The “Brightening” Effect: Reactions to Positive Events in the Daily Lives of Individuals With Major Depressive Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder

Depressed individuals are less reactive than healthy individuals to positive stimuli in the laboratory, but accumulating evidence suggests that they are more emotionally reactive to positive events in their daily lives. The present study probed the boundaries of this curious “mood brightening” effect and investigated its specificity to major depressive disorder (MDD) vis-à-vis generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), its closest boundary condition. We used ecological momentary assessment to measure reactions to positive events over one week in individuals with MDD (n = 38), GAD (n = 36), comorbid MDD-GAD (n = 38), and no psychopathology (n = 33). Depressed individuals responded to positive events with larger changes in affect, cognition, reported withdrawal (but not approach) behavior, and symptoms than healthy controls. More severe depression assessed before the sampling week predicted greater brightening. Altered reactivity to positive events was relatively specific to MDD when compared with GAD, similar to patterns found for other positive emotional processes. The robustness, scope, and relative specificity of the brightening effect highlights the need to resolve conflicting findings across laboratory and non-laboratory studies to advance understanding of altered reactivity in emotional disorders.     

Categories and Dimensions

ABSTRACT— The distinction between categories and dimensions has important consequences for basic and applied science in many areas of psychological research. Decisions as to whether individuals should be assigned to groups or located along one or more continua often are based on personal preferences or discipline-specific measurement traditions, which can lead to the creation, use, or reification of spurious categories or dimensions. Methods for evaluating the latent structure of psychological constructs, using powerful and informative tests between competing models, are available. Rather than choosing on a priori grounds, investigators can perform structural research to evaluate the strength and consistency with which results tease apart categorical and dimensional models. Here, we review why researchers should make this distinction empirically, briefly discuss methods available for doing so, and describe the breadth of areas ripe for exploiting the largely untapped potential of structural research.     

一个参与者眼中的行为遗传学史上的里程碑

行为遗传学的历史,从横切面看,就好似一个由心理学、遗传学、生物学、进化论、人类学、人口学、生物统计、社会学以及法哲学等学科组合成的万花筒。任何一对学科的演进都呈正相关。虽然任何一对学科都不至于相互否定,但是,他们各自独特的历史和人物,又使得每一对学科并不完全相似     

Right hemispatial neglect: frequency and characterization following acute left hemisphere stroke

The frequency of various types of unilateral spatial neglect and associated areas of neural dysfunction after left hemisphere stroke are not well characterized. Unilateral spatial neglect (USN) in distinct spatial reference frames have been identified after acute right, but not left hemisphere stroke. We studied 47 consecutive right handed patients within 48h of left hemisphere stroke to determine the frequency and distribution of types of right USN using cognitive testing and MRI imaging. The distribution of USN types was different from the previously reported distribution following acute right hemisphere stroke. In this left hemisphere stroke population, allocentric neglect was more frequent than egocentric neglect.     

The dilution model: how additional goals undermine the perceived instrumentality of a shared path

Six experiments tested a dilution model of self-regulation, whereby increasing the number of goals (e.g., building muscles and losing weight) that a single means (e.g., exercising) can satisfy reduces the perception of its instrumentality with respect to each goal. The authors found that an increase in the number of simultaneous, salient goals that can be satisfied via a single means weakens the associative strength between that means and each individual goal, and as a result, individuals perceive the means as less effective for the attainment of each goal. Consequently, means that are connected to multiple (vs. single) goals are less likely to be chosen and pursued when only one of these goals is activated.     

Be better or be merry: how mood affects self-control

In 6 studies, the authors tested whether the effect of mood on self-control success depends on a person's accessible goal. We propose that positive mood signals a person to adopt an accessible goal, whereas negative mood signals a person to reject an accessible goal; therefore, if a self-improvement goal is accessible, happy (vs. neutral or unhappy) people perform better on self-control tasks that further that goal. Conversely, if a mood management goal is accessible, happy people abstain from self-control tasks because the tasks are incompatible with this goal. This pattern receives consistent support across several self-control tasks, including donating to charity, demonstrating physical endurance, seeking negative feedback, and completing tests.     

Event-based prospective memory for poorly attended events

In the most frequently used paradigm for studying event-based prospective memory (PM, Einstein & McDaniel, 1990), participants perform an ongoing task and are asked to perform an additional task when a particular stimulus (the PM cue) is presented. In this study three experiments examined how PM performance depends on stimulus selection, which is a major process involved in executive task control according to current theorizing. Participants made semantic judgments about a target word accompanied by two nontargets (distracters). The target was indicated by its spatial position (Experiment 1) or color (Experiment 2). The findings indicated that PM performance was much poorer when the PM cue was irrelevant to the ongoing task, in spite of the fact that nontargets were processed semantically as shown in Experiment 3.     

Experience and appraisal of worry among high worriers with and without generalized anxiety disorder

Recent research has revealed that a large number of highly worried individuals do not qualify for a diagnosis of generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). This raises the intriguing question of why some high worriers are more impaired and distressed by their worrying than others, particularly when the severity of their worry is the same. The present investigation sought to address this question by examining whether GAD and non-GAD high worriers differ in their actual worry experiences, their subjective appraisals of worry experiences, or both experiences and appraisals of worry. GAD and non-GAD worriers, selected for matching levels of trait worry severity, completed an attention-focus task with thought sampling before and after a brief worry induction. They also completed questionnaires assessing their experiences during and after the worry induction, as well as their general beliefs about worry. GAD worriers experienced less control over negative intrusive thoughts immediately after worrying, reported greater somatic hyperarousal following worry, and endorsed several negative beliefs about worry more strongly than their worry-matched controls. Results suggest that GAD is associated with unique experiences and appraisals that distinguish it from other forms of severe worry.     

Two-year-olds' sensitivity to speakers' intent: an alternative account of Samuelson and Smith

Seventy-two 2-year-olds participated in a study designed to test two competing accounts of the effect of contextual change on children's ability to learn a word for an object. The mechanistic account hypothesizes that any change in context that highlights a target object will lead to word learning; the social-pragmatic account maintains that a change in context must be perceived as relevant to the speaker's communicative intentions. Consistent with the latter account, we found that children learned the word when a change in context was intentional but not when it was accidental, and children failed to learn the word for the highlighted object when a speaker naive to the preceding context named the object.