Suppression-induced hyperaccessibility of thoughts in abstinent alcoholics: a preliminary investigation

Abstinent alcoholics were compared to a non-alcoholic control group on a modified Stroop color-naming task. Alcoholics took significantly longer to name the color of the word "alcohol" than to name the color of non-alcohol words (i.e., they showed an interference effect) after they had first tried to suppress thoughts of alcohol. Alcoholics who had freely expressed thoughts about alcohol prior to the Stroop did not show such interference. Control participants who had suppressed thoughts of alcohol showed no interference effect. The results overall suggest that when alcoholics try to suppress thoughts of alcohol, these thoughts may become hyperaccessible immediately afterward.     

Infants' timing strategies to optical collisions: a longitudinal study

Blinking is a good indication of awareness to optical collisions in early infancy. In the current longitudinal study, infants were presented with the image of a looming virtual object approaching on a collision course under different constant velocities and constant accelerations. The aim was to investigate which timing strategies the infants used to determine when to make the defensive blink. Blinking when the virtual object reaches a threshold visual angle (angle-strategy) or angular velocity would result in difficulties with accelerating approaches, while blinking when the object is a certain time away (time-strategy) would enable successful responses to all approaches. Eleven infants were tested longitudinally at 22, 26, and 30 weeks. Five infants switched from an angle- to a time-strategy, while one infant switched from using angular velocity to a time-strategy. Five infants used a time-strategy already at 22 weeks. These findings show that with age there is an attunement in the perceptual systems of infants which makes them switch to better specifying variables, enabling them to successfully time their defensive blinking to impending optical collisions.     

Still Mythic After All Those Years: On Alston's Latest Defense of the Given

Wilfrid Sellars' conclusion in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" that "the Given" is a "Myth" quickly elicited philosophical opposition and remains contentious fifty years later. William Alston has challenged that conclusion on several occasions by attempting to devise an acceptable account of perception committed to the givenness of perceived objects. His most recent challenge advances a "Theory of Appearing" which posits irreducible non-conceptual relations, ostensibly overlooked by Sellars, e.g., of "looking red", between the subject and the object perceived, that can play a justificatory role vis-à-vis the corresponding beliefs, e.g., that the object is red. I argue that Alston undermines his positive plausibility arguments by first blurring and then ignoring crucial differences among various looks-concepts, and that his own putative "phenomenal" looks-concept demonstrably cannot play the justificatory role that he envisions for it. Both his critique of Sellars' arguments and his own alternative proposal thus fail on all fronts.