No two entities without identity

In a naïve realist approach to reading an ontology off the models of a physical theory, the invariance of a given theory under permutations of its property-bearing objects entails the existence of distinct possible worlds from amongst which the theory cannot choose. A brand of Ontic Structural Realism (OSR) attempts to avoid this consequence by denying that objects possess primitive identity, and thus worlds with property values permuted amongst those objects are really one and the same world. Assuming that any successful ontology of objects is able to describe a universe containing a determinate number of them, I argue that no version of OSR which both retains objects and understands ‘structure’ in terms of relations can be successful. This follows from the fact that no set of relational facts is sufficient to fix the cardinality of the collection of objects implied by those facts. More broadly, I offer reasons to believe that no version of OSR is compatible with the existence of objects, no matter how ontologically derivative they are taken to be. Any such account would have to attribute a definite cardinality to a collection of objects while denying that those objects are possessed of a primitive identity. With no compelling reason to abandon the classical conception of cardinality, such an attribution is incoherent.     

Defection in the dark? A randomized‐response investigation of cooperativeness in social dilemma games

As previous research has demonstrated numerous times, humans show a robust tendency for cooperation. However, part—or indeed all—of this cooperativeness may be due to socially desirable responding. To address this problem, we propose and apply a new approach for the unbiased measurement of cooperativeness in social dilemma games. Specifically, we employ an extension of the randomized‐response technique (RRT). The RRT protects the privacy of respondents by adding random noise to their responses. It thus encourages more honest responding and thereby provides less biased estimates of sensitive attributes. In a large‐scale study with 2043 respondents we maximized anonymity in a one‐shot prisoner's dilemma game through use of the RRT. Comparing the prevalence rates for cooperation obtained via the RRT with those from direct self‐report showed that traditional direct questioning formats overestimate cooperation rates, with a relative bias of 18%. This finding suggests that to a considerable extent, self‐reported cooperation is due to socially desirable responding, rather than actual cooperativeness. However, our results also demonstrate that cooperation remains substantial even under conditions of maximized anonymity. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of age and divided attention on spontaneous recognition

Studies of recognition typically involve tests in which the participant’s memory for a stimulus is directly questioned. There are occasions however, in which memory occurs more spontaneously (e.g., an acquaintance seeming familiar out of context). Spontaneous recognition was investigated in a novel paradigm involving study of pictures and words followed by recognition judgments on stimuli with an old or new word superimposed over an old or new picture. Participants were instructed to make their recognition decision on either the picture or word and to ignore the distracting stimulus. Spontaneous recognition was measured as the influence of old vs. new distracters on target recognition. Across two experiments, older adults and younger adults placed under divided-attention showed a greater tendency to spontaneously recognize old distracters as compared to full-attention younger adults. The occurrence of spontaneous recognition is discussed in relation to ability to constrain retrieval to goal-relevant information.     

The effects of proactive interference (PI) and release from PI on judgments of learning

In three experiments, we investigated metacognitive monitoring in a variant of an A–B A–C learning paradigm in which the repetition of cues, but not targets, led to increasing proactive interference (PI) across trials. Judgments of learning (JOLs) correctly predicted decreases across trials in this paradigm but incorrectly continued to predict decreases on a final release trial in which new cues were introduced and performance consequently increased. Experience with the paradigm did not ameliorate this metacognitive failure (Experiment 3). In addition, JOLs decreased equally for pairs with repeated and with novel cue terms, even though recall of the latter group of items did not decrease across trials (Experiment 2). These results suggest that metacognizers’ naïve theories of remembering and forgetting include a role for global, but not cue-specific, interference.     

Cantankerous creativity: Honesty-Humility, Agreeableness, and the HEXACO structure of creative achievement

Creativity research has suggested that creative people are low in agreeableness. To explore this issue, we applied the HEXACO model of personality structure, which offers an expanded representation of interpersonal traits, particularly a distinction between Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness. A sample of 1304 adults completed the HEXACO-60 and several measures of creative achievement and activities. Latent variable models found that Agreeableness had no relationship with creativity, but Honesty-Humility did: people lower in Honesty-Humility had higher creativity scores, consistent with past work on arrogance and pretentiousness among creative people.     

