Lost in the wilderness: terror management, action orientation, and nature evaluation

The authors propose that wilderness is intrinsically associated with death, and, consequently, terror management concerns may promote more negative evaluations of wilderness. Consistent with this, wilderness inspired more thoughts about death than either cultivated nature or urban environments (Study 1), and death reminders reduced perceived beauty of wilderness (Study 2). The authors further suggest that active self-regulation facilitates suppression of the dark side of wilderness. Consistent with this, action orientation was positively related to perceived beauty of wilderness (Study 3), and after viewing wilderness, action-oriented individuals were more efficient at suppressing the association between wilderness and death than state-oriented individuals (Study 4). Direct death reminders overruled the effects of action orientation on nature evaluation (Study 5), presumably because direct death reminders are difficult to suppress even for action-oriented individuals.     

An evaluation of the Tripartite Influence Model of body dissatisfaction and eating disturbance with adolescent girls

The Tripartite Influence Model of body image and eating disturbance proposes that three formative influences (peer, parents, and media) affect body image and eating problems through two mediational mechanisms: internalization of the thin-ideal and appearance comparison processes. The current study evaluated this model in a sample of 325 sixth through eighth grade girls. Simple path analyses indicated that internalization and comparison fully mediated the relationship between parental influence and body dissatisfaction and partially mediated the relationship between peer influence and body dissatisfaction. Additionally, internalization and comparison partially mediated the relationship between media influence and body dissatisfaction. Six a priori SEM models based on the full Tripartite Influence Model were also evaluated. A resulting model was found to be an adequate fit to the data, supporting the viability of the Tripartite Model as a useful framework for understanding processes that may predispose young women to develop body image disturbances and eating dysfunction.     

Dissociation and memory fragmentation: experimental effects on meta-memory but not on actual memory performance

The relation between state dissociation and fragmentary memory was investigated by assessing both actual memory performance and meta-memory. From a sample of 330 normal subjects, two subsamples were selected on basis of trait dissociation, as measured by the Dissociative Experience Scale. Twenty subjects scoring above 30 and 20 subjects scoring below 10 were selected. Subjects watched an extremely aversive film, after which state dissociation was measured by the Peri-traumatic Dissociative Experience Scale. Four hours later memory fragmentation was assessed in two ways. Actual fragmentation was measured by a sequential memory task, and perceived fragmentation (meta-memory) was measured using a visual analogue scale. Subjects who tended to dissociate during the film judged their recollections of the film as more fragmentary. Although this finding is in line with clinical reports given by trauma victims, it was not sustained by objective evidence. That is, no effect was observed of state dissociation on the sequential memory task. The present findings suggest that the claim that dissociation induces memory fragmentation may have to be confined to meta-memory. Implications of this divergence between actual memory and meta-memory are discussed.     

Repeated checking causes memory distrust

This paper attempts to explain why in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) checkers distrust in memory persists despite extensive checking. It is argued that: (1) repeated checking increases familiarity with the issues checked; (2) increased familiarity promotes conceptual processing which inhibits perceptual processing; (3) inhibited perceptual processing makes recollections less vivid and detailed and finally; (4) reduction in vividness and detail promotes distrust in memory. An interactive computer animation was developed in which participants had to perform checking rituals on a virtual gas stove. Two separate experiments were carried out with n=39 (Experiment I) and n=40 (Experiment II) healthy participants. In both studies, the control group and the experimental group were given the same pre-test and post-test on the virtual gas stove. In between, the experimental group engaged in 'relevant checking', i.e. checking the gas stove, while the control group engaged in 'irrelevant checking', i.e. checking virtual light bulbs. In both experiments there were powerful effects of repeated 'relevant checking': while actual memory accuracy remained unaffected, the vividness and detail of the recollections were greatly reduced. Most pertinently, in both experiments relevant checking undermined confidence in memory. No such effects were observed in the control group. One might argue that the pre-test/post-test design may have made the control group anticipate a memory assessment at the post-test and that this artifact made them relatively alert producing memory confidence at post test that was artificially high. A third experiment was carried out (n=2 x 20) in which no pre-test was given while, other than that, Experiment III was identical to the first two experiments. Results confirmed earlier findings: compared to the irrelevant checking control group, recollections in the relevant checking group were non-vivid, non-detailed while confidence in memory was low. The theory and data suggest an answer to the question 'why memory distrust persists despite repetitive checking'. In people who check extensively, memory distrust may persist as a result of repetitive checking. OCD checking may be motivated by the wish to reduce uncertainty, but checking appears to be a counter-productive safety strategy. Rather than reducing doubt, checking fosters doubt and ironically increases meta-memory problems.     

