Wilderness family therapy: Experiential dimensions

This paper describes the process in which families participate in a wilderness experience. Metaphors such as climbing or paddling a canoe are translated into daily living patterns to deepen individual and family self-knowledge, self-esteem, and intimacy.     

目的、意向和意识

本文提出了一个意向性目标搜寻的计算机模型,它有两个部分,静态部分包括一个目标表征和到达这个目标的程序。动态部分是一个感觉输入、中间信息加工,行为输出的重复的反馈循环。人类意向必然伴有意识,但机器人则可能无意识而有意向。 利用目标搜寻系统机器人模型,我们对目标搜寻系统的目的连续统下了定义;这个连续统从简单的直接反应系统一直到意向性系统。对这个目的连续统有两种传统的解释:一是柏拉图、亚里士多德和普罗提诺的终极原因理论,二是希腊原子论者和现代进化生物学家的还原主义学说。本文评价了这些学说。 本文考察了几种类型的意识机能,提出了以自动机为依据的意识理论,比较了人类和计算机。从计算机结构的角度来看,人类意识是一类特殊的计算机控制系统。     

Ineffability and intelligibility: Towards an understanding of the radical unlikeness of religious experience

Conclusion I do not for a moment question the fact that many people have experiences of a special type which may be termed religious, that such experiences often involve reference to something which appears to display a radical unlikeness to all else and that they are therefore in some sense inexpressible. Doubtless the ideas I have put forward about the possible source of such unlikeness and ineffability might suggest models of God which would not find much theological approval, at least within any mainstream theistic tradition, since some sort of pantheism seems inevitably to be implied. But however this might be, the concept of radical unlikeness as it has been analyzed here can, I think, help us towards understanding certain problematic areas in religion quite apart from the issue of intelligibility, which has been the focus of this discussion.To begin with, radical unlikeness suggests a way in which the historical continuity of concepts of the transcendent might be upheld against the discontinuity suggested by the diversity of interpretations through which they have moved. Ancient and modern outlooks on, say, God differ enormously, as indeed do the range of co-temporal accounts at many particular moments. But, by and large, theologians firmly maintain that it is a single and unchanging phenomenon which is being dealt with. Unless we can point to some common element which is both specific enough to create a binding sense of common tradition, yet never completely expressed by any attempt at understanding it within that tradition (thus persistently demanding new attempts to apprehend it), then given the widely differing views of God within, for example, the Christian community, it is difficult to see how we could assume that in fact they all stemmed from the same source and were talking about the same thing. The idea of radical unlikeness could provide an element with just these required characteristics: it could be seen as what all the accounts attempt to net, with varying degrees of adequacy, within their offered interpretations. It could be seen as what remains constant, constantly elusive yet constantly generative of fresh attempts to apprehend it, throughout a history of intra-religious diversity. Secondly, radical unlikeness might suggest a possible way of understanding inter-religious diversity in a way which allows that whilst such diversity exists, whilst the differences between religions are real, they are grounded in a similar root-experience. It may, at first sight, seem difficult to continue thinking of the various religious traditions as truly separate phenomena if they are taken as being grounded on experiences whose ineffability stems from the unlikeness of experiencing things as a whole. Here we must stress again that if they are to be considered intelligible, radically unlike experiences cannot be considered completely so - or putting this another way, we cannot more than approach experience of totality. Sense can be given to religious claims of ineffability by suggesting experience of near totality, where we reach the last point on the scale of inclusiveness which complies with the logical criteria demanded of something for it to be possible for us to be aware of it. We might thus attempt an explanation of inter-religious diversity based on the view that Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam etc. acquire their differences from the different elements included in their experience of near totality. Taking totality to be represented by the scale of one to ten, Hinduism might be seen as grounded on experience of 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-9-10, Buddhism on experience of 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10 and so on. The resulting dissimilarities are thus centred not on different types of experience, but on different areas of inclusiveness. This is, of course, to suppose that the various religious traditions are all based on the same degree (as opposed to the same elements) of inclusiveness, but it is by no means clear that such a supposition is justified. Continuing with our decimal analogy, might it not be suggested that whilst Christianity stemmed from experience of 2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10, Jainism was founded on a less extensive encounter with the divine (say 4-5-6-7-8-9-10)? It is, however, uncertain how we can compare and evaluate different religious traditions in such a way as to be able to comment on such claims. The analysis of radical unlikeness and ineffability which has been advanced might also suggest a way in which certain passages in religious writings could be understood, passages which at first sight can be seriously perplexing. If, for example, to return to the quotation given in the introductory section of this paper, we continue to think of accounts of the nature of Shiva as being attempts to describe some discrete, objective entity, then it is inevitable that either we will share the Puranic writer's puzzlement or that much of what we read about Shiva will appear as the muddled and extravagant thinking thrown up by an uncritical and over-fertile mythological imagination, consisting of little more than a hotch-potch of contradictory elements. But if we see such accounts as attempting to say something about everything, as symbols of near totality stemming from experiences which verge on the holistic, then what we read - with all its ambiguities - may become somewhat more meaningful. This analysis of ineffability and intelligibility seeks to introduce for debate a possible way of understanding the radical unlikeness which accounts of religious experience apparently attempt to speak about. It does not, however, claim to present an exhaustive treatment of the issues raised, on the contrary, I am conscious of many shortcomings and omissions. For instance, it remains to be seen under precisely what conditions something counts as being an elucidating likeness (presumably all experiences are, for example, temporal, yet temporality alone would not seem to offer a particularly elucidating comparison). Moreover, the degree to which appeal to likeness is allowed operation in actual accounts of religious experience needs to be explored. In addition, the notion of categorizing experiences according to the extent to which they approach a point of total inclusion requires careful clarification. To begin with, according to what criteria could we establish that one experience was more inclusive than another? However, such issues can only be mentioned here, any adequate consideration of them would require a separate paper.In conclusion, I would suggest that to use radical unlikeness and/or ineffability simply as devices by which to halt any process of investigation, proclaiming that the thing in question is not like anything and so is beyond all words, risks making unintelligible and placing beyond all further inquiry an important and extensive area of human experience. As William Alston put it, to label something ineffable in an unqualified way is to shirk the job of making explicit the ways in which it can be talked about. It is surely more accurate to take ineffability as a qualifier which multiplies models without end than as an absolute which prevents the construction of any elucidating models.An early draft of this paper was read to a seminar group at the University of St. Andrews during Martinmas term 1984. I am grateful to Dr. Gordon Graham & Mr. Tony Ellis, both of the Department of Moral Philosophy, and to Dr. George Hall, of the Department of Divinity, for remarks which stimulated some subsequent revisions of the argument.

