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31.
Robert Audi 《Ratio》2004,17(2):119-149
The concepts of reasons as supporting elements, of practical reason as a capacity, and of practical reasoning as a process are central in the theory of action. This paper provides a brief account of each. Several kinds of reason for action are distinguished. Practical reason is characterized both as a capacity whose exercise is largely constituted by a kind of responsiveness to reasons and as governed by certain normative principles; and practical reasoning is described as a kind of mental process in which reasons figure as premises and, from those premises, a practical conclusion is drawn. Much of the paper undertakes two related tasks: to distinguish the main kinds of practical reasoning and the associated criteria of assessment and to formulate some important substantive principles of practical reason. These principles yield criteria of several sorts: logical, inferential, epistemic, and material. On the theory presented, although any (non‐basic) intentional act can be grounded in practical reasoning, the same acts can be performed for the relevant reason(s) without being so grounded, and in either case their rationality depends on adequate support by the reason(s). One kind of reason is commonly thought to be captured by Kantian hypothetical imperatives. The final sections explore what constitutes a hypothetical imperative and what other principles are needed to account for practical rationality. A major conclusion is that in the domain of practical reason, if there are no categorical imperatives, there are no hypothetical imperatives either. 相似文献
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Robert Audi 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):43-54
This paper explores what constitutes reliability in persons, particularly intellectual reliability. It considers global reliability, the overall reliability of persons, encompassing both the theoretical and practical realms; sectorial reliability, that of a person in a subject-matter (or behavioral) domain; and focal reliability, that of a particular element, such as a belief. The paper compares reliability with predictability of the kind most akin
to it and distinguishes reliability as an intellectual virtue from reliability as an intellectual power. The paper also connects
reliability with insight, reasoning, knowledge, and trust. It is argued that insofar as reliability is an intellectual virtue,
it must meet both external standards of correctitude and internal standards of justification.
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Robert AudiEmail: |
33.
Robert Audi 《Synthese》2008,161(3):403-418
Most of the literature on doxastic voluntarism has concentrated on the question of the voluntariness of belief and the issue
of how our actual or possible control of our beliefs bears on our justification for holding them and on how, in the light
of this control, our intellectual character should be assessed. This paper largely concerns a related question on which less
philosophical work has been done: the voluntariness of the grounding of belief and the bearing of various views about this matter on justification, knowledge, and intellectual virtue. In part,
my concern is the nature and extent of our voluntary control over our responses to reasons for believing—or over what we take
to be such reasons. This paper provides a partial account of such control and, on the basis of the account, will clarify the
criteria for appraising intellectual virtue. 相似文献
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Robert Audi 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,63(1-3):87-102
Belief is a central focus of inquiry in the philosophy of religion and indeed in the field of religion itself. No one conception
of belief is central in all these cases, and sometimes the term ‘belief’ is used where ‘faith’ or ‘acceptance’ would better
express what is intended. This paper sketches the major concepts in the philosophy of religion that are expressed by these
three terms. In doing so, it distinguishes propositional belief (belief that) from both objectual belief (believing something to have a property) and, more importantly, belief in (a trusting attitude that is illustrated by at least many paradigm cases of belief in God). Faith is shown to have a similar
complexity, and even propositional faith divides into importantly different categories. Acceptance differs from both belief
and faith in that at least one kind of acceptance is behavioral in a way neither of the other two elements is. Acceptance
of a proposition, it is argued, does not entail believing it, nor does believing entail acceptance in any distinctive sense
of the latter term. In characterizing these three notions (and related ones), the paper provides some basic materials important
both for understanding a person’s religious position and for appraising its rationality. The nature of religious faith and
some of the conditions for its rationality, including some deriving from elements of an ethics of belief, are explored in
some detail. 相似文献
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The Journal of Ethics - 相似文献
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This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge. 相似文献
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