The effects of perceived parental rearing style on the development of Type A pattern

The aetiological antecedents of the Type A pattern have not been studied widely. In the present study the effects of parental rearing practices on the development of Type A pattern were evaluated. Perceived parental rearing style was assessed by the EMBU and Type A pattern by the JAS. Subjects were drawn from a random sample of residents (older than 21 years) of a Dutch community. Results suggested that a significant amount of variance of Type A behaviour can be accounted for by perceived parental characteristics, especially rejection and lack of emotional warmth. It is suggested that lack of emotional warmth and negative evaluation of children by their parents may lead to an internalized maladaptive cognitive set in the children which may be a developmental antecedent for eliciting the competitiveness, achievement striving, and sense of time urgency characteristic of Type A adults.     

Reasons for employee sabotage in the workplace

Unionized workers at a factory were asked to rate a variety of reasons which would justify the use of sabotage in an organization, as well as the justifiability of four general methods of sabotage (slowdowns, destructiveness, dishonesty, and causing chaos). Results showed that as compared to those who didn't accept a wide variety of reasons for sabotage, those who accepted a variety of reasons would more readily justify all forms of sabotage except dishonesty. The data is discussed in terms of the reasons for the lack of justification that dishonesty receives, as well as future directions for the study of sabotage.     

Male liberation

This article on Liberation approaches the subject from the perspective ofmen. Women have taken the lead in trying to throw off the bondage of patriarchy. Men have, for the most part, been reactors to the evolving changes. The author feels that there is a more creative role for men to play, but first, we must become more conscious of the ways in which our privileged position oppresses us. The author documents this dynamic as well as points to some possible directions for men to move in their personal and professional lives. The priority on developing collegiality and inclusiveness in our professional associations gives this subject an important place in our thinking and decisionmaking.This paper was read at a workshop on male liberation at the National A.A.P.C. Convention in San Antonio, April 30,1982.     

Auditory-visual interaction and the timing of inputs

Summary The objective of this study was to analyze the structural properties of the respective inputs that are conducive to immediate auditory-visual cross-modal bias. The study was designed as an updated and extended replication of one by Thomas (1941). Subjects were presented with either auditory or visual target signals in several positions around the median plane, together with a competing signal, always in the other modality, 15° to the left or to the right of that plane. The task was to indicate whether the target signal came left or right of center. Target and competing signals were delivered according to three temporal configurations: continuously on for 4 s, or periodically interrupted at either a fast or a slow tempo, and all combinations of the three configurations were used. Judgements of the location of the auditory target signal were attracted toward the visual competing signal in all conditions but two, those with a periodic target signal and a continuous competing one. Conditions with the two signals in the same configuration yielded larger biases than those combining different configurations, confirming that synchronization of discordant inputs is a major condition of cross-modal interactions. The occurrence of significant bias in nonsynchronous conditions, on the other hand, suggests that another factor might be the attraction of localization responses by competing signals with salient temporal configurations, and that interruption might be one important source of saliency. Auditory biases of visual localization were, as usual, smaller than visual biases, but nevertheless reached significance in a majority of conditions, and were also influenced by timing in much the same way as the latter.This work was supported in part by the Belgian Fonds de la Recherche Fondamentale Collective (FRFC) under convention 2.4505.80. The first author is Chercheur qualifié of the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS). The results have already been reported at the Symposium on Perception, Action and Development, Brussels, January 1984     

目的、意向和意识

本文提出了一个意向性目标搜寻的计算机模型,它有两个部分,静态部分包括一个目标表征和到达这个目标的程序。动态部分是一个感觉输入、中间信息加工,行为输出的重复的反馈循环。人类意向必然伴有意识,但机器人则可能无意识而有意向。 利用目标搜寻系统机器人模型,我们对目标搜寻系统的目的连续统下了定义;这个连续统从简单的直接反应系统一直到意向性系统。对这个目的连续统有两种传统的解释:一是柏拉图、亚里士多德和普罗提诺的终极原因理论,二是希腊原子论者和现代进化生物学家的还原主义学说。本文评价了这些学说。 本文考察了几种类型的意识机能,提出了以自动机为依据的意识理论,比较了人类和计算机。从计算机结构的角度来看,人类意识是一类特殊的计算机控制系统。     

Ineffability and intelligibility: Towards an understanding of the radical unlikeness of religious experience

