The Effect of Humor on Aggression Catharsis in the Classroom

Two studies were designed to measure the cathartic effects of humor on aggressive responses. In the first study, two versions (easy and difficult) of Raven's intelligence test were administered to two groups of high school students. Only the easy version could be solved in the alloted time. Rosenzweig's (1951) Picture Frustration test was then administered and the students' aggressive responses were scored. Results showed that those who did not solve the problems had significantly higher scores on aggressivity than did the others. The second study, using four different groups, was planned according to a modified Solomon design. Two of the four groups of students completed the difficult part of the Raven test, and then two videotapes were presented: a humorous one to two groups and a neutral one to the others. Finally, the Rosenzweig Picture Frustration test was administered to all four groups. An analysis of variance computed on the aggressivity scores showed one significant difference: frustrated students who viewed the humorous videotape had lower scores than those viewing the neutral one.     

On going (and getting) nowhere with our words: New skepticism about the philosophical method of cases

The philosophical “method of cases” has been the subject of intense discussion. In a recent paper, Frank Jackson attempts to vindicate the method by proposing that it is underwritten by the “representational view of language.” Jackson's proposal is potentially very significant. For if it is true, then the method of cases stands, but quite possibly also falls, with the representational view of language as characterized by Jackson. The aim of this paper is to question the philosophical method of cases by showing that it does in fact presuppose a particular view of language that is at the very least questionable, both philosophically and empirically.     

The Sound of Bedrock: Lines of Grammar between Kant,Wittgenstein, and Cavell

In ‘Aesthetics Problems of Modern Philosophy’ Stanley Cavell proposes, first, that Kant's characterization of judgments of beauty may be read as a Wittgensteinian grammatical characterization, and, second, that the philosophical appeal to ‘what we say and mean’ partakes of the grammar of judgment of beauty. I argue first that the expression of the dawning of an aspect partakes of the grammar of judgments of beauty as characterized by Kant, and may also be seen—on a prevailing way of thinking about concepts and how they relate to their instances—to have the same kind of significance that judgments of beauty have according to Kant. And then I argue that there are good (Wittgensteinian) reasons for being suspicious of the prevailing conception of concepts, and therefore good reasons for being suspicious of the proposed understanding of the significance of aspect perception—an understanding that has attracted many readers of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspects. This leads me to suggest that it is actually the philosophical appeal to ordinary language that has the kind of significance that the Kantian picture attributes to judgments of beauty and to the seeing of aspects. In this way, I offer a way to vindicate Cavell's second proposal.     

Urban Preservation and the Judgment of Solomon

ABSTRACT Facing heretofore unknown waves of new immigrants, the Israeli Government and the mayor of Jerusalem issued a comprehensive development programme, including rapid and massive construction. Cities with historical and aesthetic uniqueness, particularly Jerusalem, are likely to lose their special features and beauty. A question is raised: how can an argument in favour of conservation of the special beauties of such cities be advanced in light of the urgent need to supply shelter and jobs for their inhabitants? The paper has two aims: to analyse the reasons for environmental ethics'failure to discuss urban preservation so far, and to put forward a rationale for urban preservation. The latter derives from the political wisdom of King Solomon and from the notion of anthropocentric intrinsic value.     

Environmentalism for Europe — One Model?

Two models of environmentalism are considered. One — hard line environmentalism — is a theory which unites environmental ethics and political theory; the other — soft environmentalism — is a package of the two as two distinctive levels of moral reasoning. It is argued that hard-line environmentalism is a-democratic, rests on wrong methodological assumptions, and is friendly to the environment just so long as being so serves a sought-after 'psychological revolution'. Soft environmentalism is to be preferred also because its idea of democracy must be national and international rather than local. Since in the 'new' Europe people will move very often and will therefore fail to develop a sense of 'place' which is local, it may be a waste of time to emphasise 'localism' as part of environmentalism.