Measuring work styles: Towards an understanding of the dynamic components of the theory of work adjustment

Work styles are an important yet largely unexplored component of the theory of work adjustment (TWA), describing a dynamic component of how individuals maintain and adjust fit with their work environment. The active work style (AWS) scale is the first attempt to develop a specific self-report measure of work styles suitable for longitudinal research. Results from three studies support Dawis and Lofquist's (1984) proposed four factor structure, but these factors are related through a second-order factor describing a person's generalised level of work activity and effort across time. The AWS scale demonstrated good evidence for reliability and validity, and strong measurement invariance across time signifying its suitability for longitudinal research. In line with expectations, overall work style was positively related to conscientiousness and work engagement yet unrelated to stress. When controlling for these variables, AWS was positively related to demands–abilities fit, but not needs–supplies fit. Limitations and possibilities for future research are also discussed.     

On Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science

In his enormously influential The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) proposed that the mind was divided into input modules and central processes. Much subsequent research focused on the modules and whether processes like speech perception or spatial vision are truly modular. Much less attention has been given to Fodor's writing on the central processes, what would today be called higher‐level cognition. In “Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” he argued that central processes are “bad candidates for scientific study” and would resist attempts at empirical analysis. This essay evaluates his argument for this remarkable claim, concluding that although central processes may well be “messier” than input modules, this does not mean that they cannot be studied and understood. The article briefly reviews the scientific progress made in understanding central processes in the 35 years since the book was published, showing that Fodor's prediction is clearly falsified by massive advances in topics like decision making and analogy. The essay concludes that Fodor's Law was not based on a clear argument for why the complexities of central systems could not be studied but was likely based on intuitions and preferences that were common in psychology at the time.     

Trauma‐Related Guilt Mediates the Relationship between Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Suicidal Ideation in OEF/OIF/OND Veterans

Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and trauma‐related guilt are risk factors for suicidal ideation (SI) in veterans. Components of trauma‐related guilt were examined as serial mediators of the relationship between PTSD and SI. In a sample of 53 OEF/OIF/OND combat veterans, PTSD had an indirect effect on SI through a serial mediation chain of guilt cognitions, distress, and global guilt, suggesting that trauma‐related guilt via cognitions, distress, and global guilt is a pathway from PTSD to SI. Attention should be given to assessing and addressing trauma‐related guilt in veterans experiencing PTSD to prevent SI.     

Test of a distributional theory of intuitive numerical prediction

This paper investigates models that describe how subjects combine uncertain information to arrive at an intuitive prediction of a criterion. Subjects were trained, with feedback, to predict a numerical criterion from each of three single cues. Then they were asked to predict the criterion, without feedback, either from pairs of cues or from single cues. Their predictions were not consistent with a relative weight averaging model, since pairs of cues did not combine additively. Instead, the effect of a cue was inversely proportional to the standard deviation of the criterion at each level of the cue. Subjects appeared to apply greater weight to cue levels with smaller variance, i.e., those cue levels that were more valid. The data could be described by a distributional theory referred to as the equal probability model. For the present experiment, this model implies that the criterion means associated with the levels of each cue are weighted by the reciprocals of the standard deviations and then averaged. Relations between the equal probability model and other models of impression formation are discussed.     

The ABCs of categorical perception

Studies of speech perception first revealed a surprising discontinuity in the way in which stimulus values on a physical continuum are perceived. Data which demonstrate the effect in nonspeech modes have challenged the contention that categorical perception is a hallmark of the speech mode, but the psychophysical models that have been proposed have not resolved the issues raised by empirical findings. This study provides data from judgments of four sensory continua, two visual and two tactual-kinesthetic, which show that the adaptation level for a set of stimuli serves as a category boundary whether stimuli on the continuum differ by linear or logarithmic increments. For all sensory continua studied, discrimination of stimuli belonging to different perceptual categories was more accurate than discrimination of stimuli belonging to the same perceptual category. Moreover, shifts in the adaptation level produced shifts in the location of the category boundary. The concept of Adaptation-level Based Categorization (ABC) provides a unified account of judgmental processes in categorical perception without recourse to post hoc constructs such as implicit anchors or external referents.     

Decision deadlines and uncertainty monitoring: the effect of time constraints on uncertainty and perceptual responses

The behavioral uncertainty response has grounded the study of animal metacognition and influenced the study of human psychophysics. However, the interpretation of this response is debated—especially whether it is a behavioral index of metacognition. The authors advanced this interpretation using the dissociative technique of response deadlines. Uncertainty responding, if it is higher level or metacognitive, should depend on a slower, more controlled decisional process and be more vulnerable to time constraints. Humans performed sparse–uncertain–dense or sparse–middle–dense discriminations in which, respectively, they could decline difficult trials or positively identify middle stimuli. Uncertainty responses were sharply and selectively reduced under a decision deadline, as compared to primary perceptual responses (i.e., “sparse,” “middle,” and “dense” responses). This dissociation suggests that the uncertainty response does reflect a higher-level, decisional response. It grants the uncertainty response a distinctive psychological role in its task and encourages an interpretation of this response as an elemental behavioral index of uncertainty that deserves continuing research.