Psychophysical features of the transition from pure heat perception to heat pain perception

The psychophysical features of the transition from the pure heat to the heat pain range were studied in 25 healthy subjects (mean age 28.8 years). Thirty short heat stimuli from ?1.6° C to + 1.6° C relative to the pain threshold were applied to the thenar of the left hand with an apparatus containing a Peltier thermode (nine different temperatures at 0.4°C intervals). The subjects rated the sensation intensity on a visual analogue scale. The resulting stimulus/sensation intensity relations could be explained equally well (same goodness of fit) by a model with a power function (PF) and by a model with two linear regression lines (TLR), one for stimulus intensities below and one for those above the pain threshold and intersecting at the pain threshold. The slopes of the TLR model were significantly larger above the pain threshold than below it. The PF model produced exponents between 1.8 and 1.9. We conclude that to describe the transition area, it is sufficient to use simple linear models for both the pure heat and the heat pain ranges.     

The dependence of semantic relatedness effects upon prime processing

The semantic relationship between a prime and a target word has been shown to affect the speed at which the target word is processed. This series of experiments investigated how the semantic priming effect is influenced by the nature of the task performed on the prime word. Subjects were asked to perform either a naming or a letter-search task on the prime word and either a lexical-decision or color-naming task on the target word. When the primes were named, response times for the target words were facilitated in the lexical-decision task and inhibited in the color-naming task. However, these effects were eliminated or reduced to an insignificant level when the primes were searched for letters. We suggest that in order to produce the usual priming effect, the primes have to be processed for meaning rather than probed for constituents.     

Natural resources for morality: commentary

Loewy makes an extraordinary and audacious claim. He does not only reject virtue ethics, casuistry, the "Kantian injunction of respect for persons based on their capacity for self-legislation," and the utilitarian greatest good as possible groundings for clinical ethics. He even offers another grounding that he qualifies explicitly as "universally acceptable." Of course we have to analyze what it is that he offers. But prior to that, we must analyze what he means by "grounding." Grounding suggests an evidence that can neither be rationally grounded again nor rationally questioned but that other concepts can be rationally grounded upon. And it is at least doubtful whether the alternatives he quotes are groundings in that strict sense....     

Thou Shalt not Lie! Exploring and testing countermeasures against faking intentions and faking in selection interviews

Many applicants use faking in interviews to present themselves more favorably than they really are. There is widespread concern that this may affect interview validity. As previous research on countermeasures is sparse, we conducted an exploratory study to identify the most promising countermeasures. For technology-mediated interviews, these were warnings referring to a criterion-based content analysis and lie detection algorithms focusing on nonverbal or paraverbal cues. For face-to-face interviews, these were objective questions and a personable interviewer. We then investigated the effects of these countermeasures on faking intentions in two experimental vignette studies and on faking in another simulated interview study. However, none of the countermeasures could reduce faking intentions or faking. Additionally, in the vignette studies, warnings impaired applicant reactions.     

WHAT IS PHYSICALISM?

Although 'most contemporary analytic philosophers [endorse] a physicalist picture of the world' (A. Newen; V. Hoffmann; M. Esfeld, 'Preface to Mental Causation, Externalism and Self-Knowledge', Erkenntnis , 67 (2007), p. 147), it is unclear what exactly the physicalist thesis states. The response that physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical does not solve the problem but is a precise statement of the problem because 'the claim is hopelessly vague' (G. Hellman; F. Thompson, 'Physicalism: Ontology, Determination, and Reduction', Journal of Philosophy , 72 (1975), p. 552). I argue that physicalism in fact should be the thesis that every existing particular essentially exemplifies properties the exemplification of which does not conceptually entail the existence of conscious beings. Physicalism thus is a purely philosophical thesis with no intrinsic relation to physics. ¹