in visually guided action

For almost half a century dual-stream advocates have vigorously defended the view that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in the primary visual cortex: a ventral, perception-related ‘conscious’ stream and a dorsal, action-related ‘unconscious’ stream. They furthermore maintain that the perceptual and memory systems in the ventral stream are relatively shielded from the action system in the dorsal stream. In recent years, this view has come under scrutiny. Evidence points to two overlapping action pathways: a dorso-dorsal pathway that calculates features of the object to be acted on, and a ventro-dorsal pathway that transmits stored information about skilled object use from the ventral stream to the dorso-dorsal pathway. This evidence suggests that stored information may exert significantly more influence on visually guided action than hitherto assumed. I argue that this, in turn, supports the notion of skilled automatic action that is nonetheless agential. My focus here will be on actions influenced by implicit biases (stereotypes/prejudices). Action that is biased in this way, I argue, is in an important sense intentional and agential.

     

Psychometric properties and standardised data for questionnaires measuring negative affect, dispositional style and daily hassles. A nation-wide sample

Within the behavioral field, self-report inventories measuring emotional condition from a state/trait perspective are in frequent use. Some of these measures have insufficient standardisation and/or are out of date. In order to upgrade some of the frequently used self-report inventories a nation-wide survey ( N =2500) was performed. Measures of negative affect (state-anxiety STAI-S , trait-anger STAS-T ), and depression ( CES-D ), dispositional style ( LOT ) and daily hassles ( DH ) were examined. Psychometric data and demographic differences for all the inventories used are presented. The reliability measures for the scales show high consistency, ranging from 0.76 to 0.95 (Cronbach's alpha). The overall results indicate that females are more hassled, depressed, anxious, hostile, and have a more negative dispositional style than males. These results are most pronounced among younger females.