Stress as a state of anticipatory vigilance

The pituitary-adrenocortical system is activated in stressful situations, and the adrenocortical hormones have been implicated by Selye in the diseases of stress. Evidence indicates that the adrenocortical hormones peak during the period of anticipation of stressful events, not during actual confrontation with them. The circadian cortisol rhythm shows peaks before waking, not during active periods of the day, and cortisol does not appear to be required during physical activity. The role of these hormones appears to be to suppress ongoing physiological activity in order to increase vigilance and to get the organism ready to take action before the impact of dangers.     

Albert Ellis' personal responses to the Survey of Rational-Emotive Therapists

This article presents Albert Ellis' personal responses to the Survey of Rational-Emotive Therapists and his answers to a number of questions that the first and second authors asked Ellis regarding some of his responses. Ellis also commented on how adequately he thought the results of the survey appeared to represent the current philosophies and practices of RET.     

目的、意向和意识

本文提出了一个意向性目标搜寻的计算机模型,它有两个部分,静态部分包括一个目标表征和到达这个目标的程序。动态部分是一个感觉输入、中间信息加工,行为输出的重复的反馈循环。人类意向必然伴有意识,但机器人则可能无意识而有意向。 利用目标搜寻系统机器人模型,我们对目标搜寻系统的目的连续统下了定义;这个连续统从简单的直接反应系统一直到意向性系统。对这个目的连续统有两种传统的解释:一是柏拉图、亚里士多德和普罗提诺的终极原因理论,二是希腊原子论者和现代进化生物学家的还原主义学说。本文评价了这些学说。 本文考察了几种类型的意识机能,提出了以自动机为依据的意识理论,比较了人类和计算机。从计算机结构的角度来看,人类意识是一类特殊的计算机控制系统。     

Ineffability and intelligibility: Towards an understanding of the radical unlikeness of religious experience

