Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal? A Reply to Zimmerman

According to Michael Zimmerman, no interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal captures a significant truth. He raises several worries about the Strawsonian view that moral responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes and claims that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. He outlines three problems. First, the existence of self-reactive attitudes may be incompatible with the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility. Secondly, Zimmerman questions the significance of the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility, according to the Strawsonian view. Thirdly, he argues that that view may be taken to suggest the wrong kind of priority relation between ‘P is morally responsible’ and ‘it is appropriate to adopt some reactive attitude toward P’. I discuss each of these problems in turn and conclude that Strawsonians can respond to all three problems raised by Zimmerman. The Strawsonian view supports a significant interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal.     

Relationship Education for Military Couples: Recommendations for Best Practice

Military couples have a number of distinctive strengths and challenges that are likely to influence their relationship adjustment. Military couples' strengths include stable employment, financial security, and subsidized health and counseling services. At the same time, military couples often experience long periods of separation and associated difficulties with emotional disconnect, trauma symptoms, and reintegrating the family. This paper describes best practice recommendations for working with military couples, including: addressing the distinctive challenges of the military lifestyle, ensuring program delivery is seen as relevant by military couples, and providing relationship education in formats that enhance the accessibility of programs.     

Aversive functions of response effort: Fact or artifact?

Historically, effort has been viewed as aversive. Most supporting evidence comes from studies demonstrating increased force/effort requirements reduce operant responding. Changes in force/effort requirements, however, are often accompanied by changes in response definition when mechanical devices are used to define the response. As a consequence, responses measured at one point in a study may go unmeasured at other points. In an alternative approach, we used a continuous measurement strategy that provided a means to fix the threshold force defining the response class and simultaneously allowed independent manipulation of the force criteria required to produce reinforcement. Rats pressed a force transducer according to a fixed‐ratio 5 schedule of food delivery. The criterion force was systematically increased and decreased; the threshold for response detection was constant. When response rates included only criterion responses, overall rate decreased when force requirements increased. By contrast, when all responses, both those meeting force criteria and those that did not (above the threshold but below the criteria for reinforcement) were included in the rate calculation, increases in force increased response rate. Increases in force criteria also increased the maximum force (g) and time‐integral of force (g‐s) of operant behavior. Control conditions showed increases in responding could be explained by the emergence of subcriterion responses, irrespective of force. We conclude that prior results showing effort decreases response rates are due to an artifact arising from inadvertent changes in response definitions. Increases in effort may better be understood as changes in the response:reinforcer payoff owing to the emergence of a subcriterion response class.     

Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity

Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that—contrary to popular opinion—permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. I conclude with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist.     

Physician Bayesian updating from personal beliefs about the base rate and likelihood ratio

Whether humans can accurately make decisions in line with Bayes’ rule has been one of the most important yet contentious topics in cognitive psychology. Though a number of paradigms have been used for studying Bayesian updating, rarely have subjects been allowed to use their own preexisting beliefs about the prior and the likelihood. A study is reported in which physicians judged the posttest probability of a diagnosis for a patient vignette after receiving a test result, and the physicians’ posttest judgments were compared to the normative posttest calculated from their own beliefs in the sensitivity and false positive rate of the test (likelihood ratio) and prior probability of the diagnosis. On the one hand, the posttest judgments were strongly related to the physicians’ beliefs about both the prior probability as well as the likelihood ratio, and the priors were used considerably more strongly than in previous research. On the other hand, both the prior and the likelihoods were still not used quite as much as they should have been, and there was evidence of other nonnormative aspects to the updating, such as updating independent of the likelihood beliefs. By focusing on how physicians use their own prior beliefs for Bayesian updating, this study provides insight into how well experts perform probabilistic inference in settings in which they rely upon their own prior beliefs rather than experimenter-provided cues. It suggests that there is reason to be optimistic about experts’ abilities, but that there is still considerable need for improvement.     

