Pure agraphia and Gerstmann's syndrome as a visuospatial-language dissociation: an experimental case study

A right-handed man suffered a left parieto-occipital cerebral infarction, causing agraphia with Gerstmann's syndrome but without major aphasia, alexia, or apraxia. Oral spelling was superior to written spelling. Experiments were performed involving (1) analysis of errors in writing, (2) tasks of visual imagery, and (3) identifying letters drawn without leaving a visual trace. The results suggest that the agraphia and Gerstmann's syndrome are due to a dissociation of language skills and visuospatial skills caused by a dominant parieto-occipital lesion.     

Comprehension of sentence structure in anomic and conduction aphasia

Picture-pointing auditory and reading comprehension tests were administered to anomic and conduction aphasics. Subjects responded to active sentences of the present progressive form. The possible errors which a subject could make on these experimental tasks included failure to correctly interpret noun order, number, or lexical meaning. Both groups made significantly more correct responses than error responses. Of their error responses, noun-order errors significantly exceeded number and lexical errors for which no differences were observed. When compared with results previously obtained for agrammatic Broca's aphasics, no differences in the pattern of errors were identified. These results are discussed relative to current theories of syntactic processing and for the mechanisms which account for these syntactic comprehension deficits following aphasia.     

The foundations of epistemological probability

Epistemological probability is the kind of probability relative to a body of evidence. Many philosophers, including Henry Kyburg and Roderick Chisholm, hold that all epistemological probabilities reflect a relation between an evidential body of propositions and other propositions. But this article argues that some epistemological probabilities for empirical propositions must be relative to non-propositional evidence, specifically the contents of non-propositional perceptual states. In doing so, the article distinguishes between internalism and externalism regarding epistemological probability, and argues for a version of awareness internalism. The article draws three main concluding lessons. First, epistemological probability is not to be identified with the sort of objective, experience-independent probability that is familiar from statistical and propensity interpretations of probability. Second, it is doubtful that epistemological probability is measurable, in any useful way, by real numbers, even if it admits of comparative assessments. Third, contrary to the familiar claim of C. I. Lewis, epistemological probability should not be viewed as requiring a basis of certainty.     

Powers, causation, and modality

A complex theory concerning powers, natures, and causal necessity has emerged from the writings of P. H. Hare, E. H. Madden, and R. Harré. In the course of rebutting objections that other critics have raised to the power account of causation, I correct three of its genuine difficulties: its attempt to analyze power attributions in terms of conditional statements; its characterization of the relation between something's powers and its nature; and its doctrines concerning conceptual necessity. The resulting interpretation of causal modalities is then subsumed under a more general power account of modality, related at a number of points to considerations concerning powers, and further illustrating their philosophical importance.     

Memory and awareness in a patient with multiple personality disorder

We studied an individual with multiple personality disorder in whom each of several personalities claimed to have no direct awareness of the others and to be unable to consciously remember the experiences of other personalities. A broad selection of implicit and explicit memory tests was used to determine the extent to which one personality had access to knowledge acquired by another and the circumstances in which that knowledge would be expressed. The implicit assessment of memory was a necessary but not sufficient condition for demonstrating interpersonality access. The degree of compartmentalization of knowledge in this patient depended largely on whether the interpretation of presented information was likely to differ across personalities.     

Knowledge and beliefs regarding the consequences of cigarette smoking and their relationships to smoking status in a biracial sample

The purpose of this investigation was to evaluate carefully smoking-related knowledge and beliefs and their relationships to smoking status in a large, heterogeneous sample of smokers and nonsmokers in two settings: (a) a large, biracial southern city and (b) a small midwestern community. Participants were 611 (198 male, 413 female) adult respondents to a random-dialing telephone survey in Fargo, North Dakota (n = 200), and Memphis, Tennessee (n = 411). Each participant was given the Smoking Attitudes Survey, which assesses generalized health beliefs as well as health-related problems associated with smoking. Participants' knowledge of smoking-associated diseases (e.g., lung cancer) and of diseases not associated with smoking (e.g., kidney stones) was assessed. Stepwise regression analysis of composite knowledge scores revealed four independent predictors of the health consequences of smoking: education, race, smoking status, and income. Smokers, compared to nonsmokers, reported less knowledge related to the health consequences of smoking, were more likely to be male, were less concerned with the health consequences of smoking, and were more concerned about the health consequences of cholesterol. The best predictor of smokers who had never attempted cessation was their greater concern over weight control when compared to smokers with a history of smoking cessation attempts. The results are discussed in terms of smoking prevention and intervention efforts.     

Studies of psychosocial influences on coronary artery atherogenesis in cynomolgus monkeys

The cynomolgus macaque provides a suitable primate model for studying how psychosocial factors contribute to coronary artery atherogenesis. Important interactions with diet, sex, and behaviorally elicited cardiovascular reactivity are described.     

Changes in functional response units with briefly delayed reinforcement

In two experiments, key-peck responding of pigeons was compared under variable-interval schedules that arranged immediate reinforcement and ones that arranged unsignaled delays of reinforcement. Responses during the nominal unsignaled delay periods had no effect on the reinforcer presentations. In Experiment 1, the unsignaled delays were studied using variable-interval schedules as baselines. Relative to the immediate reinforcement condition, 0.5-s unsignaled delays decreased the duration of the reinforced interresponse times and increased the overall frequency of short (<0.5-s) interresponse times. Longer, 5.0-s unsignaled delays increased the duration of the reinforced interresponse times and decreased the overall frequency of the short interresponse times. In Experiment 2, similar effects to those of Experiment 1 were obtained when the 0.5-s unsignaled delays were imposed upon a baseline schedule that explicitly arranged reinforcement of short interresponse times and therefore already generated a large number of short interresponse times. The results support earlier suggestions that the unsignaled 0.5-s delays change the functional response unit from a single key peck to a multiple key-peck unit. These findings are discussed in terms of the mechanisms by which contingencies control response structure in the absence of specific structural requirements.