Conclusion I do not for a moment question the fact that many people have experiences of a special type which may be termed religious, that such experiences often involve reference to something which appears to display a radical unlikeness to all else and that they are therefore in some sense inexpressible. Doubtless the ideas I have put forward about the possible source of such unlikeness and ineffability might suggest models of God which would not find much theological approval, at least within any mainstream theistic tradition, since some sort of pantheism seems inevitably to be implied. But however this might be, the concept of radical unlikeness as it has been analyzed here can, I think, help us towards understanding certain problematic areas in religion quite apart from the issue of intelligibility, which has been the focus of this discussion.To begin with, radical unlikeness suggests a way in which the historical continuity of concepts of the transcendent might be upheld against the discontinuity suggested by the diversity of interpretations through which they have moved. Ancient and modern outlooks on, say, God differ enormously, as indeed do the range of co-temporal accounts at many particular moments. But, by and large, theologians firmly maintain that it is a single and unchanging phenomenon which is being dealt with. Unless we can point to some common element which is both specific enough to create a binding sense of common tradition, yet never completely expressed by any attempt at understanding it within that tradition (thus persistently demanding new attempts to apprehend it), then given the widely differing views of God within, for example, the Christian community, it is difficult to see how we could assume that in fact they all stemmed from the same source and were talking about the same thing. The idea of radical unlikeness could provide an element with just these required characteristics: it could be seen as what all the accounts attempt to net, with varying degrees of adequacy, within their offered interpretations. It could be seen as what remains constant, constantly elusive yet constantly generative of fresh attempts to apprehend it, throughout a history of intra-religious diversity. Secondly, radical unlikeness might suggest a possible way of understanding inter-religious diversity in a way which allows that whilst such diversity exists, whilst the differences between religions are real, they are grounded in a similar root-experience. It may, at first sight, seem difficult to continue thinking of the various religious traditions as truly separate phenomena if they are taken as being grounded on experiences whose ineffability stems from the unlikeness of experiencing things as a whole. Here we must stress again that if they are to be considered intelligible, radically unlike experiences cannot be considered completely so - or putting this another way, we cannot more than approach experience of totality. Sense can be given to religious claims of ineffability by suggesting experience of near totality, where we reach the last point on the scale of inclusiveness which complies with the logical criteria demanded of something for it to be possible for us to be aware of it. We might thus attempt an explanation of inter-religious diversity based on the view that Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam etc. acquire their differences from the different elements included in their experience of near totality. Taking totality to be represented by the scale of one to ten, Hinduism might be seen as grounded on experience of 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-9-10, Buddhism on experience of 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 and so on. The resulting dissimilarities are thus centred not on different types of experience, but on different areas of inclusiveness. This is, of course, to suppose that the various religious traditions are all based on the same degree (as opposed to the same elements) of inclusiveness, but it is by no means clear that such a supposition is justified. Continuing with our decimal analogy, might it not be suggested that whilst Christianity stemmed from experience of 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10, Jainism was founded on a less extensive encounter with the divine (say 4-5-6-7-8-9-10)? It is, however, uncertain how we can compare and evaluate different religious traditions in such a way as to be able to comment on such claims. The analysis of radical unlikeness and ineffability which has been advanced might also suggest a way in which certain passages in religious writings could be understood, passages which at first sight can be seriously perplexing. If, for example, to return to the quotation given in the introductory section of this paper, we continue to think of accounts of the nature of Shiva as being attempts to describe some discrete, objective entity, then it is inevitable that either we will share the Puranic writer's puzzlement or that much of what we read about Shiva will appear as the muddled and extravagant thinking thrown up by an uncritical and over-fertile mythological imagination, consisting of little more than a hotch-potch of contradictory elements. But if we see such accounts as attempting to say something about everything, as symbols of near totality stemming from experiences which verge on the holistic, then what we read - with all its ambiguities - may become somewhat more meaningful. This analysis of ineffability and intelligibility seeks to introduce for debate a possible way of understanding the radical unlikeness which accounts of religious experience apparently attempt to speak about. It does not, however, claim to present an exhaustive treatment of the issues raised, on the contrary, I am conscious of many shortcomings and omissions. For instance, it remains to be seen under precisely what conditions something counts as being an elucidating likeness (presumably all experiences are, for example, temporal, yet temporality alone would not seem to offer a particularly elucidating comparison). Moreover, the degree to which appeal to likeness is allowed operation in actual accounts of religious experience needs to be explored. In addition, the notion of categorizing experiences according to the extent to which they approach a point of total inclusion requires careful clarification. To begin with, according to what criteria could we establish that one experience was more inclusive than another? However, such issues can only be mentioned here, any adequate consideration of them would require a separate paper.In conclusion, I would suggest that to use radical unlikeness and/or ineffability simply as devices by which to halt any process of investigation, proclaiming that the thing in question is not like anything and so is beyond all words, risks making unintelligible and placing beyond all further inquiry an important and extensive area of human experience. As William Alston put it, to label something ineffable in an unqualified way is to shirk the job of making explicit the ways in which it can be talked about. It is surely more accurate to take ineffability as a qualifier which multiplies models without end than as an absolute which prevents the construction of any elucidating models.An early draft of this paper was read to a seminar group at the University of St. Andrews during Martinmas term 1984. I am grateful to Dr. Gordon Graham & Mr. Tony Ellis, both of the Department of Moral Philosophy, and to Dr. George Hall, of the Department of Divinity, for remarks which stimulated some subsequent revisions of the argument.

