Crawling-onset age predicts visual cliff avoidance in infants

Two experiments are reported that tested the effects of crawling-onset age, the amount of crawling experience, and testing age on avoidance of the deep side of a visual cliff apparatus by human infants. In Experiment 1, 49 infants ranging in age from 7 to 13 mo. were tested on the visual cliff after 1 or 2 mo. of crawling experience. Discriminant analysis revealed that crawling-onset age, and not crawling experience, discriminated between those infants who crossed and those infants who avoided the apparent drop-off. Infants who crossed the deep side were infants with an early crawling-onset age. In Experiment 2, 40 infants were tested on a visual cliff apparatus, half at 9 and half at 12 mo. of age. Discriminant analysis again found that crawling-onset age discriminated between infants who crossed the infants who would not cross the deep side, whereas testing age alone did not. These results call into question the idea that experience crawling is critical in inducing visually guided avoidance behavior in infants. It is argued that the crawling-onset age effect occurs because crawling during the tactile phase of infancy interferes with later visual control of locomotion.     

A voice-operated method for administering the MMPI

Paper/pencil psychological tests such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) are difficult to complete independently by patients with limited hand function. This paper describes a voice recognition system developed to allow patients with no hand function to take the MMPI independently. Profiles generated by this system are not statistically different from those generated by standard MMPI booklet format. Limitations and possible extensions of the system as it currently exists are discussed.     

Children's representation of knowledge in verification

Thirty-two children aged 8–9 and 10–11 were asked to perform two statement verification tasks. Task 1 consisted of statements that were likely to elicit an affirmative knowledge representation,You have three eyes, is likely to elicit the representation,I have two eyes. Task 2 consisted of statements that were likely to elicit a negative knowledge of representation,You have a tail, is likely to elicit a negative representation,I do not have a tail. All statements varied in two dimensions, polarity (affirmative vs. negative) and truth value (true vs. false). Negative statements in Task 1 were found to be more difficult for children to verify than those in Task 2. This performance difference was used to infer the form of knowledge representation generated in verifying negative statements.     

Semantic processing and organization in free recall

It was hypothesized that both semantic processing and organizational activity are necessary for optimal free recall performance. In a series of three experiments, subjects were presented with a list of randomly selected nouns and were asked to make up a meaningful sentence for each noun. The subjects also rated the difficulty of using each noun. The subjects were instructed to try to remember words that were labeled "remember" words. For words that were labeled "story" words, the subjects were instructed only to make each sentence, using the word, part of an ongoing story which each subject was to make up. A test of retention for all presented words, using retention intervals of both 1 min and 24 h, showed that the story words were always recalled better than were the remember words. However, the amount of sequential organization was the same for both the story and the remember words. Recognition performance was found to be the same for both types of words. In addition, the story words were rated as being more difficult than the remember words. It was concluded that extensive semantic processing without organization is not sufficient for optimal recall.     

Working Memory in Pediatric Epilepsy: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

Neuropsychology Review - Working memory is a multicomponent system that is supported by overlapping specialized networks in the brain. Baddeley’s working memory model includes four...     

Sex and genes,part 2: A biopsychosocial approach to assess and treat challenging sexual behavior in persons with intellectual disabilities including fragile X syndrome and 22q11.2 deletion syndrome

Individuals with intellectual disabilities (IDs) – and specifically those with genetic disorders – are more prone to medical and psychological challenges that affect their sexual development, experiences, and fertility. In this review paper we first provide an overview of the biopsychosocial (BPS) model and then explain how the model can guide and improve the assessment and treatment of challenging sexual behaviors by persons with IDs. We discuss two genetic conditions – fragile X syndrome and 22q11.2 deletion syndrome – in case studies, showing how the BPS model can be used to assess and treat the sexual problems of individuals with various types of ID. We conclude with BPS-formulated treatment considerations in three key domains: biomedical treatment (e.g., medication side effects; stopping or changing medications), psychological treatment (e.g., providing psychological therapies), and socio-environmental interventions (e.g., providing socio-sexual education and staff training). Together, these treatment interventions can aid clinicians to prevent and/or treat problematic sexual behaviors of people with IDs.     

Anxiety-related bias in the classification of emotionally ambiguous facial expressions

High- and low-trait socially anxious individuals classified the emotional expressions of photographic quality continua of interpolated ("morphed") facial images that were derived from combining 6 basic prototype emotional expressions to various degrees, with the 2 adjacent emotions arranged in an emotion hexagon. When fear was 1 of the 2 component emotions, the high-trait group displayed enhanced sensitivity for fear. In a 2nd experiment where a mood manipulation was incorporated, again, the high-trait group exhibited enhanced sensitivity for fear. The low-trait group was sensitive for happiness in the control condition. The mood-manipulated group had increased sensitivity for anger expressions, and trait anxiety did not moderate these effects. Interpretations of the results related to the classification of fearful expressions are discussed.     

Emotion regulation and memory: the cognitive costs of keeping one's cool

An emerging literature has begun to document the affective consequences of emotion regulation. Little is known, however, about whether emotion regulation also has cognitive consequences. A process model of emotion suggests that expressive suppression should reduce memory for emotional events but that reappraisal should not. Three studies tested this hypothesis. Study 1 experimentally manipulated expressive suppression during film viewing, showing that suppression led to poorer memory for the details of the film. Study 2 manipulated expressive suppression and reappraisal during slide viewing. Only suppression led to poorer slide memory. Study 3 examined individual differences in typical expressive suppression and reappraisal and found that suppression was associated with poorer self-reported and objective memory but that reappraisal was not. Together, these studies suggest that the cognitive costs of keeping one's cool may vary according to how this is done.     

Responsibility attitudes and interpretations are characteristic of obsessive compulsive disorder

The cognitive-behavioural theory of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) proposes that a key factor influencing obsessional behaviour is the way in which the intrusive cognitions are interpreted. The present paper reports an investigation of links between clinical symptoms (of anxiety, depression and obsessionality) and responsibility beliefs. These beliefs include not only measures of general responsibility attitudes (assumptions) but also more specific responsibility appraisals consequent on intrusive cognitions. The characteristics of two new questionnaires specifically designed to measure these beliefs were assessed in patients suffering from Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, in patients suffering from other anxiety disorders and in non-clinical controls. The scales measuring negative beliefs about responsibility were found to have good reliability and internal consistency. Comparisons between criterion groups indicate considerable specificity for both assumptions and appraisals with respect to OCD. There was also good evidence of specificity in the association between responsibility cognitions and obsessional symptoms across groups, and that this association was not a consequence of links with anxiety or depressive symptoms. Although the two measures were correlated, they each made unique contributions to the prediction of obsessional symptoms. Overall, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that responsibility beliefs are important in the experience of obsessional problems.