Protecting Nature for the Sake of Human Beings

It is often assumed that to say that nature should be protected for the sake of human beings just is to say that it should be protected because it is a means to one or more anthropocentric ends. I argue that this assumption is false. In some contexts, claims that a particular natural X should be protected for our sakes mean that X should be protected, not because it is a means to anthropocentric ends, but because it is part of something about human life that is of value: because, that is, its value is anthropocentric and constitutive rather than anthropocentric and instrumental. It follows, I suggest, that one does not need to endorse the non‐anthropocentric claim that nature should be protected for its own sake in order to challenge the instrumentalist notion that it should be protected simply because it is a means to anthropocentric ends (as, say, a provider of ecosystem services). To make my case, I consider the UK Government's failed attempt to sell off England's publicly‐owned forests.     

Textbooks for teaching the anthropology of religion: a review

Written from the perspective of those who teach the anthropology of religion, the paper reviews a selection of texts commonly used in teaching. The authors find the texts are generally useful, although those written clearly and with good cross-referencing detail (index, bibliography, overviews) are the most helpful. One major finding is the range of views over what might constitute 'textbook’ - itself a fairly contested term more widely.     

Emergent verbal behavior in preschool children learning a second language

We evaluated the emergence of untaught second‐language skills following directly taught listener and intraverbal responses. Three preschool children were taught first‐language (English) listener responses (e.g., “Point to the horse”) and second‐language (Welsh) intraverbal responses (e.g., “What is horse in Welsh?” [ceffyl]). After intervention, increases in untaught second‐language tacts (e.g., “What is this in Welsh?” [ceffyl]) and listener responses (e.g., “Point to the ceffyl”) were observed for all 3 participants.     

Generalisation of fear and avoidance along a semantic continuum

Directly conditioned fear and avoidance readily generalises to dissimilar but conceptually related stimuli. Here, for the first time, we examined the conceptual/semantic generalisation of both fear and avoidance using real words (synonyms). Participants were first exposed to a differential fear conditioning procedure in which one word (e.g., “broth”; CS+) was followed with brief electric shock [unconditioned stimulus (US)] and another was not (e.g., “assist”; CS–). Next, an instrumental conditioning phase taught avoidance in the presence the CS+ but not the CS–. During generalisation testing, synonyms of the CS+ (e.g., “soup”; GCS+) and CS– (e.g., “help”; GCS–) were presented in the absence of shock. Conditioned fear and avoidance, measured via skin conductance responses, behavioural avoidance and US expectancy ratings, generalised to the semantically related, but not to the semantically unrelated, synonyms. Findings have implications for how natural language categories and concepts mediate the expansion of fear and avoidance repertoires in clinical contexts.     

Top-down social modulation of interpersonal observation–execution

Cyclical upper limb movement can involuntarily deviate from its primary movement axis when the performer concurrently observes incongruent biological motion (i.e. interpersonal observation–execution). The current study examined the social modulation of such involuntary motor interference using a protocol that reflected everyday social interactions encountered in a naturalistic social setting. Eighteen participants executed cyclical horizontal arm movements during the observation of horizontal (congruent) or curvilinear (incongruent) biological motion. Both prior to, and during the interpersonal observation–execution task, participants also received a series of social words designed to prime a pro-social or anti-social attitude. The results showed greater orthogonal movement deviation, and thus interference, for the curvilinear compared to horizontal stimuli. Importantly, and opposite to most of the previous findings from work on automatic imitation and mimicry, there was a greater interference effect for the anti-social compared to pro-social prime condition. These findings demonstrate the importance of interpreting the context of social primes, and strongly support predictions of a comparison between the prime construct and the self-concept/-schema and the top-down response modulation of social incentives.