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Preferences for Individual Video Games as a Function of Their Emotional Effects on Players

Video games vary in terms of the emotional states they elicit from players. These differences in emotional reactions, in turn, help account for differential preferences of individual games. The three independent dimensions of pleasure-displeasure, arousal-nonarousal, and dominance-submissiveness were used to assess emotional impacts of individual games. In addition, a preference measure was constructed to evaluate attraction toward, versus avoidance of, specific games. In Study One, a group of subjects provided data on emotional responses to 22 common arcade video games and a different group rated their preferences for the same games. The emotional impact of video games was highly unpleasant, moderately arousing, and moderately dominance-inducing; thus, the predominant emotional response to these games was aggression, anger, or hostility. I n Study Two, subjects visiting a video game arcade were recruited and assigned to play two games each and to report their reactions to each game immediately after playing the game. Results showed that greater feelings of pleasure, and separately of arousal, while playing video games resulted in higher preferences for the games and that greater dominance (significant only for males) also led to higher preferences. It may be beneficial, therefore, to experiment with more arousing and more dominance-inducing game designs which are not necessarily unpleasant or which definitely yield high pleasure.     

Arousal-reducing effects of chronic stimulant use

A variety of studies withhabitual users of nicotine, caffeine, cocaine, and amphetamines have shown that administration of these stimulants has the paradoxical effect of lowering arousal states. Research on transmarginal inhibition shows that when subjects are presented with a succession of stimuli monotonically increasing in intensity, GSR and related arousal responses increase first and then begin to decline beyond a certain point of stimulus intensity. That is, following repeated exposure to intense stimuli, continued more intense stimulation has the effect of lowering arousal. Since stimulants subjectively heighten stimulus intensity, the transmarginal inhibition data provide a basis for explaining opposing effects of stimulants on arousal, depending on dose and frequency of use. It was hypothesized that when dose levels are low and usage is infrequent, arousal increases with stimulant intake. In contrast, when dose levels are high and frequent, arousal shows decrements with new intakes of stimulant. A new questionnaire measure of characteristic arousal was developed and correlated with subjects' reports of habitual levels of stimulant and sedative intake. Weekly total stimulant use correlated significantly and negatively with characteristic arousal level, providing support for the hypothesis. This lowered arousal of frequent stimulant users was not a confound of, or due to, concomitant frequent sedative use, since total stimulant and sedative use levels were uncorrelated.The author would like to thank Janice Schafrik for running the subjects in this study.     

Psychopathology subtypes and symptom correlates among former prisoners of war

Psychopathology and symptom patterns were studied in 60 former prisoners-of-war (POWs) by administering standardized tests including the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), an adjustment problem checklist, and a structured clinical interview. Most POWs showed marked psychological impairment, but modal profile analysis identified two prototypic MMPI patterns, which differed in pervasiveness and type of psychopathology. Profile subtypes were defined by unique clusters of clinical symptoms and differed in confinement stress severity. The typology of symptoms argues against a homogeneous conceptualization of stress-induced disorders and suggests the need for definition of the severity and subtype of stress phenomena and individual difference factors in responding to trauma.     

Casuistry and clinical ethics

For the last century, moral philosophy has stressed theory for the analysis of moral argument and concepts. In the last decade, interest in the ethical issues of health care has stimulated attention to cases and particular instances. This has revealed the gap between ethical theory and practice. This article reviews the history and method of casuistry which for many centuries provided an approach to practical ethics. Its strengths and weaknesses are noted and its potential for contemporary use explored.     

A comparison of monocular and binocular depth perception in 5- and 7-month-old infants

Monocular depth perception was compared with binocular depth perception in 5- and 7-month-old infants. Reaching was used as the dependent measure. Two objects, identical except in size, were presented simultaneously to each infant. The smaller object was within reach for the infants while the larger object was just beyond reach. The two objects subtended equal visual angles from the infants' observation point. With binocular presentation, 96% of the 7-month-olds' reaches and 89% of the 5-month-olds' reaches were for the nearer object. With monocular presentation, 58% of the 7-month-olds' reaches and 65% of the 5-month-olds' reaches were for the nearer object. The reaching preferences observed in the monocular condition indicated sensitivity to monocular depth information (motion parallax, accommodation, and relative size information were available). Binocular viewing, however, resulted in a far more consistent tendency to reach for the nearer object. This result suggests that the infants' perception of the objects' distances was more veridical in the binocular condition than in the monocular condition.