Family Therapy in Trouble: Psychoeducation as Solution and as Problem

The authors cite clinical literature attesting to the importance of recognizing the family, rather than the individual, as the proper locus of conceptualizing, diagnosing, and treating mental illnesses. Specifically with regard to severe psychiatric illnesses, in particular schizophrenia, family dysfunction contributes to the emergence of the illness, significantly affects its course, and strongly influences the achievement and maintenance of treatment gains. Currently, a movement is afoot to limit sharply the amount and kind of treatment offered to schizophrenic patients and their families. Rooted in a “medical model” or “biogenic” view of the etiology of schizophrenia, this school of thought prescribes psychoeducation as the family treatment of choice. The present article looks at some misconceptions regarding treatment that prompted a widespread turning away from psychoanalytically oriented family psychotherapy for schizophrenic patients and their families, examines the reductionism (biological and behavioral) inhering in the exclusive use of psychoeducation, and looks at the clinical dangers of such reductionism. Finally, it proposes that family psycho-therapists should not abandon a concern with the inner lives of severely ill patients and their families in the face of spuriously generalized claims made by reductionist researchers.     

Frontal amnesia and the dysexecutive syndrome

This study analyzes the memory deficits shown by an amnesic patient with bilateral frontal damage and a dysexecutive syndrome. He resembles a classic amnesic patient in showing grossly impaired episodic memory for both verbal and nonverbal material, together with normal digit span, and on occasion normal recency in free recall. He differs from the classic amnesic pattern however in showing an impairment in both the speed and accuracy of performance on tests of semantic memory, and in clear evidence for impaired performance on some though not all procedural learning tasks. Finally, his autobiographical memory was poor and subject to substantial confabulation. It is suggested that the pattern of deficits is consistent with a combination of a classic amnesic syndrome with the additional problems associated with the frontal dysexecutive syndrome, rather than exhibiting a qualitatively different form of amnesia.     

The perception of an optical flow projected on the ground surface

In most experiments in which the importance of visual control on postural stability is studied, optical stimuli attached to vertical surfaces are used. Analyses of long-term standing readjustments generally involve back-and-forth movements of a visual scene or its projection on vertical circular screens. In a natural environment, however, visual information is largely available from the ground. The aim of the experiment reported was to assess the effect of a flow pattern simulating an open outdoor setting on motion perception and postural control. Subjects were presented with an optical texture projected onto the ground. Periods of motionless texture alternated with equivalent durations of unidirectional flows. The change of position of the subject's centre of gravity over time was recorded on a force platform. Results show that the direction of body sway corresponded with that of texture motion. Important aftereffects, as shown in linear vection experiments, were also observed. However, the latency of postural responses was much shorter than with prolonged unidirectional flows produced in other locations of the visual environment. The hypothesis of an ecological specificity of the flows perceived on the ground during terrestrial displacements is discussed.     

The epistemic efficacy of stupidity

I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, as contemporary theories construe it, is not a particularly valuable cognitive achievement, and that we would do well to reopen epistemology to the study of cognitive excellences of all sorts.I am grateful to Warren Goldfarb for sharing his knowledge of wines with me, and to Kenneth Winkler for sharing his knowledge of birds.