Phenomenological validity of an OCD-memory model and the remember/know distinction

In earlier experiments using interactive computer animation with healthy subjects, it was found that displaying compulsive-like repeated checking behavior affects memory. That is, checking does not alter actual memory accuracy, but it does affect 'meta-memory': as checking continues, recollections are experienced as less vivid and less detailed while confidence in memory is undermined. This procedure provides a model of OCD checking and suggests that checking is a counterproductive strategy to reduce memory distrust. The present experiment was carried out to specify the phenomenological quality of memory distrust after checking and to see if repeated checking produces a shift in the memory source that is used to decide about the outcome of checking: from 'remembering' to 'knowing' (Tulving, 1985). Using the same interactive computer-animation, the earlier findings on vividness, detail and confidence were replicated. In addition, it was found that checking made participants endorse quotations from OCD patients (Reed, 1985) expressing a specific ambivalence about memory: 'It is as though the memory is there, but is isn't definite enough', 'I remember doing it in a way, but it's all fuzzy....' And 'I can remember that I've done it. But the memory isn't clear somehow'. This finding adds to the validity of the experimental model. Furthermore, after checking subjects' beliefs about the outcome of checking became based on (general) knowing instead of (specific) remembering. It is suggested that OCD checkers feel a general and relatively strong need to be certain about the veracity of recollections and that they have high standards for memory performance. This may explain earlier findings that OCD checkers have a general tendency to distrust their episodic memory. A need for certainty and a critical attitude towards memory performance may not be problematic or abnormal. It is suggested that clinical problems arise when the patient tries to fight memory distrust by repeated checking. The latter does not reduce distrust but rather increases distrust and the patient may get trapped in a spiral of mutually reinforcing checking behavior and memory distrust.     

The role of cognitive variables in psychological functioning after the death of a first degree relative

The present study sought to explore the relationship between negative cognitions and emotional problems after bereavement, with a group of 329 adults who had suffered the loss of a first degree relative. The following cognitions were assessed: global negative beliefs, cognitions about self-blame, negative cognitions about other people's responses after the loss, and negative cognitions about one's own grief reactions. Results showed that each of these cognitive variables was significantly related to the severity of symptoms of traumatic grief, depression and anxiety, even when background and loss-related variables that were initially found to influence symptom severity, were statistically controlled. When the shared variance between the cognitive variables was controlled, it was found that global negative beliefs about life, the world, and the future, and threatening interpretations of grief reactions each explained a unique proportion of variance in traumatic grief symptom severity. Global negative beliefs about life, the self and the future, and threatening interpretations of grief explained most variance in depression, while negative beliefs about the self and threatening interpretations of grief explained most variance in anxiety. Overall, the findings are in support of cognitive theories of grief, and suggest that effective treatment of problematic grief will need to address negative cognitions.     

Avoidant personality disorder and implicit schema-congruent information processing bias: a pilot study with a pragmatic inference task.

