Hypnotic experience and the autism spectrum disorder. A phenomenological investigation

In recent decades, the focus in autism research progressively expanded. It presently offers extensive material on sensorimotor disturbances as well as on perceptive-cognitive preferences of people with autism. The present article proposes not only a critical interpretation of the common theoretical framework in autism research but also focuses on certain experiences common to some people with autism and which can be appropriately understood by phenomenology. What I will call “hypnotic experiences” in autism are moments in which some individuals withdraw into intense sensorial and perceptive experiences. Following their examples, I use the term “hypnosis” primarily to describe a trance state in which the individuals become highly alert to and awake for an experience of a totally new kind. Through a close analysis of autobiographical writings from people with autism I defend the idea that the particularity of hypnotic experiences in autism consists in a certain qualitative shift within experience itself: what changes, in the hypnotic moments, is the way a person with autism relates to his/her own bodily experiences. If this qualitative shift is indeed difficult to account for within a reifying and intellectualist research perspective, phenomenology offers a large conceptual framework for understanding it. Phenomenology, and precisely, phenomenological psychopathology, will thus emerge as a major device in accounting for such “hypnotic experiences”. The argument mainly draws on the twofold structure of experience which is traditionally used in phenomenological research: it claims that in hypnotic experience people with autism are inclined to focus on non-reified “sensings”, “perceivings” and “movings”, and thus leave aside the object itself and any intentional reification of it. Finally, I will claim that this restriction to mere non-reified sensings might lead to a completely new conception of self and world. In the hypnotic experiences of autism, neither the subject nor the object come to a full-blown and independent existence. A thorough phenomenological analysis of hypnotic experience in autism therefore also has to face the question of a corresponding ontology of these experiences.     

Preference change and conservatism: comparing the Bayesian and the AGM models of preference revision

Richard Bradley’s Bayesian model of preference kinematics is compared with Sven Ove Hansson’s AGM-style model of preference revision. Both seek to model the revision of preference orders as a consequence of retaining consistency when some preferences change. Both models are often interpreted normatively, as giving advice on how an agent should revise her preferences. I raise four criticisms of the Bayesian model: it is unrealistic; it neglects an important change mechanism; it disregards endogenous information relevant to preference change, in particular about similarity and incompleteness; and its representational framework, when expanded with similarity comparisons, may give misleading advice. These criticisms are based on a principle of conservatism, and on two proposals of similarity metrics for the Bayesian model. The performance of the Bayesian model, with and without the similarity metrics, is then tested in three different cases of preference change, and compared to the performance of the AGM model.     

Differential roles of the frontal and parietal cortices in the control of saccades

Although externally as well as internally-guided eye movements allow us to flexibly explore the visual environment, their differential neural mechanisms remain elusive. A better understanding of these neural mechanisms will help us to understand the control of action and to elucidate the nature of cognitive deficits in certain psychiatric populations (e.g. schizophrenia) that show increased latencies in volitional but not visually-guided saccades. Both the superior precentral sulcus (sPCS) and the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) are implicated in the control of eye movements. However, it remains unknown what differential contributions the two areas make to the programming of visually-guided and internally-guided saccades. In this study we tested the hypotheses that sPCS and IPS distinctly encode internally-guided saccades and visually-guided saccades. We scanned subjects with fMRI while they generated visually-guided and internally-guided delayed saccades. We used multi-voxel pattern analysis to test whether patterns of cue related, preparatory and saccade related activation could be used to predict the direction of the planned eye movement. Results indicate that patterns in the human sPCS predicted internally-guided saccades but not visually-guided saccades in all trial periods and patterns in the IPS predicted internally-guided saccades and visually-guided saccades equally well. The results support the hypothesis that the human sPCS and IPS make distinct contributions to the control of volitional eye movements.     

Effects of cooperation and competition on responsibility attribution after success and failure

Pairs of Ss cooperated (Experiment I) or competed (Experiment II) in a response-matching task whose outcome either exceeded (Success condition), met (Neutral condition), or did not reach (Failure condition) a prior-established expected outcome level. Afterwards, Ss attributed responsibility for their outcomes. It was found under both cooperation and competition that neutral outcomes tended to produce situational attribution, and success produced self-attribution. However, failure produced partner attribution under cooperation but situational attribution under competition. The results were discussed from the standpoint of two general theories of responsibility attribution, the first emphasizing problem solving based on cues, and the second emphasizing motivational biases.     

The Interdisciplinarity of Collaborations in Cognitive Science

We introduce a new metric for interdisciplinarity, based on co‐author publication history. A published article that has co‐authors with quite different publication histories can be deemed relatively “interdisciplinary,” in that the article reflects a convergence of previous research in distinct sets of publication outlets. In recent work, we have shown that this interdisciplinarity metric can predict citations. Here, we show that the journal Cognitive Science tends to contain collaborations that are relatively high on this interdisciplinarity metric, at about the 80th percentile of all journals across both social and natural sciences. Following on Goldstone and Leydesdorff (2006), we describe how scientometric tools provide a valuable means of assessing the role of cognitive science in broader scientific work, and also as a tool to investigate teamwork and distributed cognition. We describe how data‐driven metrics of this kind may facilitate this exploration without relying upon rapidly changing discipline and topic keywords associated with publications.     

Skilled German Migrants and Their Motives for Migration Within Europe

German migration within Europe has so far received little attention from researchers. This is especially true of migrants with intermediate qualifications (vocational training, technical school, master craftsman’s certificate). The present contribution is devoted to this phenomenon and examines the reasons why people belonging to this particular group migrate. To do this we pick up on central theoretical arguments in migration research, on the basis of which we examine the relevance of economic and social factors for Germans who migrate within Europe. It emerges that, empirically, for Germans with intermediate qualifications, economic factors are crucial. In particular, unemployment, low or falling wages, as well as poor working conditions in Germany constitute important push factors, while job offers, higher wages and better working conditions in the destination countries constitute the main pull factors. In comparison, social networks are less important factors in migration, since only in a few cases did the interviewees have solid contacts abroad. The empirical results of the study are based on the analysis of available population statistics and 40 problem-centred, biographical interviews carried out between October 2006 and April 2007 in various regions of Germany (Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony, Berlin).     

Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics

In this introduction we discuss the motivation behind the workshop “Towards a New Epistemology of Mathematics” of which this special issue constitutes the proceedings. We elaborate on historical and empirical aspects of the desired new epistemology, connect it to the public image of mathematics, and give a summary and an introduction to the contributions to this issue.

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The explanatory potential of artificial societies

It is often claimed that artificial society simulations contribute to the explanation of social phenomena. At the hand of a particular example, this paper argues that artificial societies often cannot provide full explanations, because their models are not or cannot be validated. Despite that, many feel that such simulations somehow contribute to our understanding. This paper tries to clarify this intuition by investigating whether artificial societies provide potential explanations. It is shown that these potential explanations, if they contribute to our understanding, considerably differ from potential causal explanations. Instead of possible causal histories, simulations offer possible functional analyses of the explanandum. The paper discusses how these two kinds explanatory strategies differ, and how potential functional explanations can be appraised.