Effects of training, prompting, and self-monitoring on staff behavior in a classroom for students with disabilities

This study extended the limited research on the utility of tactile prompts and examined the effects of a treatment package on implementation of a token economy by instructional assistants in a classroom for students with disabilities. During baseline, we measured how accurately the assistants implemented a classroom token economy based on the routine training they had received through the school system. Baseline was followed by brief in-service training, which resulted in no improvement of token-economy implementation for recently hired instructional assistants. A treatment package of prompting and self-monitoring with accuracy feedback was then introduced as a multiple baseline design across behaviors. The treatment package was successfully faded to a more manageable self-monitoring intervention. Results showed visually significant improvements for all participants during observation sessions.     

Transcranial magnetic stimulation as a tool for cognitive studies

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) is a tool for the non-invasive stimulation of the human brain. It allows the activation of arbitrary sites of the superficial cortex and, combined with other brain-imaging techniques such as EEG, PET, and fMRI, it can be used to evaluate cortical excitability and connectivity. This is of major importance in, for example, the study of cognitive processes such as language, learning, memory and self-representation, which are thought to be represented in multiple brain areas. The mechanisms of action of TMS are known on a basic level, but its effect on the activation state of brain tissue is still poorly understood. Clinical applications of TMS have also been proposed and guidelines for its safe use drafted.     

PERSONALITY AND COGNITIVE ABILITY AS PREDICTORS OF JOB SEARCH AMONG EMPLOYED MANAGERS

Research on employee job search and separation traditionally focuses on situationally specific variables. Such variables may change with particular employment situations (e.g., job tenure, salary, perceived organizational success), they may be differentially relevant to work situations over time (e.g., education), or may reflect individual reactions to particular work situations (e.g., job satisfaction). More enduring individual characteristics, particularly personality and cognitive ability, may affect job search in consistent ways across different situations, but to date we have little empirical research on those effects. The present study extends traditional job search investigations by incorporating these two enduring individual characteristics–personality and cognitive ability. The value of these two enduring individual characteristics, in predicting job search, is then tested on a sample of U.S. executives. Cognitive ability as well as the personality dimensions of Agreeableness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience related positively to job search. These effects remained even in the presence of an array of situational factors previously shown to affect search. The relationship between Extroversion and job search became significant and positive in the presence of situational factors, particularly job satisfaction. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

The elimination argument

Animalism is the view that we are animals: living, breathing, wholly material beings. Despite its considerable appeal, animalism has come under fire. Other philosophers have had much to say about objections to animalism that stem from reflection on personal identity over time. But one promising objection (the `Elimination Argument') has been overlooked. In this paper, I remedy this situation and examine the Elimination Argument in some detail. I contend that the Elimination Argument is both unsound and unmotivated.     

Horgan and Tienson on phenomenology and intentionality

Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham’s arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content/fixer of truth conditions.