Object-based selection in the Baylis and Driver (1993) paradigm is subject to space-based attentional modulation

Three experiments re-examined Baylis and Driver's (1993) strong evidence for object-based selection, that making relative apex location judgments is harder between two objects than within a single object, with object (figure-ground) segmentation determined solely by color-based perceptual set. Using variations of the Baylis and Driver paradigm, the experiments replicated a two-object cost. However, they also showed a large part of the two-object cost to be attributable to space-based factors, though there remained an irreducible cost consistent with 'true' object-based selection.     

Response times seen as decompression times in Boolean concept use

This paper reports a study of a multi-agent model of working memory (WM) in the context of Boolean concept learning. The model aims to assess the compressibility of information processed in WM. Concept complexity is described as a function of communication resources (i.e., the number of agents and the structure of communication between agents) required in WM to learn a target concept. This model has been successfully applied in measuring learning times for three-dimensional (3D) concepts (Mathy and Bradmetz in Curr Psychol Cognit 22(1):41-82, 2004). In this previous study, learning time was found to be a function of compression time. To assess the effect of decompression time, this paper presents an extended intra-conceptual study of response times for two- and 3D concepts. Response times are measured in recognition phases. The model explains why the time required to compress a sample of examples into a rule is directly linked to the time to decompress this rule when categorizing examples. Three experiments were conducted with 65, 49, and 84 undergraduate students who were given Boolean concept learning tasks in two and three dimensions (also called rule-based classification tasks). The results corroborate the metric of decompression given by the multi-agent model, especially when the model is parameterized following static serial processing of information. Also, this static serial model better fits the patterns of response times than an exemplar-based model.     

Cognitive and linguistic skills in Swedish children with cochlear implants - measures of accuracy and latency as indicators of development

The purpose of the present study was to examine working memory (WM) capacity, lexical access and phonological skills in 19 children with cochlear implants (CI) (5;7-13;4 years of age) attending grades 0-2, 4, 5 and 6 and to compare their performance with 56 children with normal hearing. Their performance was also studied in relation to demographic factors. The findings indicate that children with CI had visuospatial WM capacities equivalent to the comparison group. They had lower performance levels on most of the other cognitive tests. Significant differences between the groups were not found in all grades and a number of children with CI performed within 1 SD of the mean of their respective grade-matched comparison group on most of the cognitive measures. The differences between the groups were particularly prominent in tasks of phonological WM. The results are discussed with respect to the effects of cochlear implants on cognitive development.     

Funny business in branching space-times: infinite modal correlations

The theory of branching space-times is designed as a rigorous framework for modelling indeterminism in a relativistically sound way. In that framework there is room for “funny business”, i.e., modal correlations such as occur through quantum-mechanical entanglement. This paper extends previous work by Belnap on notions of “funny business”. We provide two generalized definitions of “funny business”. Combinatorial funny business can be characterized as “absence of prima facie consistent scenarios”, while explanatory funny business characterizes situations in which no localized explanation of inconsistency can be given. These two definitions of funny business are proved to be equivalent, and we provide an example that shows them to be strictly more general than the previously available definitions of “funny business”.     

Trying and the Arguments from Total Failure

New Volitionalism is a name for certain widespread conception of the nature of intentional action. Some of the standard arguments for New Volitionalism, the so-called arguments from total failure, have even acquired the status of basic assumptions for many other kinds of philosophers. It is therefore of singular interest to investigate some of the most important arguments from total failure. This is what I propose to do in this paper. My aim is not be to demonstrate that these arguments are inconsistent or that total failure and naked tryings are metaphysically impossible. Rather, my aim is be to build a case against the possibility of naked, independently existing tryings, by questioning how well we understand the scenarios invoked in their favour. Thus, rather than attempting to present a definitive metaphysical refutation of New Volitionalism, I attempt to diminish or demolish its underlying motivation.