---

     

Context-dependent effects on analogical transfer

The role of context in facilitating analogical transfer was investigated in two experiments. In both experiments, subjects first read two stories that were analogous to Duncker’s (1945) radiation problem. Later, subjects attempted to solve the radiation problem. In Experiment 1, the radiation problem was presented in a different context than that of the stories, and followed them by 6 min. Transfer was observed in subjects who were prompted to use the earlier stories in solving the problem. However, the solution frequency of subjects not given such prompts did not differ from control levels. In Experiment 2, the radiation problem was presented in the same context as the earlier stories to some subjects, and in a different context to others. The timing of the radiation problem also was varied. When a 6-min interval separated the stories from the radiation problem, transfer was a function of context, with weak transfer being observed in the samecontext condition, and no transfer being observed in the different-context condition. At a 45-sec delay, transfer was again observed in the same~ontext condition, and a nonsignificant trend toward transfer was observed in the different-context condition. The results were interpreted as indicating that context facilitates the retrieval of relevant problem-solving schemas, and as suggesting that the possession of relevant schemas is not sufficient to produce analogical transfer.     

SOCIOBIOLOGY AND ITS THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Abstract. The broad character of the arguments used by sociobiologists is assessed, particularly in relation to criticisms coming from anthropology. The implications of sociobiology for theology are developed with respect to the general impact of evolutionary ideas, the reductionist assumptions of sociobiologists, whether or not "survival" can be a value, and more holistic accounts of the physical and biological grounding of the mental and spiritual lives of human beings.     

THERMODYNAMICS AND LIFE

Abstract. The basic features of thermodynamics as the "science of the possible" are outlined with a special emphasis on the role of the concept of entropy as a measure of irreversibility in natural processes and its relation to "order," precisely defined. Natural processes may lead to an increase in complexity, and this concept has a subtle relationship to those of order, organization, and information. These concepts are analyzed with respect to their relation to biological evolution, together with other ways of attempting to quantify it. Thermodynamic interpretations of evolution are described and critically compared, and the significance of dissipative structures, of "order through fluctuations," is emphasized in relation both to the evolutionary succession of temporarily stable forms and to kinetic mechanisms producing new patterns.     

Factor analysis by generalized least squares

Aitken's generalized least squares (GLS) principle, with the inverse of the observed variance-covariance matrix as a weight matrix, is applied to estimate the factor analysis model in the exploratory (unrestricted) case. It is shown that the GLS estimates are seale free and asymptotically efficient. The estimates are computed by a rapidly converging Newton-Raphson procedure. A new technique is used to deal with Heywood cases effectively.The work on this project was done when the first author was Research Statistician at Educational Testing Service, Princeton, N. J. The second author was in part supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the University of Wisconsin Graduate School. The authors wish to thank Michael Browne for many helpful comments and Marielle van Thillo for valuable assistance in the numerical computations.     

Limits on the applicability of signal detection theories

Two auditory signals were presented in random sequences in which the more intense signal came on.2, .5, or.8a/the trials. Each trial began with an intermediate tone which was identified in the instructions as either the standard for comparison or simply as a warning tone. Half the Os were instructed to discriminate whether the signal was “louder” or “softer” than the standard, the other half to recognize which signal had been presented. For both discrimination and recognition tasks, the total proportion of ldlouder” judgments was independent of the presentation probabilities, accuracy for each signal varying inversely with its probability of presentation. These results suggest strict limitations on the response optimization posited by theories of signal detection.