A measure of interrelationship for overlapping groups

A coefficient of interrelationship between overlapping groups that avoids indeterminacies inherent in the construction of fourfold tables for such purposes and, at the same time, is relatively insensitive to the absolute magnitude of marginal totals of fourfold tables, is developed. Under assumptions that are consistent with the objectives of organizational analysis, this coefficient is shown to be equivalent to a product-moment correlation coefficient. The advantages and limitations of this coefficient are pointed out. A numerical example giving computational procedures is presented.This measure was developed in connection with a study made by Dorothy C. Adkins (1). Her influence in the development was felt in many ways. The article was prepared while the author was employed at The University of North Carolina.     

Setiya on reasons and causes

Setiya [2013. “Causality in Action”. Analysis Reviews, 73 (3): pp. 512–525] recently gave a novel argument in favor of a causal theory of acting for a reason. He presents three principles relating acting for a reason to psychological states of the agent and uses them to test theories of acting for a reason: theories cannot explain the necessary truth of the conditionals are to be rejected. Surveying a number of alternatives, he finds that only a causal-psychological theory passes this test, that, thus, it must be correct, and that there must be a solution to the problem of deviant causation. Setiya's challenge is forceful, but he does not establish his conclusion. The anticausalist can at this point reverse it: since deviant causation is intractable, some noncausal theory must be able to meet his challenge. This reversal has teeth: Setiya underestimates both the challenges that causal theories face and the resources available to the anticausalist to address his challenge.     

Realistic affective forecasting: The role of personality

Affective forecasting often drives decision-making. Although affective forecasting research has often focused on identifying sources of error at the event level, the present investigation draws upon the “realistic paradigm” in seeking to identify factors that similarly influence predicted and actual emotions, explaining their concordance across individuals. We hypothesised that the personality traits neuroticism and extraversion would account for variation in both predicted and actual emotional reactions to a wide array of stimuli and events (football games, an election, Valentine's Day, birthdays, happy/sad film clips, and an intrusive interview). As hypothesised, individuals who were more introverted and neurotic anticipated, correctly, that they would experience relatively more unpleasant emotional reactions, and those who were more extraverted and less neurotic anticipated, correctly, that they would experience relatively more pleasant emotional reactions. Personality explained 30% of the concordance between predicted and actual emotional reactions. Findings suggest three purported personality processes implicated in affective forecasting, highlight the importance of individual-differences research in this domain, and call for more research on realistic affective forecasts.     

The most good you can do: a response to the commentaries

Anthony Skelton, Violetta Igneski and Tracy Isaacs share my view that our obligations to help people in extreme poverty go beyond what is conventionally accepted. Nevertheless, the other contributors argue that my view is too demanding, while noting some tensions between my different writings on this issue. I explain my position, drawing on Sidgwick’s distinction between what someone ought to do, and what we should praise or blame someone for doing or not doing. I also respond to the position that Skelton considers preferable to mine, drawing this time on an argument that Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and I have made in our recent book, The Point of View of the Universe. I also address Igneski’s concerns about gender inequality, and indicate my broad agreement with Isaacs’ suggestion that effective altruism could benefit from a more co-ordinated approach.     

The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition

The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top‐down influences (at all levels of the processing hierarchy), we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking a border between perception and cognition deploys a notion I call ‘stimulus‐control.’ Thus, rather than being a grab bag of unrelated kinds, the various categories of the perceptual are unified into a superordinate natural kind (mutatis mutandis for the complimentary categories of the cognitive).     

Correction to: Rational social and political polarization

Philosophical Studies - In the original publication of the article, the Acknowledgement section was inadvertently not included. The Acknowledgement is given in this Correction.     

Reverse evolution in nanoscale Cu-rich precipitates of an aged Fe–Cu alloy under electropulsing

Nanoscale Cu-rich precipitates (CRPs) are one of the most important microstructural nano-features responsible for embrittlement and hardening of reactor pressure vessels (RPVs), which threaten the safe operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) and hinder the lifetime extension of nuclear reactors. A thermally aged Fe-1.1 wt.%Cu alloy, which is used to simulate embrittlement of the irradiated RPV steels, was treated by electropulsing with various parameters. The effect of electropulsing on nanoscale CRPs was investigated by using transmission electron microscopy (TEM). Compared to the traditional heat treatment, the electropulsing treatment (EPT) can accelerate the dissolution of CRPs in an aged Fe-Cu alloy on account of the higher atomic drift flux and the additional Gibbs free energy induced by electropulsing. More importantly, EPT is likely to be a new way of eliminating irradiation-induced Cu-rich precipitates.     

Beyond Science Wars Redux: Feminist Philosophy of Science as Trustworthy Science Criticism

Bruno Latour is not the only scholar to reflect on his earlier contributions to science studies with some regret and resolve over climate skepticism and science denialism. Given the ascendency of merchants of doubt, should those who share Latour’s concerns join the scientists they study in circling the wagons, or is there a productive role still for science studies to question and critique scientists and scientific institutions? I argue for the latter, looking to postpositivist feminist philosophy as exemplified by Alison Wylie and Lynn Nelson, among others, as a guide. Feminist philosophers of science who ground their analysis in a detailed understanding of scientific practice are not science’s champions nor its antagonists, but they do stand in a distinct relationship to science. If not merchants of doubt, are they scientific gadflies or perhaps in scientific loyal opposition? Though these notions can underwrite useful approaches to science studies, neither captures the distinctive interdependency and interestedness of feminist philosophers and science. I suggest that we would be better served by the notion of trustworthy science criticism, building on the analyses of trust and trustworthiness by Annette Baier, among others, attendant to the dynamics of interdependency in trust relationships.     

Analysing political deception: The virtues of Bernard Williams' anti‐tyranny argument

According to Bernard Williams' “anti‐tyranny argument,” it is important for citizens to have access to true information about the exercise of political power in order to check the tendency of governments and politicians to become tyrannous. Although Williams thinks the argument is one of the better arguments for the importance of truthfulness in politics, he acknowledges 2 limitations. First, it appears to offer little more than the truism that tyranny is a bad thing—a truism that will be accepted by all but tyrants themselves. Second, it may not offer any reasons for the importance of true information about forms of political power, which do not seem tyrannous. I argue that kind of political analysis required to apply the anti‐tyranny argument enables it to overcome both limitations. In so doing, I show that it has a clear advantage over rival arguments for the importance of truthfulness in politics.