Mindestanforderungen für Prognosegutachten1

Die aus Richtern am Bundesgerichtshof, Bundesanw?lten, forensischen Psychiatern und Psychologen, Sexualmedizinern und weiteren Juristen bestehende interdisziplin?re Arbeitsgruppe, die sich bereits mit Mindestanforderungen für Schuldf?higkeitsgutachten befasst hat², hat nun auch die nachfolgenden Empfehlungen für die vielf?ltig zu erstattenden forensischen Prognosegutachten erarbeitet. Wegen der H?ufigkeit und der Bedeutung dieser Gutachten in der Strafvollstreckung ist die Arbeitsgruppe um drei erfahrene Vollstreckungsrichter erweitert worden. Die Mitglieder waren: VRinBGH Dr. Rissing-van Saan, VRiBGH Nack, RiBGH Basdorf, RiBGH Dr. Bode, RiBGH Dr. Boetticher, RiBGH Maatz, RiBGH Pfister, VRiBGH a.D. Dr. Sch?fer, die Bundesanw?lte Hannich und Altvater, die Vollstreckungsrichter RiOLG B?hm, Karlsruhe, RiOLG Dr. Müller-Metz, Frankfurt a.M., VRiLG Dr. Wolf, Marburg, der Kriminologe Prof. Dr. Sch?ch, München, der Rechtsanwalt Dr. Deckers, Düsseldorf, die forensischen Psychiater Prof. Dr. Berner, Hamburg, Prof. Dr. Dittmann, Basel, Prof. Dr. Kr?ber, Berlin, Prof. Dr. Leygraf, Essen, Dr. Müller-Isberner, Gie?en, Prof. Dr. Nedopil, München, Prof. Dr. Sa?, Aachen, Dr. Habermeyer, Rostock, die Sexualmediziner Prof. Dr. Dr. Beier, Berlin, Prof. Dr. Bosinski, Kiel, und der Rechtspsychologe Prof. Dr. K?hnken, Kiel. ¹ Dieser Beitrag ist bereits erschienen in NStZ 26:237–544 (2006), Abdruck mit freundlicher Genehmigung des Verlages C. H. Beck ² NStZ 25:57–62 (2005), Nervenarzt 76:1154–1159 (2005), Forens Psychiatr Psychol Kriminol 1:3–9 (2007)     

Statistical power analyses using G<Superscript>*</Superscript>Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses

G^*Power is a free power analysis program for a variety of statistical tests. We present extensions and improvements of the version introduced by Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner (2007) in the domain of correlation and regression analyses. In the new version, we have added procedures to analyze the power of tests based on (1) single-sample tetrachoric correlations, (2) comparisons of dependent correlations, (3) bivariate linear regression, (4) multiple linear regression based on the random predictor model, (5) logistic regression, and (6) Poisson regression. We describe these new features and provide a brief introduction to their scope and handling.     

Subjective measures of consciousness in artificial grammar learning task

Consciousness can be measured in various ways, but different measures often yield different conclusions about the extent to which awareness relates to performance. Here, we compare five different subjective measures of awareness in the context of an artificial grammar learning task. Participants (N=217) expressed their subjective awareness of rules using one of five different scales: confidence ratings (CRs), post-decision wagering (PDW), feeling of warmth (FOW), rule awareness (RAS), and continuous scale (SDS). All scales were equally sensitive to conscious knowledge. PDW, however, was affected by risk aversion, and both RAS and SDS applied different minimal criteria for rule awareness. CR seems to capture the largest range of consciousness, but failed to indicate unconscious knowledge with the guessing criterion. We close by discussing the theoretical implications of scale sensitivity and propose that CR's unique features enable (in conjunction with RAS and FOW) a finer assessment of subjective states of awareness.     

Monetary rewards influence retrieval orientations

Reward anticipation during learning is known to support memory formation, but its role in retrieval processes is so far unclear. Retrieval orientations, as a reflection of controlled retrieval processing, are one aspect of retrieval that might be modulated by reward. These processes can be measured using the event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by retrieval cues from tasks with different retrieval requirements, such as via changes in the class of targeted memory information. To determine whether retrieval orientations of this kind are modulated by reward during learning, we investigated the effects of high and low reward expectancy on the ERP correlates of retrieval orientation in two separate experiments. The reward manipulation at study in Experiment 1 was associated with later memory performance, whereas in Experiment 2, reward was directly linked to accuracy in the study task. In both studies, the participants encoded mixed lists of pictures and words preceded by high- or low-reward cues. After 24?h, they performed a recognition memory exclusion task, with words as the test items. In addition to a previously reported material-specific effect of retrieval orientation, a frontally distributed, reward-associated retrieval orientation effect was found in both experiments. These findings suggest that reward motivation during learning leads to the adoption of a reward-associated retrieval orientation to support the retrieval of highly motivational information. Thus, ERP retrieval orientation effects not only reflect retrieval processes related to the sought-for materials, but also relate to the reward conditions with which items were combined during encoding.     

Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions

It is always great good fortune for an author to have his writings meet with a receptive circle of readers who take them up in their own work and clarify them further. Indeed, it may even be the secret of all theoretical productivity that one reaches an opportune point in one's own creative process when others' queries, suggestions, and criticisms give one no peace, until one has been forced to come up with new answers and solutions. The four essays collected here, in any event, jointly represent an ideal form of such a challenge: I am now compelled to make further theoretical developments and clarifications that lead me to a whole new stage of my own endeavours, well beyond what I initially had in mind in The Struggle for Recognition . For this reason, I will not concentrate here on interpretative issues regarding my earlier work but will instead take up the problems and challenges that have occasioned several revisions on my part. For this reason, it makes sense to begin (in section I) with the points that Carl-Göran Heidegren makes, in terms of a history of social theory, regarding my proposed theory of recognition. The issues that still motivate me today can best be expressed via an engagement with the conscientious interpretations he offers. The core of this rejoinder is based on Heikki Ikäheimo's and Arto Laitinen's suggestions and corrections, which they have used to develop my initial approach further, to the point where the theoretical outlines of a precise and general concept of recognition come into view. It is primarily these two contributions that helped me develop a productive elaboration of my originally vague intuitions (section II). By way of conclusion (in section III), I take up the penetrating questions raised by Antti Kauppinen regarding the use of the concept of recognition in the broader context of social criticism; he has compelled me to take on several extremely helpful clarifications, and they give me the opportunity, in conclusion, to summarize my overarching intentions.     

Adaptive memory: The survival-processing memory advantage is not due to negativity or mortality salience

Recent research has highlighted the adaptive function of memory by showing that imagining being stranded in the grasslands without any survival material and rating words according to their survival value in this situation leads to exceptionally good memory for these words. Studies examining the role of emotions in causing the survival-processing memory advantage have been inconclusive, but some studies have suggested that the effect might be due to negativity or mortality salience. In Experiments 1 and 2, we compared the survival scenario to a control scenario that implied imagining a hopeless situation (floating in outer space with dwindling oxygen supplies) in which only suicide can avoid the agony of choking to death. Although this scenario was perceived as being more negative than the survival scenario, the survival-processing memory advantage persisted. In Experiment 3, thinking about the relevance of words for survival led to better memory for these words than did thinking about the relevance of words for death. This survival advantage was found for concrete, but not for abstract, words. The latter finding is consistent with the assumption that the survival instructions encourage participants to think about many different potential uses of items to aid survival, which may be a particularly efficient form of elaborate encoding. Together, the results suggest that thinking about death is much less effective in promoting recall than is thinking about survival. Therefore, the survival-processing memory advantage cannot be satisfactorily explained by negativity or mortality salience.