The American Psychological Association's response to Brown v. Board of Education. The case of Kenneth B. Clark

In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court struck down the "separate but equal" doctrine of the Plessy v. Ferguson decision (1896) that was the foundation of school segregation in 17 states and the District of Columbia. Brown is arguably the most important Supreme Court decision of the 20th century in terms of its influence on American history. Moreover, it has a special significance for psychology because it marked the first time that psychological research was cited in a Supreme Court decision and because social science data were seen as paramount in the Court's decision to end school segregation. This article describes psychologist Kenneth B. Clark's role in that case and the response of the American Psychological Association to scientific psychology's moment in a great spotlight.     

Waxing and waning in concert: dynamic comorbidity of conduct disorder with other disruptive and emotional problems over 7 years among clinic-referred boys

Six waves of structured diagnostic assessments were conducted of 168 clinic-referred 7- to 12-year-olds, over 7 years. Wave-to-wave changes in the number of conduct disorder (CD) behaviors were paralleled by correlated changes in the numbers of symptoms of oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), depression, and anxiety. In addition, CD in Wave 1 predicted levels of ODD, ADHD, depression, and anxiety in later waves when initial levels of those symptoms were controlled, but only ODD in Wave 1 predicted CD in later waves when initial CD levels were controlled. These findings indicate a striking degree of dynamic comorbidity between CD and other types of psychopathology and provide an initial empirical framework for needed developmental models of comorbidity.     

contents Volume 108, 2002

Volume Contents

contents Volume 108, 2002     

Integration and representation in rats' serial pattern learning in the T-maze

Rats were exposed to three-trial series consisting of reinforced (R) trials and one nonreinforced (N) trial in a fixed order, RRN and RNR (Experiments 1 and 2) or NRR and RRN (Experiment 3), on extended visually distinct runways in a T-maze. When initially presented with the same sequence on each series in a session (separate presentations) with the same runway on all trials within a series (Experiments 1 and 3), all the rats developed slower running speeds on N than on R trials. When a runway was sometimes changed between the first and next two trials during separate presentations training (Experiment 2) or both sequences were later intermixed within each session in each experiment, only rats exposed to each sequence on a specific runway maintained these serial running patterns. Rats displayed serial running patterns on a test RNN sequence similar to that on the RNR sequence (Experiment 2), as would be predicted by an intertrial association model of serial pattern learning (Capaldi & Molina, 1979), but responded on test RRR and NRN sequences (Experiment 3) as would be predicted by an ordinal-trial-tag/intratrial association model (Burns, Wiley, & Payne, 1986). Results from test series of free-choice trials in Experiments 1 and 2 failed to support a prediction of the intratrial association model that these rats would integrate RRN and RNR sequences. Rather than always selecting a baited runway on both the second and the third free-choice trials, the rats only selected a baited runway on the third trial on the basis of their choice on the second trial, as would be predicted by the intertrial association model. Only after experiencing all possible outcome sequences during forced-choice training in Experiment 3 did these rats predominantly select a baited runway on every free-choice trial.     

Groups to Resolve Conflicts Between Groups: Diplomacy with a Therapeutic Dimension

The group self, an individual's self-perception as a member of a group, is distinguished from the group's self, a personification of the group as a person with a self. The perceived group's self of an opposing other group is often a repository for attributes group members are not ready to recognize in their own group's self. Theoretically, the need for an adversarial other to hold one's own group's unwanted attributes—and thus to complete one's own group's self—contributes, however unconsciously, to the apparent intractability of intergroup disputes. In dealing with these issues, I compare intergroup conflict resolution (ICR) groups with therapy groups, on the one hand, and advocacy groups on the other. All of this sets the stage for a presentation of two ICR projects and their analysis in group-developmental terms.     

Action-based and vision-based selection of input: Two sources of control

In the first part of this paper we review evidence suggesting that there exists a mechanism that selects input on the basis of its similarity to the required action. This response-based input selection differs from the more established space- and object-based input selection in that it is not constrained by the structure of the input. Our evidence suggests that the two-choice Stroop effect is caused by this response-based selection mechanism. By contrast, it is known that the flanker effect is determined by the space- and object- based selection mechanisms. We explore whether the conflict resolution of the Stroop and flanker tasks is different as well by embedding these two tasks in a PRP (Psychological Refractory Period) paradigm. We show that the Stroop and the PRP effects are additive whereas the flanker and the PRP effects are underadditive, suggesting that the processes in charge of the conflict resolution in the Stroop and the flanker tasks are indeed different. We discuss possible reasons for this difference, and discuss possible ways in which the response-based mechanism can be implemented in information processing models.     

A neural correlate of consciousness related to repression

In previous research Libet (1966) discovered that a critical time period for neural activation is necessary in order for a stimulus to become conscious. This necessary time period varies from subject to subject. In this current study, six subjects for whom the time for neural activation of consciousness had been previously determined were administered a battery of psychological tests on the basis of which ratings were made of degree of repressiveness. As hypothesized, repressive subjects had a longer critical time period for neural activation of consciousness, suggesting the possibility that this neurophysiological time factor is a necessary condition for the development of repression.     

Dissociating familiarity from recollection in human recognition memory: Different rates of forgetting over short retention intervals

Two functionally distinct forms of recognition memory have been identified in human and nonhuman species—the ability to recollect qualitative information about previous events, and the ability to differentiate between familiar and novel stimuli. Separate dual-process theories have been developed in the animal and human literatures to account for these findings. However, it is not clear whether these theories describe the same two underlying memory processes. On the basis of animal studies of medial temporal lobe function, familiarity is expected to exhibit disproportionately fast forgetting compared with recollection over short retention intervals. We tested this prediction in healthy human subjects by examining recognition forgetting rates across a range of 8–32 intervening items and found significant forgetting in the accuracy of familiarity-based discriminations and no evidence of forgetting in the accuracy of recollection-based discriminations. In agreement with the results from nonhuman species, the present results indicate that item familiarity decreases more rapidly than recollection over short retention intervals.     

A systems approach to the cellular analysis of associative learning in the pond snail Lymnaea

We show that appetitive and aversive conditioning can be analyzed at the cellular level in the well-described neural circuitries underlying rhythmic feeding and respiration in the pond snail, Lymnaea stagnalis. To relate electrical changes directly to behavior, the snails were first trained and the neural changes recorded at multiple sites in reduced preparations made from the same animals. Changes in neural activity following conditioning could be recorded at the level of motoneurons, central pattern generator interneurons and modulatory neurons. Of significant interest was recent work showing that neural correlates of long-term memory could be recorded in the feeding network following single-trial appetitive chemical conditioning. Available information on the synaptic connectivity and transmitter content of identified neurons within the Lymnaea circuits will allow further work on the synaptic and molecular mechanisms of learning and memory.     

Key Word Index Volume 4

Other Index

Key Word Index Volume 4