Seeking the boundary of boundary extension

Boundary extension (BE) is a remarkably consistent visual memory error in which participants remember seeing a more wide-angle image of a scene than was actually viewed (Intraub & Richardson, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 15:179–187, 1989). Multiple stimulus factors are thought to contribute to the occurrence of BE, including object recognition, conceptual knowledge of scenes, and amodal perception at the view boundaries (Intraub, Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 3:117–127, 2012). In the present study, we used abstract scenes instead of images of the real world, in order to remove expectations based on semantic associations with objects and the schematic context of the view. Close-angle and wide-angle scenes were created using irregular geometric shapes rated by independent observers as lacking any easily recognizable structure. The abstract objects were tested on either a random-dot or a blank background in order to assess the influence of implied continuation of the image beyond its boundaries. The random-dot background conditions had background occlusion cues either present or absent at the image border, in order to test their influence on BE in the absence of high-level information about the scenes. The results indicate that high-level information about objects and schematic context is unnecessary for BE to occur, and that occlusion information at the image boundary also has little influence on BE. Contrary to previous studies, we also found clear BE for all conditions, despite using scenes depicting undetailed objects on a blank white background. The results highlighted the ubiquitous nature of BE and the adaptability of scene perception processes.     

The impact of subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing tree approach

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.     

Time,space, and memory for order

Information about the order of items in a sequence can be conveyed either spatially or temporally. In the present investigation, we examined whether these different modes of presentation map onto compatible mental representations of serial order. We examined this issue in three immediate serial-recall experiments, in which participants recalled lists of letters in the temporal order in which they had appeared. Each letter in a to-be-remembered sequence was presented in a unique spatial position, with the order of these spatial positions progressing from either left to right or right to left. In this way, the visually presented lists contained both temporal and spatial order information. Recall of the temporal order information was more accurate with congruent spatial order information—that is, when the letters progressed from left to right, following the typical reading direction of English—than when the spatial order information was incongruent. These results suggest compatible representations of serial order when sequences are conveyed spatially and temporally.     

Domain‐specific development of face memory but not face perception

How does the remarkable human ability for face recognition arise over development? Competing theories have proposed either late maturity (beyond 10 years) or early maturity (before 5 years), but have not distinguished between perceptual and memory aspects of face recognition. Here, we demonstrate a perception–memory dissociation. We compare rate of development for (adult, human) faces versus other social stimuli (bodies), other discrete objects (cars), and other categories processed in discrete brain regions (scenes, bodies), from 5 years to adulthood. For perceptual discrimination, performance improved with age at the same rate for faces and all other categories, indicating no domain‐specific development. In contrast, face memory increased more strongly than non‐face memory, indicating domain‐specific development. The results imply that each theory is partly true: the late maturity theory holds for face memory, and the early maturity theory for face perception.     

On the classification of diseases

Identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for individuating and classifying diseases is a matter of great importance in the fields of law, ethics, epidemiology, and of course, medicine. In this paper, I first propose a means of achieving this goal, ensuring that no two distinct disease-types could correctly be ascribed to the same disease-token. I then posit a metaphysical ontology of diseases—that is, I give an account of what a disease is. This is essential to providing the most effective means of interfering with disease processes. Following existing work in the philosophy of medicine and epidemiology (primarily Christopher Boorse; Caroline Whitbeck; Alexander Broadbent), philosophy of biology (Joseph LaPorte; D.L. Hull), conditional analyses of causation (J.L. Mackie; David Lewis), and recent literature on dispositional essentialism (Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum; Alexander Bird), I endorse a dispositional conception of disease. Following discussion of various conceptions of disease-identity, their relations to the clinical and pathological effects of the diseases in question, and how diseases are treated, I conclude (i) that diseases should be individuated by their causes, and (ii) that diseases are causal processes best seen as simultaneously acting sequences of mutually manifesting dispositions.     

Stress Mediates the Within-Person Longitudinal Associations Between Depression and Different Anxiety Syndromes in Youth

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - Depressive symptoms predict within-person change in physical symptoms of anxiety and social anxiety symptoms; however, potential mediators of...     

Do Trust-Based Beliefs Mediate the Associations of Frequency of Private Prayer with Mental Health? A Cross-Sectional Study

Significant associations of private prayer with mental health have been found, while mechanisms underlying these associations are largely unknown. This cross-sectional online study (N = 325, age 35.74, SD 18.50, 77.5 % females) used path modeling to test if trust-based beliefs (whether, when, and how prayers are answered) mediated the associations of prayer frequency with the Anxiety, Confusion, and Depression Profile of Mood States-Short Form scales. The association of prayer and depression was fully mediated by trust-based beliefs; associations with anxiety and confusion were partially mediated. Further, the interaction of prayer frequency by stress was associated with anxiety.     

Social Dominance and the Cultural Politics of Immigration

We argue that conflict over immigration largely concerns who bears the burden of cultural transaction costs, which we define as the costs associated with overcoming cultural barriers (e.g., language) to social exchange. Our framework suggests that the ability of native‐born citizens to push cultural transaction costs onto immigrant out‐groups serves as an important expression of social dominance. In two novel studies, we demonstrate that social dominance motives condition emotional responses to encountering cultural transaction costs, shape engagement in cultural accommodation behavior toward immigrants, and affect immigration attitudes and policy preferences.     

Children Use Temporal Cues to Learn Causal Directionality

The ability to learn the direction of causal relations is critical for understanding and acting in the world. We investigated how children learn causal directionality in situations in which the states of variables are temporally dependent (i.e., autocorrelated). In Experiment 1, children learned about causal direction by comparing the states of one variable before versus after an intervention on another variable. In Experiment 2, children reliably inferred causal directionality merely from observing how two variables change over time; they interpreted Y changing without a change in X as evidence that Y does not influence X. Both of these strategies make sense if one believes the variables to be temporally dependent. We discuss the implications of these results for interpreting previous findings. More broadly, given that many real‐world environments are characterized by temporal dependency, these results suggest strategies that children may use to learn the causal structure of their environments.