Screening for Specific Language Impairment in Preschool Children: Evaluating a Screening Procedure Including the Token Test

Specific language impairment (SLI) comprises impairments in receptive and/or expressive language. Aim of this study was to evaluate a screening for SLI. 61 children with SLI (SLI-children, age-range 4–6 years) and 61 matched typically developing controls were tested for receptive language ability (Token Test—TT) and for intelligence (Wechsler Preschool-and-Primary-Scale-of-Intelligence—WPPSI). Group differences were analyzed using t tests, as well as direct and stepwise discriminant analyses. The predictive value of the WPPSI with respect to TT performance was analyzed using regression analyses. SLI-children performed significantly worse on both TT and WPPSI (\(p \le .0001\)). The TT alone yielded an overall classification rate of 79%, the TT and the WPPSI together yielded an overall classification rate of 80%. TT performance was significantly predicted by verbal intelligence in SLI-children and nonverbal intelligence in controls whilst WPPSI subtest arithmetic was predictive in both groups. Without further research, the Token Test cannot be seen as a valid and sufficient tool for the screening of SLI in preschool children but rather as a tool for the assessment of more general intellectual capacities. SLI-children at this age already show impairments typically associated with SLI which indicates the necessity of early developmental support or training. Token Test performance is possibly an indicator for a more general developmental factor rather than an exclusive indicator for language difficulties.     

Emotion dysregulation and threat-related attention bias variability

Although theory suggests that a bias for attending to threat information (ABT) may be a biobehavioral process underlying the transdiagnostic vulnerability factor of emotion dysregulation, there is a paucity of empirical evidence showing direct associations between emotion dysregulation and ABT. The purpose of the present study was to examine the relation between ABT and emotion dysregulation. Participants (N?=?200) completed a battery of self-report questionnaires and a modified dot-probe task with both neutral and threat stimuli and four stimulus presentation durations. Task response times were used to examine traditionally calculated ABT scores, as well as attention bias variability (ABV). As predicted, those with greater emotion dysregulation exhibited greater ABV. Importantly, emotion dysregulation was not associated with response time variability on trials for which only neutral stimuli were presented, thus increasing confidence that emotion dysregulation-related ABV is specific to the presence of threat stimuli and not merely a function of general variability in response times. Results suggest that those with greater emotion dysregulation exhibit attentional dyscontrol in the presence of perceived threat that is characterized by dynamic shifts between vigilance and avoidance.     

Trait anger,neuroticism, and the hostile reaction to provocation: examining the hierarchical organization of affective traits in context

It has been suggested that the broad trait of neuroticism may predict the tendency to become aggressive when provoked. Based on functionalist theories of emotion, however, we suspected that only the more specific trait of anger would predict such tendencies. To test these competing predictions, two laboratory studies and one daily diary study were conducted. Consistent with functionalist accounts, trait anger consistently predicted the angry emotional and aggressive behavioral response to provocation, even after controlling for neuroticism. This was true in relation to laboratory-based provocations and in provocations experienced in daily life. Neuroticism only predicted a more diverse negative emotional reaction. It is therefore proposed that trait anger clearly elicits an angry emotional response, which directly motivates aggressive behavior. By contrast, neuroticism may lead to a very diverse reaction which elicits different and even contradictory behavioral tendencies.     

Wittgenstein and Objectivity in Ethics: A Reply to Brandhorst

In “Correspondence to Reality in Ethics”, Mario Brandhorst examines the view of ethics that Wittgenstein took in his later years. According to Brandhorst, Wittgenstein leaves room for truth and falsity, facts, correspondence and reality in ethics. Wittgenstein's target, argues Brandhorst, is objectivity. I argue (i) that Brandhorst's arguments in favour of truth, facts, reality and correspondence in ethics invite similar arguments in favour of objectivity, (ii) that Brandhorst does not recognise this because his conception of objectivity is distorted by a Platonist picture and (iii) that he misinterprets the passage which he takes to support a Wittgensteinian case against objectivity.