Seeking the boundary of boundary extension

Boundary extension (BE) is a remarkably consistent visual memory error in which participants remember seeing a more wide-angle image of a scene than was actually viewed (Intraub & Richardson, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 15:179–187, 1989). Multiple stimulus factors are thought to contribute to the occurrence of BE, including object recognition, conceptual knowledge of scenes, and amodal perception at the view boundaries (Intraub, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 3:117–127, 2012). In the present study, we used abstract scenes instead of images of the real world, in order to remove expectations based on semantic associations with objects and the schematic context of the view. Close-angle and wide-angle scenes were created using irregular geometric shapes rated by independent observers as lacking any easily recognizable structure. The abstract objects were tested on either a random-dot or a blank background in order to assess the influence of implied continuation of the image beyond its boundaries. The random-dot background conditions had background occlusion cues either present or absent at the image border, in order to test their influence on BE in the absence of high-level information about the scenes. The results indicate that high-level information about objects and schematic context is unnecessary for BE to occur, and that occlusion information at the image boundary also has little influence on BE. Contrary to previous studies, we also found clear BE for all conditions, despite using scenes depicting undetailed objects on a blank white background. The results highlighted the ubiquitous nature of BE and the adaptability of scene perception processes.     

The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.     

Time,space, and memory for order

Information about the order of items in a sequence can be conveyed either spatially or temporally. In the present investigation, we examined whether these different modes of presentation map onto compatible mental representations of serial order. We examined this issue in three immediate serial-recall experiments, in which participants recalled lists of letters in the temporal order in which they had appeared. Each letter in a to-be-remembered sequence was presented in a unique spatial position, with the order of these spatial positions progressing from either left to right or right to left. In this way, the visually presented lists contained both temporal and spatial order information. Recall of the temporal order information was more accurate with congruent spatial order information—that is, when the letters progressed from left to right, following the typical reading direction of English—than when the spatial order information was incongruent. These results suggest compatible representations of serial order when sequences are conveyed spatially and temporally.     

Domain‐specific development of face memory but not face perception

How does the remarkable human ability for face recognition arise over development? Competing theories have proposed either late maturity (beyond 10 years) or early maturity (before 5 years), but have not distinguished between perceptual and memory aspects of face recognition. Here, we demonstrate a perception–memory dissociation. We compare rate of development for (adult, human) faces versus other social stimuli (bodies), other discrete objects (cars), and other categories processed in discrete brain regions (scenes, bodies), from 5 years to adulthood. For perceptual discrimination, performance improved with age at the same rate for faces and all other categories, indicating no domain‐specific development. In contrast, face memory increased more strongly than non‐face memory, indicating domain‐specific development. The results imply that each theory is partly true: the late maturity theory holds for face memory, and the early maturity theory for face perception.     

On the classification of diseases

Identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for individuating and classifying diseases is a matter of great importance in the fields of law, ethics, epidemiology, and of course, medicine. In this paper, I first propose a means of achieving this goal, ensuring that no two distinct disease-types could correctly be ascribed to the same disease-token. I then posit a metaphysical ontology of diseases—that is, I give an account of what a disease is. This is essential to providing the most effective means of interfering with disease processes. Following existing work in the philosophy of medicine and epidemiology (primarily Christopher Boorse; Caroline Whitbeck; Alexander Broadbent), philosophy of biology (Joseph LaPorte; D.L. Hull), conditional analyses of causation (J.L. Mackie; David Lewis), and recent literature on dispositional essentialism (Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum; Alexander Bird), I endorse a dispositional conception of disease. Following discussion of various conceptions of disease-identity, their relations to the clinical and pathological effects of the diseases in question, and how diseases are treated, I conclude (i) that diseases should be individuated by their causes, and (ii) that diseases are causal processes best seen as simultaneously acting sequences of mutually manifesting dispositions.