Deterrence, Opportunity, and Choice

Traditional studies of deterrence have focused on punishment with less regard for the rewards of both crime and noncrime. Influenced by work in economics and behavioral psychology, more recent studies have departed from tradition by incorporating rewards for crime. To this extent, they should be regarded as advances over the more traditional approaches. Notwithstanding these advances, variations in both the probability and magnitude of reward for noncrime have not been systematically included in these more recent theories of choice. In an attempt to determine whether opportunities for noncrime are either central or trivial to the criminal decision-making process, the present study fitted two alternative models to experimental data involving risk-taking: (a) the economic utility model employed by Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, and Matsueda (1986) in their study of criminal choice; and (b) the satisfaction balance model developed by Gray and Tallman (1984). Results showed that while both models explained significant amounts of variation in the dependent variable, the Gray-Tallman model provided a substantially better fit of the data. Despite limitations inherent in experimental studies as, for example, limitations surrounding the issue of external validity, the findings strongly suggest that opportunities for noncrime are as important as rewards and costs for crime in the process by which criminal decisions are made.     

The Shifting Border Between Perception and Cognition

The distinction between perception and cognition has always had a firm footing in both cognitive science and folk psychology. However, there is little agreement as to how the distinction should be drawn. In fact, a number of theorists have recently argued that, given the ubiquity of top‐down influences (at all levels of the processing hierarchy), we should jettison the distinction altogether. I reject this approach, and defend a pluralist account of the distinction. At the heart of my account is the claim that each legitimate way of marking a border between perception and cognition deploys a notion I call ‘stimulus‐control.’ Thus, rather than being a grab bag of unrelated kinds, the various categories of the perceptual are unified into a superordinate natural kind (mutatis mutandis for the complimentary categories of the cognitive).     

The role of spatial frequency in emotional face classification

Previous studies with emotional face stimuli have revealed that our ability to identify different emotional states is dependent on the faces’ spatial frequency content. However, these studies typically only tested a limited number of emotional states. In the present study, we measured the consistency with which 24 different emotional states are classified when the faces are unfiltered, high-, or low-pass filtered, using a novel rating method that simultaneously measures perceived arousal (high to low) and valence (pleasant to unpleasant). The data reveal that consistent ratings are made for every emotional state independent of spatial frequency content. We conclude that emotional faces possess both high- and low-frequency information that can be relied on to facilitate classification.     

Inhibition and superconditioning

Superconditioning is said to occur when learning an association between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and unconditioned stimulus (US) is facilitated by pairing the CS with the US in the presence of a previously established conditioned inhibitor. Previous demonstrations of superconditioning have been criticized because their control conditions have allowed alternative interpretations. Using a within–subjects autoshaping procedure, the present study unambiguously demonstrated superconditioning. The results support the view that superconditioning is the symmetric opposite of blocking.     

From majority to minority and vice versa: the asymmetrical effects of losing and gaining majority position within a group

Two studies examined the effects of stable, partially changed, and completely changed majority and minority positions within a group on perception and evaluation of the group. It was hypothesized that loss of majority position (majority-to-minority change) would have stronger effects than gain of majority position (minority-to-majority change). The hypothesized asymmetrical effect was demonstrated in that loss of majority position decreased perception of group-self similarity, group attraction, and expectations for positive interactions with the group, whereas a corresponding gain of position did not increase them. Thus immediately following changes, the group is especially fragile because disintegrative forces created by the loss of majority position are stronger than integrative forces created by the gain of majority position.