Differential developmental trajectories for egocentric, environmental and intrinsic frames of reference in spatial memory

We studied the development of spatial frames of reference in children aged 3-6 years, who retrieved hidden toys from an array of identical containers bordered by landmarks under four conditions. By moving the child and/or the array between presentation and test, we varied the consistency of the hidden toy with (i) the body, and (ii) the testing room. The toy's position always remained consistent with (iii) the array and bordering landmarks. We found separate, additive performance advantages for consistency with body and room. These effects were already present at 3 years. A striking finding was that the room effect, which implies allocentric representations of the room and/or egocentric representations updated by self-motion, was much stronger in the youngest children than the body effect, which implies purely egocentric representations. Children as young as 3 years therefore had, and greatly favoured, spatial representations that were not purely egocentric. Viewpoint-independent recall based only on the array and bordering landmarks emerged at 5 years. There was no evidence that this later-developing ability, which implies object-referenced (intrinsic) representations, depended on verbal encodings. These findings indicate that core components of adult spatial competence, including parallel egocentric and nonegocentric representations of space, are present as early as 3 years. These are supplemented by later-developing object-referenced representations.     

The Solvability of Probabilistic Regresses. A Reply to Frederik Herzberg

We have earlier shown by construction that a proposition can have a welldefined nonzero probability, even if it is justified by an infinite probabilistic regress. We thought this to be an adequate rebuttal of foundationalist claims that probabilistic regresses must lead either to an indeterminate, or to a determinate but zero probability. In a comment, Frederik Herzberg has argued that our counterexamples are of a special kind, being what he calls ‘solvable’. In the present reaction we investigate what Herzberg means by solvability. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making solvability a sine qua non, and we ventilate our misgivings about Herzberg’s suggestion that the notion of solvability might help the foundationalist.     

Beyond Components of Wellbeing: The Effects of Relational and Situated Assemblage

Despite multiple axes of variation in defining wellbeing, the paper argues for the dominance of a ‘components approach’ in current research and practice. This approach builds on a well-established tradition within the social sciences of attending to categories whether for their identification, their value or their meanings and political resonance. The paper critiques the components approach and explores how to move beyond it towards conceptually integrating the various categories and dimensions through a relational and situated account of wellbeing. Drawing on more fluid social sciences, wellbeing is framed as an effect, dependent on the mobilisation of resources from everyday encounters with complex assemblages of people, things and places. Through such a framing, wellbeing can be conceived of as stable and amenable to change, as individual and collective and as subjective and objective. Policy interventions then need to attend to the relationalities of particular social and spatial contexts.     

Quality adjusted survival analysis: A neglected application of the quality of well-being scale

Abstract

Background In survival analysis, those who are alive are statistically coded as 1.0 while those who are dead are coded as 0.0. Since everyone who remains alive is given the same score, a person confined to bed with an irreversible coma is alive and is counted the same as someone who is active and asymtomatic. The Quality of Well-being (QWB) scale defines levels of wellness on the continuum between death and optimum function and integrates morbidity and mortality into the same number. This paper demonstrates the effect of including mortality in QWB estimates for male adults with HIV infection.

Method This study involves follow-up of a cohort of 386 male adults participating in the San Diego HIV Neurobehavioral Research Center (HNRC). Patients were evaluated using the QWB at enrollment and at six month intervals. All patients were classified into three stages of HIV disease according to the Center for Disease Control (CDC) classification: CDC IV (symptomatic HIV disease), CDC II or III (asymptomatic infection) and uninfected male controls.

Results QWB scores were calculated with and without mortality included for men in each CDC class who completed a one year (N = 148) or two year follow-up (N = 60). At each evaluation, there were significant differences among CDC classes and inclusion of deaths increased the variance accounted for by CDC class at each evaluation.

Conclusions HIV infection has significant impacts upon both morbidity and mortality. Survival analysis captures only the mortality dimension, while quality adjusted survival analysis using the QWB includes both dimensions. We propose quality adjusted survival analysis as a more sensitive method for assessing outcome in HIV disease and other health conditions.     

When Are Thought Experiments Poor Ones?

A characteristic of contemporary analytic philosophy is its ample use of thought experiments. We formulate two features that can lead one to suspect that a given thought experiment is a poor one. Although these features are especially in evidence within the philosophy of mind, they can, surprisingly enough, also be discerned in some celebrated scientific thought experiments. Yet in the latter case the consequences appear to be less disastrous. We conclude that the use of thought experiments is more successful in science than in philosophy. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.