Conclusion I do not for a moment question the fact that many people have experiences of a special type which may be termed religious, that such experiences often involve reference to something which appears to display a radical unlikeness to all else and that they are therefore in some sense inexpressible. Doubtless the ideas I have put forward about the possible source of such unlikeness and ineffability might suggest models of God which would not find much theological approval, at least within any mainstream theistic tradition, since some sort of pantheism seems inevitably to be implied. But however this might be, the concept of radical unlikeness as it has been analyzed here can, I think, help us towards understanding certain problematic areas in religion quite apart from the issue of intelligibility, which has been the focus of this discussion.To begin with, radical unlikeness suggests a way in which the historical continuity of concepts of the transcendent might be upheld against the discontinuity suggested by the diversity of interpretations through which they have moved. Ancient and modern outlooks on, say, God differ enormously, as indeed do the range of co-temporal accounts at many particular moments. But, by and large, theologians firmly maintain that it is a single and unchanging phenomenon which is being dealt with. Unless we can point to some common element which is both specific enough to create a binding sense of common tradition, yet never completely expressed by any attempt at understanding it within that tradition (thus persistently demanding new attempts to apprehend it), then given the widely differing views of God within, for example, the Christian community, it is difficult to see how we could assume that in fact they all stemmed from the same source and were talking about the same thing. The idea of radical unlikeness could provide an element with just these required characteristics: it could be seen as what all the accounts attempt to net, with varying degrees of adequacy, within their offered interpretations. It could be seen as what remains constant, constantly elusive yet constantly generative of fresh attempts to apprehend it, throughout a history of intra-religious diversity. Secondly, radical unlikeness might suggest a possible way of understanding inter-religious diversity in a way which allows that whilst such diversity exists, whilst the differences between religions are real, they are grounded in a similar root-experience. It may, at first sight, seem difficult to continue thinking of the various religious traditions as truly separate phenomena if they are taken as being grounded on experiences whose ineffability stems from the unlikeness of experiencing things as a whole. Here we must stress again that if they are to be considered intelligible, radically unlike experiences cannot be considered completely so - or putting this another way, we cannot more than approach experience of totality. Sense can be given to religious claims of ineffability by suggesting experience of near totality, where we reach the last point on the scale of inclusiveness which complies with the logical criteria demanded of something for it to be possible for us to be aware of it. We might thus attempt an explanation of inter-religious diversity based on the view that Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam etc. acquire their differences from the different elements included in their experience of near totality. Taking totality to be represented by the scale of one to ten, Hinduism might be seen as grounded on experience of 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-9-10, Buddhism on experience of 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 and so on. The resulting dissimilarities are thus centred not on different types of experience, but on different areas of inclusiveness. This is, of course, to suppose that the various religious traditions are all based on the same degree (as opposed to the same elements) of inclusiveness, but it is by no means clear that such a supposition is justified. Continuing with our decimal analogy, might it not be suggested that whilst Christianity stemmed from experience of 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10, Jainism was founded on a less extensive encounter with the divine (say 4-5-6-7-8-9-10)? It is, however, uncertain how we can compare and evaluate different religious traditions in such a way as to be able to comment on such claims. The analysis of radical unlikeness and ineffability which has been advanced might also suggest a way in which certain passages in religious writings could be understood, passages which at first sight can be seriously perplexing. If, for example, to return to the quotation given in the introductory section of this paper, we continue to think of accounts of the nature of Shiva as being attempts to describe some discrete, objective entity, then it is inevitable that either we will share the Puranic writer's puzzlement or that much of what we read about Shiva will appear as the muddled and extravagant thinking thrown up by an uncritical and over-fertile mythological imagination, consisting of little more than a hotch-potch of contradictory elements. But if we see such accounts as attempting to say something about everything, as symbols of near totality stemming from experiences which verge on the holistic, then what we read - with all its ambiguities - may become somewhat more meaningful. This analysis of ineffability and intelligibility seeks to introduce for debate a possible way of understanding the radical unlikeness which accounts of religious experience apparently attempt to speak about. It does not, however, claim to present an exhaustive treatment of the issues raised, on the contrary, I am conscious of many shortcomings and omissions. For instance, it remains to be seen under precisely what conditions something counts as being an elucidating likeness (presumably all experiences are, for example, temporal, yet temporality alone would not seem to offer a particularly elucidating comparison). Moreover, the degree to which appeal to likeness is allowed operation in actual accounts of religious experience needs to be explored. In addition, the notion of categorizing experiences according to the extent to which they approach a point of total inclusion requires careful clarification. To begin with, according to what criteria could we establish that one experience was more inclusive than another? However, such issues can only be mentioned here, any adequate consideration of them would require a separate paper.In conclusion, I would suggest that to use radical unlikeness and/or ineffability simply as devices by which to halt any process of investigation, proclaiming that the thing in question is not like anything and so is beyond all words, risks making unintelligible and placing beyond all further inquiry an important and extensive area of human experience. As William Alston put it, to label something ineffable in an unqualified way is to shirk the job of making explicit the ways in which it can be talked about. It is surely more accurate to take ineffability as a qualifier which multiplies models without end than as an absolute which prevents the construction of any elucidating models.An early draft of this paper was read to a seminar group at the University of St. Andrews during Martinmas term 1984. I am grateful to Dr. Gordon Graham & Mr. Tony Ellis, both of the Department of Moral Philosophy, and to Dr. George Hall, of the Department of Divinity, for remarks which stimulated some subsequent revisions of the argument.

