Perception,Judgment and Individuation: Towards a Metaphysics of Particularity

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to develop a new theory of particularity. In so doing it redefines the concepts ‘perception’ and ‘judgment’. The redefinition occurs once perception is understood as recognition. The move to recognition entails the centrality of repetition. Recognition, it is argued, is a form of repetition. Allowing for repetition necessitates changing the way the relationship between universals and particulars is understood. This is developed via an engagement with Hume and Plato. The article concludes with the outline for a rethinking of the metaphysics of particularity.     

Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability

We challenge a line of thinking at the fore of recent work on epistemic value: the line (suggested by Kvanvig in The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding, 2003 and others) that if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of mere true belief, then we have good reason to doubt its theoretical importance in epistemology. We offer a value-driven argument for the theoretical importance of knowledge—one that stands even if the value of knowledge is “swamped” by the value of true belief. Specifically, we contend that even if knowledge itself has no special epistemic value, its relationship to other items of value—cognitive abilities—gives ample reason to locate the concept at the very core of epistemology.     

The Wandering IQ: A Continuation

The hypothesis addressed in this study was that for every experimental condition, learning with awareness would occur. An experiment was conducted with use of a collating task that incorporated the awareness question into the design investigating the change in performance quality and quantity. Statistical evaluation of Dulany's awareness questionnaire suggested general unawareness of attempted verbal operant conditioning. There is some evidence suggesting that an actual change in performance quality and quantity is accompanied by awareness with use of operant conditioning procedures.     

Target Meaning-Making of Workplace Incivility Based on Perceived Personality Similarity with Perpetrators

Abstract

Target meaning-making of incivility (i.e., the ways targets assess uncivil events) has received attention as an important mediating mechanism in explaining the varied outcomes of incivility. The present study draws on person-environment (PE) fit theory, as well as the similarity-attraction paradigm and repulsion hypothesis, to uncover how perceived personality (dis)similarity affects both cognitive (i.e., attribution, negative appraisal) and emotional reactions (i.e., hostility) to incivility. Specifically, we examine whether incongruence between target personality and perceived perpetrator personality worsens target meaning-making (vice versa for personality congruence). Study 1 (N?=?479 employees) addressed (dis)similarity in agreeableness, while Study 2 (N?=?296 working adults) addressed (dis)similarity in neuroticism. Based on polynomial regressions with response surface modeling, the results generally supported the hypotheses. Along the line of dissimilarity, targets often assessed (i.e., attributed intent to, appraised, reacted emotionally to) uncivil events more negatively when they perceived personality dissimilarity with perpetrators. However, similarity in personality did not always have the opposite effect by buffering against negative assessments; meaning-making was worse when both parties scored high on neuroticism. Implications for workplace incivility and PE fit literatures are discussed, along with practical implications that highlight information elaboration and perspective taking.     

A SIMPLICIAL DESIGN FOR THE ANALYSIS OF CORRELATIONAL LEARNING DATA

The usual matrix of intercorrelations among trials in a study of the learning process produces a superdiagonal matrix with resulting factors which are uninteresting: viz, a factor for the early trials and a factor for the later trials; with perhaps also a factor for the middle trials. By introducing several independent measures of learning for each trial a more meaningful factor structure can be obtained.     

Knowledge: Value on the Cheap

We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To a first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is that of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being true. The Secondary Value Problem is one of understanding how, for instance, the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are continuing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth.     

Prism Exposure Aftereffects and Direct Effects for Different Movement and Feedback Times

The effects of movement time and time to visual feedback (feedback time) on prism exposure aftereffects and direct effects were studied. In Experiment 1, the participants' (N = 60) pointing limb became visible early in the movement (.2-s feedback time, and eye-head aftereffects increased with increasing movement time (.5 to 3.0 s), but larger hand-head aftereffects showed little change. Direct effects (terminal error during exposure) showed near-perfect compensation for the prismatic displacement (11.4 diopters) when movement time was short but decreasing compensation with longer movement times. In Experiment 2, participants' (N = 48) eye-head aftereffects increased and their larger hand-head aftereffects decreased with increasing movement time (2.0 and 3.0 s), especially when feedback time increased (.25 and 1.5 s). Direct effects showed increasing overcompensation for longer movement and feedback times. Those results suggest that aftereffects and direct effects measure distinct adaptive processes, namely, spatial realignment and strategic control, respectively. Differences in movement and feedback times evoke different eye -hand coordination strategies and consequent direct effects. Realignment aftereffects also depend upon the coordination strategy deployed, but not all strategies support realignment. Moreover, realignment is transparent to strategic control and, when added to strategic correction, may produce nonadaptive performance.     

Effects on Prism Adaptation of Duration and Timing of Visual Feedback During Pointing

In two experiments, we investigated the effects of duration of visual feedback of the pointing limb and the time (early to late) in the movement when the limb first becomes visible (timing of visual feedback). Timing, rather than duration of visual feedback, proved to have the greater effect on the relative magnitude of visual and proprioceptive adaptation. Visual adaptation increased smoothly with feedback delay, but corresponding decreases in proprioceptive adaptation underwent an additional sharp change when feedback was delayed until about three-fourths of the way to the terminal limb position. These results are consistent with the idea that visual and proprioceptive adaptation are mediated by exclusive processes. Change in the limb position sense (i.e., proprioceptive adaptation) may be produced by visual guidance of the pointing limb, and view of the limb early in the pointing movement seems to be critical for such visual guidance. The limb may be ballistically “released“ as it nears the terminal position, and, thereafter, any opportunity for visual guidance (i.e., view of the limb) is not effective. On the other hand, change in the eye position sense (i.e., visual adaptation) may be mediated by proprioceptive guidance of the eye; the eyes may track the imaged position of the nonvisible limb. Such proprioceptive guidance seems to be solely a function of the distance moved before the limb becomes visible.