Domain‐specific development of face memory but not face perception

How does the remarkable human ability for face recognition arise over development? Competing theories have proposed either late maturity (beyond 10 years) or early maturity (before 5 years), but have not distinguished between perceptual and memory aspects of face recognition. Here, we demonstrate a perception–memory dissociation. We compare rate of development for (adult, human) faces versus other social stimuli (bodies), other discrete objects (cars), and other categories processed in discrete brain regions (scenes, bodies), from 5 years to adulthood. For perceptual discrimination, performance improved with age at the same rate for faces and all other categories, indicating no domain‐specific development. In contrast, face memory increased more strongly than non‐face memory, indicating domain‐specific development. The results imply that each theory is partly true: the late maturity theory holds for face memory, and the early maturity theory for face perception.     

On the classification of diseases

Identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for individuating and classifying diseases is a matter of great importance in the fields of law, ethics, epidemiology, and of course, medicine. In this paper, I first propose a means of achieving this goal, ensuring that no two distinct disease-types could correctly be ascribed to the same disease-token. I then posit a metaphysical ontology of diseases—that is, I give an account of what a disease is. This is essential to providing the most effective means of interfering with disease processes. Following existing work in the philosophy of medicine and epidemiology (primarily Christopher Boorse; Caroline Whitbeck; Alexander Broadbent), philosophy of biology (Joseph LaPorte; D.L. Hull), conditional analyses of causation (J.L. Mackie; David Lewis), and recent literature on dispositional essentialism (Stephen Mumford and Rani Anjum; Alexander Bird), I endorse a dispositional conception of disease. Following discussion of various conceptions of disease-identity, their relations to the clinical and pathological effects of the diseases in question, and how diseases are treated, I conclude (i) that diseases should be individuated by their causes, and (ii) that diseases are causal processes best seen as simultaneously acting sequences of mutually manifesting dispositions.     

Lunacy and Scepticism: Notes on the Logic of Doubt Concerning the Existence of an External World

This article develops a logical (or semantic) response to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Specifically, it is argued that any doubt about the existence of an external world can be proved to be false, but whatever appears to be doubt about the existence of an external world that cannot be proved to be false is nonsense, insofar as it must rely on the assertion of something that is logically impossible. The article further suggests that both G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein worked towards the same solution but left their work unfinished.

     

Stress Mediates the Within-Person Longitudinal Associations Between Depression and Different Anxiety Syndromes in Youth

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - Depressive symptoms predict within-person change in physical symptoms of anxiety and social anxiety symptoms; however, potential mediators of...     

Do Trust-Based Beliefs Mediate the Associations of Frequency of Private Prayer with Mental Health? A Cross-Sectional Study

Significant associations of private prayer with mental health have been found, while mechanisms underlying these associations are largely unknown. This cross-sectional online study (N = 325, age 35.74, SD 18.50, 77.5 % females) used path modeling to test if trust-based beliefs (whether, when, and how prayers are answered) mediated the associations of prayer frequency with the Anxiety, Confusion, and Depression Profile of Mood States-Short Form scales. The association of prayer and depression was fully mediated by trust-based beliefs; associations with anxiety and confusion were partially mediated. Further, the interaction of prayer frequency by stress was associated with anxiety.     

Social Dominance and the Cultural Politics of Immigration

We argue that conflict over immigration largely concerns who bears the burden of cultural transaction costs, which we define as the costs associated with overcoming cultural barriers (e.g., language) to social exchange. Our framework suggests that the ability of native‐born citizens to push cultural transaction costs onto immigrant out‐groups serves as an important expression of social dominance. In two novel studies, we demonstrate that social dominance motives condition emotional responses to encountering cultural transaction costs, shape engagement in cultural accommodation behavior toward immigrants, and affect immigration attitudes and policy preferences.     

We are made,not born: Empiricism is existentially useful

The perennial “nativist-empiricist” debate in developmental science has far-reaching relevance in our existence. Two studies conducted under the terror management framework tested whether the empiricist developmental conception serves distal defensive purposes. Experiment 1 highlights the palliative existential effect of the empiricist conception since participants who read an empiricist essay exhibited less death thoughts than participants who read a nativist essay or a control essay. Experiment 2 gives support to the distal defensive function of the empiricist conception by showing that, unlike with the nativist or the control essay, people under mortality salience exhibited a higher need to rely on empiricism than participants in the control pain condition. The existential advantage of empiricism is explained by the fact that human development is shaped by a meaningful cultural blueprint. Our results are discussed in terms of the ontological and existential benefits of contemplating human intrinsic identity, ranging from its biology to its social behaviors as primarily influenced by the cultural environment.     

Children Use Temporal Cues to Learn Causal Directionality

The ability to learn the direction of causal relations is critical for understanding and acting in the world. We investigated how children learn causal directionality in situations in which the states of variables are temporally dependent (i.e., autocorrelated). In Experiment 1, children learned about causal direction by comparing the states of one variable before versus after an intervention on another variable. In Experiment 2, children reliably inferred causal directionality merely from observing how two variables change over time; they interpreted Y changing without a change in X as evidence that Y does not influence X. Both of these strategies make sense if one believes the variables to be temporally dependent. We discuss the implications of these results for interpreting previous findings. More broadly, given that many real‐world environments are characterized by temporal dependency, these results suggest strategies that children may use to learn the causal structure of their environments.     

Influence of emotional valence and arousal on the spread of activation in memory

Controversy still persists on whether emotional valence and arousal influence cognitive activities. Our study sought to compare how these two factors foster the spread of activation within the semantic network. In a lexical decision task, prime words were varied depending on the valence (pleasant or unpleasant) or on the level of emotional arousal (high or low). Target words were carefully selected to avoid semantic priming effects, as well as to avoid arousing specific emotions (neutral). Three SOA durations (220, 420 and 720 ms) were applied across three independent groups. Results indicate that at 220 ms, the effect of arousal is significantly higher than the effect of valence in facilitating spreading activation while at 420 ms, the effect of valence is significantly higher than the effect of arousal in facilitating spreading activation. These findings suggest that affect is a sequential process involving the successive intervention of arousal and valence.