Interpreting functional analysis results using the real-time recording of independent and dependent variables

An extended series of functional analysis conditions were conducted to assess the operant function of aggressive behaviors emitted by a 33-year-old female with diagnoses of severe mental retardation and organic psychosis. Results from the primary test conditions were fairly undifferentiated, but response rates were elevated in the control condition. Independent-variable integrity data from the control condition indicated that aggressive behaviors were nearly always contiguous with the fixed-time delivery of experimenter attention. These results are discussed in the context of the current control condition functioning as a possible test for escape from social interaction. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sex differences in estimates of multiple intelligences

This paper reports on two studies, each concerned with sex differences in the estimates of Gardner's ‘seven basic types of intelligence’. In the first study, 180 British adults were asked to estimate their own intelligence on the seven intelligence factors. Only one (mathematical/logical) showed a significant sex difference, with males believing they had higher scores than females. Factor analysis of these seven scales yielded three interpretable higher‐order factors. There was a similar sex difference on only one factor (mathematical/spatial intelligence), which showed males rating themselves higher than females. In the second study, 80 student participants completed the same seven estimates of intelligence, plus a standard sex‐role inventory, in order to separate sex and sex role in the self‐estimation of intelligence. A series of sex×sex‐role ANOVAs showed some effects, particularly for mathematical, musical, and spatial intelligence, but nearly always for sex and not sex role. Results suggest that previous studies which found consistent sex differences in self‐estimates of overall intelligence (‘g’) may have over‐exaggerated the issue as the difference is clearly confined to a limited number of factors of intelligence. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The closing of the theory of mind: A critique of perspective-taking

Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others and is often said to be one of the cornerstones of efficient social interaction. In recent years, a number of authors have suggested that one particular ToM process occurs spontaneously in that it is rapid and outside of conscious control. This work has argued that humans efficiently compute the visual perspective of other individuals. In this article, we present a critique of this notion both on empirical and theoretical grounds. We argue that the experiments and paradigms that purportedly demonstrate spontaneous perspective-taking have not as yet convincingly demonstrated the existence of such a phenomenon. We also suggest that it is not possible to represent the percept of another person, spontaneous or otherwise. Indeed, the perspective-taking field has suggested that humans can represent the visual experience of others. That is, going beyond assuming that we can represent another’s viewpoint in anything other than symbolic form. In this sense, the field suffers from the same problem that afflicted the “pictorial” theory in the mental imagery debate. In the last section we present a number of experiments designed to provide a more thorough assessment of whether humans can indeed represent the visual experience of others.

     

Mixed up about mixed worlds? Understanding Blackburn’s supervenience argument

Simon Blackburn’s supervenience argument—focusing on the mysterious “ban on mixed worlds”—is still subject to a variety of conflicting interpretations. In this paper, I hope to provide a defense of the argument that clarifies both the argument and the objections it must overcome. Many of the extant objections, I will argue, fail to engage the argument in its true form. And to counter the more compelling objections, it will be necessary to bring in additional argumentation that Blackburn himself does not clearly provide. One important upshot of this discussion is that moral realism is not the only target of the argument: it raises trouble for a variety of metaethical views wed to realist-friendly construals of moral evaluation. Rightly understood, this argument not only survives the prominent responses, but turns out to be more powerful than his critics and Blackburn himself have recognized.