Talking loudly but lazing at work—Behavioral effects of stereotypes are context dependent

Recent research suggests that stereotype activation is context dependent. In the current research, we tested whether this context‐dependence also generalizes to behavioral effects of stereotypes. Extending previous findings, we could show that activation of the category “Italians” in a work context (but not in an interaction context) resulted in slow behavior (Experiment 1), whereas it increased the loudness of speech in an interaction context (but not in a work context; Experiment 2). Our results further strengthen the notion of context‐specific mental representations of stereotypes. Stereotypic attributes become activated and exert their influence on behavior in close correspondence with the current situation. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Branching in the landscape of possibilities

The metaphor of a branching tree of future possibilities has a number of important philosophical and logical uses. In this paper we trace this metaphor through some of its uses and argue that the metaphor works the same way in physics as in philosophy. We then give an overview of formal systems for branching possibilities, viz., branching time and (briefly) branching space-times. In a next step we describe a number of different notions of possibility, thereby sketching a landscape of possibilities. In the final section of the paper we look at the place of branching-based possibilities in that larger landscape of possibilities. Our main message is that far from being an outlandish metaphysical extravagancy, branching-based possibilities are epistemically as well as metaphysically basic.     

On the fate of distractor representations

Research on the topic of distractor inhibition has used different empirical approaches to study how the human mind selects relevant information from the environment, and the results are controversially discussed. One key question that typically arises is how selection deals with the irrelevant information. We used a new selection task, in which participants sometimes had to respond to the distractors instead of the target. Importantly, we varied the time interval between stimuli onset and the cue that signaled participants to respond to the distractors. We analyzed RTs and error rates from responses to distractors as a function of how long the target had been processed (and the distractor ignored) before the cue required a response to the distractor (i.e., stimulus-cue SOA). The data are compatible with selection models assuming that distractor stimuli are initially activated and then deactivated. Thus, we argue for selection models assuming top down deactivation of distractor representations that work in parallel with top down activation of target representations.     

Top-down control of attention: it's gradual, practice-dependent, and hierarchically organized

When searching for a "pop-out" target, interference from a salient but irrelevant distractor can be reduced or even prevented under certain circumstances. Here, five experiments were conducted to further our understanding of three different aspects of top-down interference reduction: first, whether or not qualitatively different search modes can account for different reduction patterns; second, whether distractor practice plays a causal role in reduction; and third, how specific reduction is, that is, whether interference by intradimensional distractors can be reduced as effectively as interference by cross-dimensional distractors. The results provide evidence that interference reduction does not critically depend on the implementation of a feature search mode, but rather on practice with the distractor, that is, the acquisition of an effective suppression strategy. In addition, they suggest that interference reduction is based on hierarchically organized feature weighting ("dimension weighting"), rather than on completely independent feature weighting.     

Lexical representation of schwa words: two mackerels, but only one salami

The present study investigated the lexical representations underlying the production of English schwa words. Two types of schwa words were compared: words with a schwa in poststress position (e.g., mackerel), whose schwa and reduced variants differ in a categorical way, and words with a schwa in prestress position (e.g., salami), whose variants differ in a noncategorical way. Participants named pseudohomophones and matched pseudowords corresponding to schwa and reduced variants of these words. Results revealed an advantage for pseudohomophones over matched pseudowords for both variants of poststress schwa words but only for schwa variants of prestress schwa words. As the pseudohomophone advantage is assumed to reflect the activation of a phonologically matching stored phonological representation, these results suggest that both variants of poststress schwa words are lexically represented while only schwa variants of prestress schwa words are. This result extends the proposal that words with two categorically distinct variants are stored in the production lexicon with 2 representations to another language and demonstrates that this 2-lexeme account does not generalize to pronunciation variants differing from one another in a noncategorical fashion. This finding challenges one of the widely shared assumption of generative models of word production: that content words have only 1 phonological representation. On the other hand, it provides further evidence in favor of another fundamental assumption of these models: that lexical representations are abstract sets of segments rather than fully detailed exemplars.     

Mind and movement

Voluntary movements embrace both intentional, conscious and post-intentional, largely automatic processes. Here, we examine these types of processes and the relations between them during preparation and execution of voluntary movements. First, a general overview is given about how intentional and post-intentional components are interleaved to enable successful control of purposeful movements. Second, we briefly describe some post-intentional processes that are triggered by preceding intentions. Third, we discuss findings according to which such post-intentional processes or their results can become accessible to conscious awareness. Under such conditions, automatic and conscious processes can co-occur. We show that intentional interventions into post-intentional processes can be overridden by automatic processes, can interfere with automatic processes and can be independent so that their outcomes add to those of automatic processes.     

Eating Goldstone Bosons in a Phase Transition: A Critical Review of Lyre’s Analysis of the Higgs Mechanism

In this note, I briefly review Lyre’s (2008) analysis and interpretation of the Higgs mechanism. Contrary to Lyre, I maintain that, on the proper understanding of the term, the Higgs mechanism refers to a physical process in the course of which gauge bosons acquire a mass. Since also Lyre’s worries about imaginary masses can be dismissed, a realistic interpretation of the Higgs mechanism seems viable. While it may remain an open empirical question whether the Higgs mechanism did actually occur in the early history of the universe and what the details of the mechanism are, I claim that the term can certainly refer to a physical process.     

The Structure of Causal Sets

More often than not, recently popular structuralist interpretations of physical theories leave the central concept of a structure insufficiently precisified. The incipient causal sets approach to quantum gravity offers a paradigmatic case of a physical theory predestined to be interpreted in structuralist terms. It is shown how employing structuralism lends itself to a natural interpretation of the physical meaning of causal set theory. Conversely, the conceptually exceptionally clear case of causal sets is used as a foil to illustrate how a mathematically informed rigorous conceptualization of structure serves to identify structures in physical theories. Furthermore, a number of technical issues infesting structuralist interpretations of physical theories such as difficulties with grounding the identity of the places of highly symmetrical physical structures in their relational profile and what may resolve these difficulties can be vividly illustrated with causal sets.