Potential Bone-Marrow Donors and Their Spouses: The Effects of Volunteerism on Distress Levels1

The current study sought to provide a better understanding of the reactions of bone-marrow volunteers to the possibility of donating by examining these volunteers in the context of their closest relationships. Using Tesser's (1988) self-evaluation maintenance (SEM) model as a guide, we examined the influence of spouses who are also volunteers on each member of the couple's distress levels and on the marrow volunteer's ambivalence about donating. We also examined the independent effects of known risk factors for donation-related distress and the combined effects of spouse volunteer status and these risk factors on distress levels. Questionnaire data were collected from 278 couples selected from 39 bone-marrow donor centers. Results demonstrated that when spouses of potential donors were engaged in any type of volunteer activity, members of the couple felt greater anxiety than when spouses were not volunteers. Additionally, other variables were found to have a conjoint effect with spouse volunteer status on volunteer and spouse anxiety levels.     

Frequency judgements: the problem of defining a perceptual event

In four experiments the conditions under which frequency judgments reflect the relative frequency of complex perceptual events were explored. Subjects viewed a series of 4 x 4 grids each containing seven items, which were letters and numbers in one of four typefaces. Later judgments of the relative frequency with which particular letters appeared in particular typefaces were unaffected by a warning about an upcoming frequency judgment task, but were affected by both the time available for processing the stimuli and the nature of the cover task subjects engaged in while viewing the grids. Frequency judgments were poor when exposure durations were less than 2 s and when the cover task directed subjects' attention merely to the locations of the items within the grids. Frequency judgments improved when the cover task directed subjects' attention to the identity of the stimuli, especially to the conjunction of letter and typeface. The results suggest that frequency estimation of complex stimuli may be possible only for stimuli that have been processed as phenomenal objects.     

Book reviews

Hall, G. (1991). Perceptual and associative leaning. Oxfod: Clarendon Press. Pp. xi + 300. ISBN 0-19-8524182-0. £35.00.

Rahmann, H., & Rahmann, M. (1992). The neurobilogical basis of memoy and behavior. New York: Springe Verlag. Pp. 292. ISBN 3-540-97545-4. £53.00.

Iversen, I.H., & Lattal, K.A. (Eds.). (1991). Experimental analysis of behavior, arts 1 and 2. Techniques in the behavioral and neural sciences, volume 6 (series editor: J.P Huston). Amstedam: Elsevier. Pp. 724. ISBN 0-444-8932-2. £50.00 (paperback).

Baudry, M., & Davis, J.L. (Eds.) (1991). Long-tem potentiation: A debate of current issues. Cambridge, Ma & London, England: MIT Press. Pp. xxii + 454. ISBN 0-262-02330-x. £62.95 (Hb).

The Biological Council Animal Reseach and Welfare Panel (1992). Guidelines on the handling and training of laboatory animals. Univer-sities Federation for Animal Welfare. Pp. ISBN 0-900767-77-4. £2.50.     

Liberalism, legal moralism and moral disagreement

According to "legal moralism" it is part of law's proper role to "enforce morality as such". I explore the idea that legal moralism runs afoul of morality itself: there are good moral reasons not to require by law all that there is nevertheless good moral reason to do. I suggest that many such reasons have broad common-sense appeal and could be appreciated even in a society in which everyone completely agreed about what morality requires. But I also critique legal moralism from the special perspective of liberal political justice. Liberalism requires that citizens who disagree with one another on a number of morally significant matters nevertheless coexist and cooperate within a political framework of basic rights protections. When it comes to working out the most basic terms of their political association, citizens are expected to address one another within the limits of what Rawls has called "public reason". Critics of liberalism claim that this is an essentially a-moral (or expedient) attempt to evade substantive moral issues--such as the moral status of the fetus. I argue, on the contrary, that liberalism's emphasis on public reason is itself grounded in very deep--though (suitably) "non-comprehensive"--moral considerations.