No evidence for contagious yawning in lemurs

Among some haplorhine primates, including humans, relaxed yawns spread contagiously. Such contagious yawning has been linked to social bonds and empathy in some species. However, no studies have investigated contagious yawning in strepsirhines. We conducted an experimental study of contagious yawning in strepsirhines, testing ring-tailed and ruffed lemurs (n = 24) in a paradigm similar to one that has induced contagious yawning in haplorhines. First, in a control experiment, we investigated whether lemurs responded to projected video content in general (experiment 1). We showed them two videos to which we expected differential responses: one featured a terrestrial predator and the other a caretaker holding food. Next, to test for yawn contagion, we showed individual lemurs life-size video projections of groupmates and conspecific strangers yawning, and control footage of the same individuals at rest (experiment 2). Then, to examine whether a group context might enhance or allow for contagion, we exposed subjects to the same videos in a group setting (experiment 3). Lemurs produced alarm vocalizations and moved upward while viewing the predator, but not the caretaker, demonstrating that they do perceive video content meaningfully. However, lemurs did not yawn in response to yawning stimuli when tested alone, or with their groupmates. This study provides preliminary evidence that lemurs do not respond to yawning stimuli similarly to haplorhines, and suggests that this behavior may have evolved or become more exaggerated in haplorhines after the two major primate lineages split.     

Spatial habit competes with effort to determine human spatial organization

Despite the important role that the physical environment plays in shaping human cognition, few studies have endeavoured to experimentally examine the principles underlying how individuals organize objects in their space. The current investigation examines the idea that humans organize objects in their space in order to minimize effort or maximize performance. We devised a novel spatial organization task whereby participants freely arranged objects in the context of a writing task. Critically, we manipulated the frequency with which each object was used and assessed participants’ spontaneous placements. In the first set of experiments, participants showed a counterintuitive tendency to match pen pairs with their initial placements rather than placing pens in the less effortful configuration. However, in Experiment 2, where the difference in physical effort between different locations was increased, participants were more likely to reorganize the pens into the less effortful configuration. We begin developing a theory of human spatial organization wherein the observed initial bias may represent a kind of spatial habit formation that competes with effort/performance considerations to shape future spatial organization.     

Long-Term Follow-Up of a Randomized Controlled Trial Comparing Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and Standard Cognitive Behavior Therapy for Anxiety and Depression

The present study represents one of the first comparisons of the long-term effectiveness of traditional cognitive behavior therapy (i.e., Beckian cognitive therapy; CT) and acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT). One hundred thirty-two anxious or depressed outpatients were randomly assigned to receive either CT or ACT, and were assessed at posttreatment (n = 90) and at 1.5-year (n = 91) follow-up. As previously reported, the two treatments were equivalently effective at posttreatment according to measures of depression, anxiety, overall (social/occupational/symptom-related) functioning, and quality of life. However, current results suggest that treatment gains were better maintained at follow-up in the CT condition. Clinical significance analyses revealed that, at follow-up, one-third more CT patients were in the clinically normative range in terms of depressive symptoms and more than twice as many CT patients were in the normative range in terms of functioning levels. The possible long-term advantage of CT relative to ACT in this population is discussed.     

Self–other decision making and loss aversion

In eight studies, we tested the prediction that making choices for others involves less loss aversion than making choices for the self. We found that loss aversion is significantly lessened among people choosing for others in scenarios describing riskless choice (Study 1), gambling (Studies 2 and 3), and social aspects of life, such as likeably and status (Studies 4a–e). Moreover, we found this pattern in relatively realistic conditions where people are rewarded for making desirable (i.e., profitable) choices for others (Study 2), when the other for whom a choice is made is physically present (Study 3), and when real money is at stake (Studies 2 and 3). Finally, we found loss aversion is moderated when factors associated with self–other differences in decision making are taken into account, such as decision makers’ construal level (Study 4a), regulatory focus (Study 4b), degree of information seeking (Study 4c), omission bias (Study 4d), and power (Study 4e).     

Everyday Attention: Variation in Mind Wandering and Memory in a Lecture

Understanding the factors underlying variation in attentional state is critical in a number of domains. Here, we investigate the relation between time on task and mind wandering (i.e., a state of decoupled attention) in the context of a lecture. Lectures are the primary means of knowledge transmission in post secondary education rendering an understanding of attentional variations in lectures a pressing practical concern. We report two experiments wherein participants watched a video recorded lecture either alone (Experiment 1) or in a classroom context (Experiment 2). Participants responded to mind wandering probes at various times in the lecture in an effort to track variations in mind wandering over time. In addition, following the lecture, memory for the lecture material was tested. Results demonstrate that in a lecture mind wandering increases with time on task and memory for the lecture material decreases. In addition, there was a significant relation between mind wandering and memory for lecture material. Theoretical and practical applications of the present results are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Affect-biased attention as emotion regulation

The affective biasing of attention is not typically considered to be a form of emotion regulation. In this article, we argue that 'affect-biased attention' - the predisposition to attend to certain categories of affectively salient stimuli over others - provides an important component of emotion regulation. Affect-biased attention regulates subsequent emotional responses by tuning one's filters for initial attention and subsequent processing. By reviewing parallel research in the fields of emotion regulation and affect-biased attention, as well as clinical and developmental research on individual differences in attentional biases, we provide convergent evidence that habitual affective filtering processes, tuned and re-tuned over development and situation, modulate emotional responses to the world. Moreover, they do so in a manner that is proactive rather than reactive.     

Reasonable Trust

Abstract: Establishing trust among individual agents has defined a central issue of practical reasoning since the dawning of liberal individualism. Hobbes was convinced that foolish self‐interest always threatens to defeat uncompelled cooperation when one can gain by abandoning a joint effort. Against this philosophical background, scientific studies of human beings display a surprisingly cooperative species. It would seem to follow that biologically inherited characteristics impair our reason. The response proposed here distinguishes rationality and reasonableness as two forms of good reasoning. One is consistent with the model of strategic rationality, the other with a model of emotional relationship. From the Hobbesian perspective trusting agents are not rational if their makeup discourages advantageous defection even when one knows it will not be detected or punished. The point is indecisive because reasonable trust insulates cooperative action from the factors that have appeared to make it chancy or unstable without some enforcing power. A critical theme is that trust does not simply rest upon a biological disposition to conform to norms. That would explain but not justify aversion to defection. In fact, trust can survive reasoned challenges to norm‐conforming dispositions, displaying the responsible social animal living along with the rational individual.