Looking ahead from age 6 to 13: A deeper insight into the development of planning ability

Planning ability gradually increases throughout childhood. However, it remains unknown whether this is attributable to global factors such as an increased ability and willingness to inhibit premature, impulsive responding, or due to the availability of specific planning operations, such as being able to mentally plan ahead more steps (‘search depth’) or to derive a clear temporal order of goals by the task layout (‘goal hierarchy’). Here, we studied the development of planning ability with respect to these global and problem‐specific aspects (search depth and goal hierarchy) of performance in 178 children from 6 to 13 years using the Tower of London task. As expected, global performance gradually developed with age. In accordance, planning durations increasingly reflected global problem demands with longer pre‐planning in harder problems. Furthermore, specific planning parameters revealed that children were increasingly capable of mentally searching ahead more steps. In contrast, the ability to derive a goal hierarchy did not show age‐related changes. While the global development of planning performance and adaptive planning durations were proposed to primarily reflect enhanced self‐monitoring, the specific increase in search depth across childhood that most likely proceeds until young adult age represents more directly planning‐related processes. Thus, development of planning ability is supported by multiple contributions.     

Deduction and definability in infinite statistical systems

Synthese - Classical accounts of intertheoretic reduction involve two pieces: first, the new terms of the higher-level theory must be definable from the terms of the lower-level theory, and second,...     

The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

Strawsonians about moral responsibility often claim that our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, rather than the other way round. Many have argued that such ‘reversal’ claims have an unwelcome consequence: If our practices of holding morally responsible fix the facts of moral responsibility, does this not imply, absurdly, that if we held severely mentally ill people responsible, they would be responsible? We provide a new Strawsonian answer to this question, and we explore the relation between reversal claims and (in)compatibilism.     

The Faulty Magnitude Detector: Why SNARC‐Like Tasks Cannot Support a Generalized Magnitude System

Do people represent space, time, number, and other conceptual domains using a generalized magnitude system (GMS)? To answer this question, numerous studies have used the spatial‐numerical association of response codes (SNARC) task and its variants. Yet, for a combination of reasons, SNARC‐like effects cannot provide evidence for a GMS, even in principle. Rather, these effects support a broader theory of how people use space metaphorically to scaffold their understanding of myriad non‐spatial domains, whether or not these domains exhibit variation in magnitude.