Drawing the net: internet identification, internet use, and the image of internet users.

Theory and research suggest that Internet identification may account for some of the gender divide in Internet use. Internet identification is a type of domain identification, and is inherently bound with images of those who use the Internet, a domain traditionally conceived as masculine. Combining the "draw an Internet user" test with an Internet identification scale, this study tests two hypotheses: participants drawing gender-concordant images will (i) identify with and (ii) use the Internet more than those drawing gender-discordant images. Participants were 371 students (121 males, 250 females) from three universities in the United Kingdom and Australia. The need to challenge masculinized images of the Internet is discussed.     

Conditions for young infants' failure to perceive trajectory continuity

When viewing an event in which an object moves behind an occluder on part of its trajectory, 4-month-old infants perceive the trajectory as continuous only when time or distance out of sight is short. Little is known, however, about the conditions under which young infants perceive trajectories to be discontinuous. In the present studies we focus first on infants' perception of trajectories that change during a period of occlusion. Four-month-olds perceive discontinuity in trajectories that change in height or orientation while behind an occluder, and this is true even when a change in direction could be due to an invisible bouncing collision with a surface. Further experiments reveal that infants do not perceive diagonal linear trajectories as continuous across an occlusion unless the occluding and revealing edges are orthogonal to the path of movement. Implications for theories of perceptual and cognitive development are discussed.     

I Talked to a Genius and All I Got was Knowledge

Bryan Frances’s recent argument is for the epistemic position called Live Skepticism. The Live Skepticism Argument (LSA) attempts to establish a restricted set of skeptical conclusions. The LSA’s “skeptical hypotheses” are scientific and philosophical positions that are “live actual possibilities” in an intellectual community. In order to “rule out” live hypotheses, an expert must know them to be false. However, since these are live hypotheses in this expert’s intellectual community—endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding—this expert is unable to rule them out. Consistent with the LSA is the outcome that people not exposed to these live hypotheses can know what these experts cannot. However, in this paper, I defeat the LSA by developing and defending a counterexample that focuses on the phenomenon of genius testimony. Everyone, including the LSA’s proponent, can and should allow that expertise comes in degrees. While in many cases a person’s intelligence, understanding, and knowledge are parallel to others in the field, there are some who are extraordinary in their intelligence, understanding, and knowledge (geniuses). If an expert meets with a genius, it is possible that the genius provides this individual with beliefs that can rule out a skeptical hypothesis. Therefore, an expert can have knowledge, even if the skeptical hypothesis is live and endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding. After providing this counterexample, I present three potential objections, and show how people can know global warming exists and that smoking does not give someone cancer. I conclude by defending this counterexample from a likely reply by proponents of the LSA involving luck and knowledge.     

Practice with anxiety improves performance,but only when anxious: evidence for the specificity of practice hypothesis

We investigated for the first time whether the principles of specificity could be extended to the psychological construct of anxiety and whether any benefits of practicing with anxiety are dependent on the amount of exposure and timing of that exposure in relation to where in learning the exposure occurs. In Experiment 1, novices practiced a discrete golf-putting task in one of four groups: all practice trials under anxiety (anxiety), non-anxiety (control), or a combination of these two (i.e., the first half of practice under anxiety before changing to non-anxiety conditions, anxiety-control, or the reverse of this, control-anxiety). Following acquisition, all groups were transferred to an anxiety condition. Results revealed a significant acquisition-to-transfer decrement in performance between acquisition and transfer for the control group only. In Experiment 2, novices practiced a complex rock climbing task in one of the four groups detailed above, before being transferred to both a high-anxiety condition and a low-anxiety condition (the ordering of these was counterbalanced across participants). Performance in anxiety transfer was greater following practice with anxiety compared to practice without anxiety. However, these benefits were influenced by the timing of anxiety exposure since performance was greatest when exposure to anxiety occurred in the latter half of acquisition. In the low-anxiety transfer test, performance was lowest for those who had practiced with anxiety only, thus providing support for the specificity of practice hypothesis. Results demonstrate that the specificity of learning principle can be extended to include the psychological construct of anxiety. Furthermore, the specificity advantage appears dependent on its timing in the learning process.