Motivating exercise: The interactive effect of general action goals and past behavior on physical activity

Although exercise is recognized as a powerful tool to combat obesity, remarkably few US adults pursue adequate amounts of exercise, with one major impediment being a lack of motivation for active behaviors. Recent empirical work has demonstrated that behavior can be guided by goals to be generally active or inactive. In the present paper, an experiment is presented in which participants played or observed a video game, were primed with action or inaction goals, and practiced a stretching exercise for as long as desired. Exposure to environmental action cues led to increased time spent exercising. This effect was moderated by past behavior, such that individuals who had just engaged in an active task (played a videogame) were insensitive to attempts to motivate general action. This suggests that the effectiveness of attempts to motivate activity (??just do it??, ??be active??) hinges on the recent past-behavior of the targeted individuals. An implication of this work is that participation in certain leisure activities, such as playing videogames, may be causally related to a lack of motivation for exercise.     

La generalización del entrenamiento en las técnicas de evaluación del potencial de aprendizaje

Resumen

Dos cuestiones parecen ser las que requieren mayor investigación actualmente en el contexto de las técnicas de potencial de aprendizaje: los efectos diferenciales, en distintos tipos de sujetos, del entrenamiento suministrado y la posibilidad de generalización del entrenamiento en el tiempo y a otras tareas.

Se presentan una serie de investigaciones llevadas a cabo con el objeto de analizar estas cuestiones en sujetos de 10 a 15 años con distintos niveles intelectuales; todas ellas se han centrado en la técnica EPA: evaluación del potencial de aprendizaje, que utiliza material tipo Raven en sus entrenamientos.

Los resultados muestran la especificidad del entrenamiento suministrado aunque aparecen diferencias significativas en la generalización entre sujetos con y sin alteraciones orgánicas.     

What do people mean when speaking of evilness?

The term evilness started to become popular in social psychology after the publication in 1999 of the special issue edited by Arthur G. Miller, "Perspectives on evil and violence". It is usually used to define behaviors that are extremely and strongly harmful. However, the concept is still imprecise and needs to be empirically delineated. This article attempts to answer the following questions. What is evilness? What is the difference between aggression and evilness? We conducted several studies with three goals: to analyze how laypersons and experts define evilness, to verify whether laypeople distinguish between different intensities of evilness, and to determine the dimensions that predict aggression and evilness. The results offer preliminary answers to the three questions.     

Supererogation,optionality and cost

A familiar part of debates about supererogatory actions concerns the role that cost should play. Two camps have emerged: one claiming that extreme cost is a necessary condition for when (and why) an action is supererogatory, while the other denies that it should be part of our definition of supererogation. In this paper, I propose an alternative position. I argue that it is comparative cost that is central to the supererogatory and that it is needed to explain a feature that all accounts agree is central to the very notion of supererogation: optionality. Perhaps because of this agreement on its importance, few attempts have been made to clarify and explain the notion of optionality. I argue that giving an account of the optionality of supererogatory requires drawing a line between doing the bare minimum permissible and going beyond the bare minimum and that this line ought to be drawn based on comparative cost of alternative permissible acts. Having outlined my account and motivated it, I discuss and reject two concerns that might be raised: firstly, that it is extreme cost, not comparative cost, that matters and, secondly, that in fact no cost is needed for an act to be supererogatory.