Remindings influence the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli

Remindings—stimulus-guided retrievals of prior events—may help us interpret ambiguous events by linking the current situation to relevant prior experiences. Evidence suggests that remindings play an important role in interpreting complex ambiguous stimuli (Ross & Bradshaw Memory & Cognition, 22, 591–605, 1994); here, we evaluate whether remindings will influence word interpretation and memory in a new paradigm. Learners studied words on distinct visual backgrounds and generated a sentence for each word. Homographs were preceded by a biasing cue on the same background three items earlier, preceded by a biasing cue on a different background three items earlier, or followed by a biasing cue on the same background three items later. When biasing cues preceded the homographs on the same backgrounds as the homographs, the meanings of the homographs in learner-generated sentences were consistent with the biasing cues more often than in the other two conditions. These results show that remindings can influence word interpretation. In addition, later memory for the homographs and cues was greater when the meaning of the homograph in the sentence was consistent with the earlier biasing cue, suggesting that remindings enhanced mnemonic performance. Remindings play an important role in how we interpret ambiguous stimuli and enhance memory for the involved material.     

Active versus passive maintenance of visual nonverbal memory

Forgetting over the short term has challenged researchers for more than a century, largely because of the difficulty of controlling what goes on within the memory retention interval. But the “recent-negative-probe” procedure offers a valuable paradigm, by examining the influences of (presumably) unattended memoranda from prior trials. Here we used a recent-probe task to investigate forgetting for visual nonverbal short-term memory. The target stimuli (two visually presented abstract shapes) on a trial were followed after a retention interval by a probe, and participants indicated whether the probe matched one of the target items. Proactive interference, and hence memory for old trial probes, was observed, whereby participants were slowed in rejecting a nonmatching probe on the current trial that nevertheless matched a target item on the previous trial (a recent-negative probe). The attraction of the paradigm is that, by uncovering proactive influences of past-trial probe stimuli, it can be argued that active maintenance in memory of those probes is unlikely. In two experiments, we recorded such proactive interference of prior-trial items over a range of interstimulus (ISI) and intertrial (ITI) intervals (between 1 and 6 s, respectively). Consistent with a proposed two-process memory conception (the active–passive memory model, or APM), actively maintained memories on current trials decayed, but passively “maintained,” or unattended, visual memories of stimuli on past trials did not.     

Detecting personal familiarity depends on static frames in “thin slices” of behavior

Brief glimpses of nonverbal behavior (or “thin slices”) offer ample visual information to make reliable judgments about individuals. Previous work has largely focused on the personality characteristics and traits of individuals; however, the nature of dyadic relationships (strangers, lovers, or friends) can also be determined (Ambady & Gray, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 947–961 2002). Judgments from thin slices are known to be accurate, but the motion features supporting accurate performance are unknown. We explored whether personal familiarity was detectable within the context of “thin slices” of genuine interaction, as well as the invariant properties of thin-slice recognition. In two experiments, participants sequentially viewed two 6-s silent videos on each trial of an individual interacting with an unfamiliar partner; the other depicted the same person interacting with a personally familiar partner. All sequences were cropped so that only the target individual was visible. In Experiment 1, participants viewed either the original sequences, reversed sequences, a static-image “slideshow” of the sequence, or a static-image slideshow with blank frames separating the images. In Experiment 2, all participants viewed the original sequences and clips played at either double speed or half speed. Participants’ performance was above chance in the forward and reverse conditions, but was significantly better in both the static-image slideshow conditions. When task speed was manipulated, we found a larger performance cost for fast than for slow videos. Detecting personal familiarity via spontaneous natural gestures depends on information in static images more than on face or body movement. Although static images are typically less important for recognizing nonverbal behavior, we argue they may be valuable for making familiarity judgments from thin slices.     

Emotion recognition (sometimes) depends on horizontal orientations

Face recognition depends critically on horizontal orientations (Goffaux & Dakin, Frontiers in Psychology, 1(143), 1–14, 2010): Face images that lack horizontal features are harder to recognize than those that have this information preserved. We asked whether facial emotional recognition also exhibits this dependency by asking observers to categorize orientation-filtered happy and sad expressions. Furthermore, we aimed to dissociate image-based orientation energy from object-based orientation by rotating images 90 deg in the picture plane. In our first experiment, we showed that the perception of emotional expression does depend on horizontal orientations, and that object-based orientation constrained performance more than image-based orientation did. In Experiment 2, we showed that mouth openness (i.e., open vs. closed mouths) also influenced the emotion-dependent reliance on horizontal information. Finally, we describe a simple computational analysis that demonstrates that the impact of mouth openness was not predicted by variation in the distribution of orientation energy across horizontal and vertical orientation bands. Overall, our results suggest that emotion recognition largely does depend on horizontal information defined relative to the face, but that this bias is modulated by multiple factors that introduce variation in appearance across and within distinct emotions.     

Examining the costs and benefits of inhibition in memory retrieval

Inhibitory control is thought to serve an adaptive function in controlling behavior, with individual differences predicting variation in numerous cognitive functions. However, inhibition is more properly construed as inducing both benefits and costs to performance. Benefits arise at the point when inhibition prevents expression of an unwanted or contextually inappropriate response; costs arise later, when access to the inhibited representation is required by other processes. Here we illustrate how failure to consider both the costs and benefits of inhibition has generated confusion in the literature on individual differences in cognitive control. Using retrieval-induced forgetting as a model case, we illustrate this by showing that changing the way that retrieval-induced forgetting is measured to allow greater expression of the benefits of inhibition together with the costs can reduce and even reverse the theoretically predicted correlation between motor and memory inhibition. Specifically, we show that when the final test in a retrieval-induced forgetting procedure employs item-specific cues (i.e., category-plus-stem cued recall and item-recognition) that better isolate the lingering costs of inhibition, better motor response inhibition (faster stop-signal reaction times) predicts greater retrieval-induced forgetting. In striking contrast, when the final test is less well controlled, allowing both the costs and benefits of inhibition to contribute, motor response inhibition has the opposite relationship with retrieval-induced forgetting. These findings underscore the importance of considering the correlated costs and benefits problem when studying individual differences in inhibitory control. More generally, they suggest that a shared inhibition mechanism may underlie people’s ability to control memories and actions.     

Infinitism and probabilistic justification

According to infinitism, beliefs can be justified by an infinite chain of reasons. So far, infinitism has rarely been taken seriously and often even dismissed as inconsistent. However, Peijnenburg and Atkinson have recently argued that beliefs can indeed be justified by an infinite chain of reasons, if justification is understood probabilistically. In the following, I will discuss the formal result that has led to this conclusion. I will then introduce three probabilistic explications of justification and examine to which extent they support Peijnenburg’s and Atkinson’s claim.     

Evaluation of Digital Drawing Tests and Paper-and-Pencil Drawing Tests for the Screening of Mild Cognitive Impairment and Dementia: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis of Diagnostic Studies

Neuropsychology Review - Digital drawing tests have been proposed for cognitive screening over the past decade. However, the diagnostic performance is still to clarify. The objective of this study...