The emotional feeling as a combination of two qualia: A neurophilosophical-based emotion theory

It is argued that the emotional feeling comprises the following two emotional qualia. (1) A nucleus feeling or primary emotional quale, which is the phenomenological counterpart of the end product of appraisal by the central nervous system. (2) The experience of being urged to emotion-related reflection or secondary emotional quale, which is the phenomenological counterpart of the brain's decision to inhibit pre-programmed emotional behaviour, and to initiate emotion-related reflections. Different brain modules regulate these two qualia, and thus each can be experienced independently of the other. The primary emotional quale is related to activation of the amygdala, it is emotion specific, and neutral with respect to affect. The secondary emotional quale is related to activation of the orbito-prefrontal cortex (O-PFC), and includes affective aspects.

It is argued that emotional behaviour is regulated by the following three neural mechanisms, two of which two are directly related to the two qualia. (1) An evolutionary ancient system (amygdala-system), which comprises the amygdalae and subcortical nuclei, and which activates pre-programmed emotional behaviour. (2) An evolutionary recent system (PFC-system), comprising the prefrontal cortex, which inhibits pre-programmed emotional behaviour, activates emotional reflection, generates and evaluates behavioural alternatives. In contrast to the pre-programmed behaviour, the behavioural alternatives are more likely to serve long-term goals. (3) A default mechanism, which gives rise to default (i.e., “just do something”) behaviour. The first two systems are mutually competitive, while the third mechanism takes over if either the competition between the first two mechanisms, or the decision process of the PFC-system, takes too long. This default mechanism involves the function of the medial-prefrontal cortex (M-PFC).     

Negative valence can evoke a liberal response bias in syllogistic reasoning

Recently, studies have demonstrated that negative valence reduces the magnitude of the belief-bias effect in syllogistic reasoning. This effect has been localized in the reasoning stage, in the form of increased deliberation on trials where validity and conclusion believability are incongruent. Here, using signal detection theory, we show that the attenuation of belief bias observed when valence was negative can also be evoked by a liberal response bias at the decision stage. Indeed, when valence was negative participants adopted a more liberal criterion for judging syllogisms as “valid,” and were overconfident in their judgments. They also displayed less sensitivity in distinguishing between valid and invalid syllogisms. Our findings dovetail with recent evidence from memory research suggesting that negative valence can evoke a liberal response bias without improving performance. Our novel contribution is the demonstration that the attenuating effect of negative valence on belief bias can take multiples routes—by influencing the decision stage as was the case here, the reasoning stage as has been demonstrated elsewhere, and potentially both stages.     

A Comparison of Academic Dishonesty Among Business Students in a Public and Private Catholic University

A questionnaire on academic dishonesty was administered to junior and senior business administration majors at a public and a private Catholic university. Students were asked their extent of participation in 16 dishonest academic practices; their ratings of the ethical levels of the practices; their ratings of the likelihood of reasons for participation in the practices; and their sex, grade point average (GPA), and class rank. Though the catalog of the Catholic university indicated a greater emphasis on ethics and values education than did the catalog of the public school, the two groups of students reported very similar levels of academic dishonesty. Possible reasons for the disconnect between the emphasis on values and morals at the Catholic university and the students' academic behavior are discussed.     

THE CONFESSING ANIMAL IN FOUCAULT AND WITTGENSTEIN

In The History of Sexuality, Foucault maintains that “Western man has become a confessing animal” (1990, 59), thus implying that “man” was not always such a creature. On a related point, Wittgenstein suggests that “man is a ceremonial animal” (1996, 67); here the suggestion is that human beings are, by their very nature, ritualistically inclined. In this paper I examine this crucial difference in emphasis, first by reconstructing Foucault's “genealogy” of confession, and subsequently by exploring relevant facets of Wittgenstein's later thinking. While there are significant correlations between Foucault and Wittgenstein, an important disparity emerges in relation to the question of the “natural.” By critically analyzing this, I show how Wittgenstein's minimal naturalism provides an important corrective to Foucault's more extravagant claims. By implication, we see why any radical relativist, historicist, and/or constructivist position becomes untenable on Wittgensteinian grounds, even though Wittgenstein himself is often read as promoting such views.     

Legal responsibilities for educational psychologists

This paper considers the legal responsibilities of educational psychologists which fall mainly in relation to pupils with special educational needs. The first section introduces the work of educational psychologists, with some discussion of the professional and ethical difficulties posed by many aspects of their practice. An outline of the legal framework for their work in the England and Wales is provided, as an example of the application of those professional and ethical issues in practice, followed by and outline of potential areas of legal challenge and their implications. Reference is finally made to problems being experienced in policy, principle and practice arising from the tensions and dilemmas inherent in the legislation.