Cognitive theory of personality disorders hypothesizes that each personality disorder is characterized by typical maladaptive schemes and that these schemas direct the processing of information resulting in schema-congruent biases. With regard to the avoidant personality disorder, these hypotheses were put to an initial test in a pilot study, using a self-report questionnaire to asses DSM-III-R personality pathology, a belief questionnaire to assess avoidant schemas and a pragmatic inference task to assess schema-congruent implicit attributional bias. Participants were students (n = 57) who scored high or low on DSM-III-R avoidant personality pathology. As predicted from cognitive theory, DSM-III-R avoidant personality pathology was associated with avoidant beliefs (t(45.1) = 4.68, p < 0.001) and avoidant beliefs were associated with schema-congruent information processing bias (t(55) = 2.17, p = 0.02, one-tailed test). However, DSM-III-R avoidant personality pathology was not associated with schema-congruent information processing bias (t(55) = 0.17, p = 0.43, one-tailed test). In addition to avoidant beliefs, low self-esteem was also related to the information processing bias. Social phobia and general personality pathology, two other control variables, were not. The findings warrant further study using the pragmatic inference task in a clinical group.     

Fear relevance and diminution of unconditioned skin conductance responses.

According to Donegan and Wagner's priming model [1987], a signalled UCS will elicit a smaller UCR than an unsignalled UCS. Assuming that fear-relevant CSs are good predictors of aversive UCSs, while fear-irrelevant CSs are relatively bad predictors of aversive UCSs, the present study examined the effect of fear relevance on electrodermal UCR diminution during the acquisition phase of a single cue conditioning procedure. Four groups were studied, each of which consisted of 12 subjects. Group 1 had a fear-relevant CS (a slide of an angry face) paired with a UCS (7 mA shock), whereas group 2 had a fear-irrelevant CS (a slide of a happy face) paired with a UCS. Groups 3 and 4 had unpaired presentations of the CS and UCS and served as control groups for 1 and 2. There were 4 habituation, 8 acquisition, 4 recovery (UCS-only), and 6 extinction (CS-only) trials. While overall UCR levels were lower in the paired than in the unpaired control groups, it was also found that the size of UCR decrement and subsequent recovery was greater in the angry face CS-paired group than in the happy face CS-paired group. This finding is in line with the predictions that flow from the Donegan and Wagner model.     

Local homogeneity in latent trait models. A characterization of the homogeneous monotone irt model

The stochastic subject formulation of latent trait models contends that, within a given subject, the event of obtaining a certain response pattern may be probabilistic. Ordinary latent trait models do not imply that these within-subject probabilities are identical to the conditional probabilities specified by the model. The latter condition is called local homogeneity. It is shown that local homgeneity is equivalent to subpopulation invariance of the model. In case of the monotone IRT model, local homogeneity implies absence of item bias, absence of item specific traits, and the possibility to join overlapping subtests. The following characterization theorem is proved: the homogeneous monotone IRT model holds for a finite or countable item pool if and only if the pool is experimentally independent and pairwise nonnegative association holds in every positive subpopulation.This research was supported by the Dutch Interuniversity Graduate School of Psychometrics and Sociometrics. The authors wish to thank two reviewers for their thorough comments.     

The effects of incorrect pain expectations on acquired fear and pain responses

Previous experimental research on the effects of incorrect intensity expectations of aversive events can be criticized because intensity expectations were not manipulated independently from changes in objective intensity. The present study aims at investigating the effects of incorrect intensity expectations on the immediate and later responses to a painful stimulus, and on the acquisition of anticipatory responses, with proper experimental control. Subjects (n = 62) received 20 painful stimuli of varying intensity. In the control group intensities were correctly signalled on all trials by an analogue signal. On 3 trials the signal was too large in the overprediction condition, and too small in the underestimation condition. Underpredicted painful experiences were related to subsequent higher pain responses on the physiological level, but not on the subjective level; and to increased anticipatory responses (increased pain expectations, uncertainty, subjective fear, skin conductance responses). Skin conductance level also indicated increased fear after underpredicted experiences. Overpredicted painful experiences were related to a faster decrease in subjective fear compared to the control group, but did not influence other variables. The findings support the notion that underpredictions contribute to the acquistion of fear and disrupt habituation processes. The asymmetrical processing of the two kinds of incorrectly predicted experiences is discussed.