Eyewitness accuracy and confidence: within- versus between-subjects correlations

Previous researchers using between-subjects comparisons have found eyewitness confidence and accuracy to be only negligibly correlated. In this study, we examined the predictive power of confidence in within-subject terms. Ninety-six subjects answered, and made confidence ratings for, a series of questions about a crime they witnessed. The average between-subjects and within-subject accuracy-confidence correlations were comparably low: r = .14 (p less than .001) and r = .17 (p less than .001), respectively. Confidence is neither a useful predictor of the accuracy of a particular witness nor of the accuracy of particular statements made by the same witness. Another possible predictor of accuracy, response latency, correlated only negligibly with accuracy (r = -.09 within subjects), but more strongly with confidence (r = -.27 within subjects). This pattern was obtained for both between-subjects and within-subject comparisons. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

Conceptualizations of valence and instrumentality: A fourfold model

Within the framework of valence-instrumentality (VI) theory, a fourfold model is developed to predict the contribution which is made by one outcome of an alternative to the valence of that alternative. The proposed model uses four subjective conditional probabilities which are based on the presence and absence of an alternative, and on the occurrence and nonoccurrence of an outcome. Valence is defined as the difference between the attractiveness values of the occurrence of an alternative (or an outcome) and the nonoccurrence of an alternative (or an outcome). Also, differences between subjective probabilities replace instrumentalities. Alternative valence-instrumentality formulations are analyzed in relation to the proposed fourfold model. The proposed model can be understood as a consistent application of Vroom's model (1964, Work and motivation, New York: Wiley), while other models are judged to be relatively deficient. The fourfold model, in combination with a matrix formulation of expectancy concepts, addresses a number of criticisms of VI theory and makes possible a test of the theory within the limits of its own assumptions.     

Delayed recognition memory for orientation by human infants

The familiarization/novelty preference paradigm was employed to study the effect of a delay (between the end of the familiarization phase and the beginning of the test phase) on discrimination of the orientation of square-wave gratings by 2- and 3-month-old human infants. Three stimulus pairs were studied: horizontal-vertical, non-mirror-image obliques, and mirror-image obliques. The data indicate that the members of the oblique-oblique stimulus pairs are confused in memory to a greater extent than the members of the horizontal-vertical stimulus pair. These findings are consistent with P.C. Bomba's (1984, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 37, 609-636) recent report that infants respond to the orientation of a visual stimulus in a categorical-like manner.     

Patients' perceptions of treatment for kidney failure: The impact of personal experience on population predictions

Estimates of the probability of various outcomes associated with treatment for kidney failure were made by chronic dialysis patients, dialysis patients awaiting transplant, successful transplant patients, and unsuccessful transplant patients back on dialysis. The latter two groups can be considered a natural experiment testing the impact of personal experience on population predictions. Consistent with the law of small numbers and the availability heuristic, successful transplant patients gave higher estimates of the population success rate for transplantation than unsuccessful transplant patients gave.     

Excuse inference modification in children and adults

The ability of first- and third-grade children and college adults to make excuse inferences about a speaker's use of an utterance and to modify those inferences appropriately upon receiving later information was examined in four experiments. Short stories containing an utterance by a speaker were read aloud. Utterances in the story were preceded by contextual information that suggested either that the speaker was truthful or making an excuse. Utterances were followed by information that confirmed or disconfirmed the excuse interpretation. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that even first and third graders can make excuse inferences, but these children rarely modify these interpretations upon receiving disconfirming information. In Experiments 2–4 possible reasons for the children's interpretive inflexibility were examined by varying the difficulty of relating the excuse interpretation and succeeding information. Results suggested processing difficulty, as well as an interpretive “set,” contributed to the children's inflexibility.