Enhancing the Learning of Sport Skills Through External-Focus Feedback

The authors examined how the effectiveness of feedback for the learning of complex motor skills is affected by the focus of attention it induces. The feedback referred specifically either to body movements (internal focus) or to movement effects (external focus). In Experiment 1, groups of novices and advanced volleyball players (N = 48) practiced “tennis” serves under internal-focus or external-focus feedback conditions in a 2 (expertise) × 2 (feedback type) design. Type of feedback did not differentially affect movement quality, but external-focus feedback resulted in greater accuracy of the serves than internal-focus feedback during both practice and retention, independent of the level of expertise. In Experiment 2, the effects of relative feedback frequency as a function of attentional focus were examined. A 2 (feedback frequency: 100% vs. 33%) × 2 (feedback type) design was used. Experienced soccer players (N = 52) were required to shoot lofted passes at a target. External-focus feedback resulted in greater accuracy than internal-focus feedback did. In addition, reduced feedback frequency was beneficial under internal-focus feedback conditions, whereas 100% and 33% feedback were equally effective under external-focus conditions. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of effect-related, as opposed to movement-related, feedback and also suggest that there is a need to revise current views regarding the role of feedback for motor learning.     

Emotion,cognition, and decision making

We examine two explanations of the subliminal affective priming effect. The feelings-as-information model (Schwarz &; Clore, 1988) holds that judgements are based on perceptible feelings. Hence, affective influences depend on the source to which feelings are (mis)attributed. In contrast, the affective primary hypothesis (Zajonc, 1980) suggests that affective influences should resist attributional interventions. This is because the affective system responsible for preferences is separate from the cognitive system responsible for inferences; because early affective processes are automatic and therefore inaccessible to higher-order interventions; and because early affective responses are not represented as conscious feelings. We tested these explanations in two experiments that crossed subliminal affective priming with (mis)attribution manipulations. Both studies found reliable shifts in judgements of neutral stimuli as a result of primes even when subjects were aware that their feelings might not be diagnostic for the judgement at hand. Subjects did not report experiencing any feelings in response to the primes. The obtained affective priming effect was independent of response times and subjective reports of engaging in judgemental corrections. However, the priming effect did prove sensitive to the experimental instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the affective primacy hypothesis and the feelings-as-information model.     

Against Magnetism

Magnetism in meta-semantics is the view that the meaning of our words is determined in part by their use and in part by the objective naturalness of candidate meanings. This hypothesis is commonly attributed to David Lewis, and has been put to philosophical work by Brian Weatherson, Ted Sider and others. I argue that there is no evidence that Lewis ever endorsed the view, and that his actual account of language reveals good reasons against it.     

Out of Sight Is Not Out of Mind: Developmental Changes in Infants' Understanding of Visual Perception During the Second Year

Three experiments investigated 14-, 18-, and 24- month-old infants' understanding of visual perception. Infants viewed films in which a protagonist was either able to view the location of a hidden object (Visual Access condition) or was blindfolded when the object location was revealed (No Visual Access condition). When requested to find the object, the protagonist pointed either at the correct location or at the incorrect location. Across experiments, 18-month-olds looked longer at the unexpected action (e.g., person pointing at the incorrect location in the Visual Access condition). By 24 month of age, infants could infer the correct search behavior from gaze alone. These findings suggest that by the middle of the second year of life, infants understand the psychological relation between an observer and an object, even if the object is no longer visible.     

A specific calculating ability

We report two experiments that investigate the calculating strategy used by a low IQ savant to identify prime numbers. Hermelin and O'Connor (1990) had suggested previously that this subject may use a procedure first described by Eratosthenes to detect a prime number, namely, dividing a target number by all primes up to the square root of the target number and testing for a remainder. In the first experiment, we compare the reaction times of the savant to decide whether a number is prime with those of a control subject proficient in mathematical calculation. In addition, we measured the savant's speed of information processing using an inspection time task. We found that the reaction times of the savant, although generally faster, followed the same pattern of the control subject who reported using the Eratosthenes procedure. The savant's inspection time indicated that his speed of processing was far superior to that expected from someone of his IQ. In the second experiment, we measured the time it takes mathematics students to divide by different prime numbers and we also tested them on the prime identification task. We used their division times to simulate their performance on the prime number identification task under the assumption that they used the Eratosthenes procedure. We also simulated the reaction times that would result from a simple memory-based procedure for identifying primes. We found that the Eratosthenes simulation, in contrast to the memory simulation, provided a good fit to both the students' and the savant's reaction times. We conclude that the savant is using a complex computational algorithm to identify primes and suggest two explanations of how the apparent contradiction between his low general intelligence and his superior numerical ability might be resolved.     

Non-Normative Systemic Therapy in a Case of Intergenerational Enmeshment

There are a number of differences between normative and non-normative systemic therapy. It is useful to understand normative thinking because that is a traditional orientation. Non-normative clinical work also has much to offer both philosophically and practically: It is characterized by the premise that people's behavior makes sense given their histories and current context. Therefore, when understood from the perspective of the individual, even his or her psychopathology would make sense. Using a composite case analyzed in normative terms and treated non-normatively, the author illustrates how to bridge these two approaches. Solution-focused methods constitute the interventions of choice.     

Recalling more childhood events leads to judgments of poorer memory: Implications for the recovered/false memory debate

Dissociative disorders that are believed to develop from childhood sexual abuse are often considered to include amnesia for childhood events, particularly the events that involve the abuse itself. One unresolved issue is the extent to which memory recovery attempts can contribute to claims of having amnestic symptoms. Experiments with undergraduate subjects reveal that requiring more reports of childhood events will increase judgments of having poorer memory of one’s childhood. The results are consistent with the use of heuristics when one is reasoning under conditions of uncertainty, as experienced difficulty in remembering more experiences is attributed to the incompleteness of childhood memory. The findings challenge the validity of reports of childhood amnesia that follow memory recovery attempts.