Processing modifier-head agreement in reading: Evidence for a delayed effect of agreement

The present study examined whether type of inflectional case (semantic or grammatical) and phonological and morphological transparency affect the processing of Finnish modifier-head agreement in reading. Readers' eye movement patterns were registered. In Experiment 1, an agreeing modifier condition (agreement was transparent) was compared with a no-modifier condition, and in Experiment 2, similar constructions with opaque agreement were used. In both experiments, agreement was found to affect the processing of the target noun with some delay. In Experiment 3, unmarked and case-marked modifiers were used. The results again demonstrated a delayed agreement effect, ruling out the possibility that the agreement effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2 reflect a mere modifier-presence effect. We concluded that agreement exerts its effect at the level of syntactic integration but not at the level of lexical access.     

Syntax as a reflex: neurophysiological evidence for early automaticity of grammatical processing

It has been a matter of debate whether the specifically human capacity to process syntactic information draws on attentional resources or is automatic. To address this issue, we recorded neurophysiological indicators of syntactic processing to spoken sentences while subjects were distracted to different degrees from language processing. Subjects were either passively distracted, by watching a silent video film, or their attention was actively streamed away from the language input by performing a demanding acoustic signal detection task. An early index of syntactic violations, the syntactic Mismatch Negativity (sMMN), distinguished between grammatical and ungrammatical speech even under strongest distraction. The magnitude of the early sMMN (at <150ms) was unaffected by attention load of the distraction task. The independence of the early syntactic brain response of attentional distraction provides neurophysiological evidence for the automaticity of syntax and for its autonomy from other attention-demanding processes, including acoustic stimulus discrimination. The first attentional modulation of syntactic brain responses became manifest at a later stage, at approximately 200ms, thus demonstrating the narrowness of the early time window of syntactic autonomy. We discuss these results in the light of modular and interactive theories of cognitive processing and draw inferences on the automaticity of both the cognitive MMN response and certain grammar processes in general.     

A mouse with a roof? effects of phonological neighbors on processing of words in sentences in a non-native language

The architecture of the language processing system for speakers of more than one language remains an intriguing topic of research. A common finding is that speakers of multiple languages are slower at responding to language stimuli in their non-native language (L2) than monolingual speakers. This may simply reflect participants' unfamiliarity with words in the L2, however it may also be the reflection of interference from competing lexical alternatives both across and within the participants' multiple languages. In the current studies (one behavioral, one electrophysiological) we investigate how interference from phonologically similar words within the L2 alone may account for problems in auditory language comprehension in non-native speakers. To this end a cross modal lexical priming (CMLP) paradigm was implemented, which allowed us to look for effects of spoken word primes embedded in sentences on the recognition of target stimuli. Specifically, we investigated whether a word such as mouse, which has a close phonological neighbor, house, would show a modulating effect on recognition of a word semantically related to house but not to mouse (i.e., roof). We hypothesized that L2 speakers, less efficient at categorizing phonemes in their L2 would show a difference in the processing of roof preceded by mouse as compared to roof preceded by another unrelated word, such as lamp, due to a residual co-activation of the phonological neighbor mouse. Furthermore, L1 speakers, highly proficient at recognizing phonemes in their native tongue, should show no such effect. The results of both studies clearly support our hypothesis, indicating that phonological neighbors in the L2 may greatly interfere with L2 word recognition.     

Investigating the effect of mental set on insight problem solving

Mental set is the tendency to solve certain problems in a fixed way based on previous solutions to similar problems. The moment of insight occurs when a problem cannot be solved using solution methods suggested by prior experience and the problem solver suddenly realizes that the solution requires different solution methods. Mental set and insight have often been linked together and yet no attempt thus far has systematically examined the interplay between the two. Three experiments are presented that examine the extent to which sets of noninsight and insight problems affect the subsequent solutions of insight test problems. The results indicate a subtle interplay between mental set and insight: when the set involves noninsight problems, no mental set effects are shown for the insight test problems, yet when the set involves insight problems, both facilitation and inhibition can be seen depending on the type of insight problem presented in the set. A two process model is detailed to explain these findings that combines the representational change mechanism with that of proceduralization.