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Latent trait models and dichotomization of graded responses

This paper discusses thecompatibility of the polychotomous Rasch model with dichotomization of the response continuum. It is argued that in the case of graded responses, the response categories presented to the subject are essentially an arbitrary polychotomization of the response continuum, ranging for example from total rejection or disagreement to total acceptance or agreement of an item or statement. Because of this arbitrariness, the measurement outcome should be independent of the specific polychotomization applied, for example, presenting a specific multicategory response format should not affect the measurement outcome. When such is the case, the original polychotomous model is called compatible with dichotomization.A distinction is made between polychotomization or dichotomization before the fact, that is, in constructing the response format, and polycho- or dichotomization after the fact, for example in dichotomizing existing graded response data.It is shown that, at least in case of dichotomization after-the-fact, the polychotomous Rasch model is not compatible with dichotomization, unless a rather special condition of the model parameters is met. Insofar as it may be argued that dichotomization before the fact is not essentially different from dichotomization after the fact, the value of the unidimensional polychotomous Rasch model is consequently questionable. The impact of our conclusion on related models is also discussed.     

A critique of Dennett

This essay is intended to be a systematic exposition and critique of Daniel Dennett's general views. It is divided into three main sections. In section 1 we raise the question of the nature of a plausible scientific psychology, and suggest that the question of whether folk psychology will serve as an adequate scientific psychology is of special relevance in a discussion of Dennett. We then characterize folk psychology briefly. We suggest that Dennett's views have undergone at least one major change, and proceed to discuss both his earlier and his later views.In section 2 we suggest that Dennett is correctly perceived as an instrumentalist in his earlier works. We think that Dennett later abandons this position because of general worries about instrumentalism and, more importantly, because Dennett became convinced that an instrumentalist conception of folk psychology will not enable us to vindicate the notions of personhood, moral agency, and responsibility. This left Dennett with a dilemma. On the one hand, he does not think that beliefs, etc., will turn out to be genuine scientific posits. On the other hand, he thinks that moral agency would be impossible if we could not treat beliefs, etc. as causally efficacious in some suitable sense.In section 3 we discuss Dennett's resolution of this dilemma. The key to his current view, we suggest, is the illata-abstracta distinction. Dennett holds that both illata and abstracta are real and have causal powers, even though only illata are genuine scientific posits. He suggests that beliefs etc. are abstracta, and are the subject matter of what he calls intentional system theory. The subject matter of another theory, what Dennett calls subpersonal cognitive psychology, are illata, which are subpersonal intentional states. The important point is that this distinction lets Dennett have it both ways: (i) Since beliefs are mere abstracta, we need not commit ourselves to the thesis that beliefs will turn out to be posits of an adequate scientific psychology. (ii) Since beliefs have causal power, we are assured of moral and rational agency. We shall argue that Dennett's current view is untenable. If we are right in our arguments, then Dennett's program to produce a scientifically plausible psychology, one that will turn out to vindicate folk psychology (in some suitable sense), is a failure. It fails in the following important ways: (i) What Dennett sketches — intentional system theory cum subpersonal cognitive psychology — is not a plausible scientific psychology. (ii) As a consequence, Dennett also fails to provide a satisfactory foundation for moral and rational agency.