Perception,nonconceptual content,and immunity to error through misidentification

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we clarify the notion of immunity to error through misidentification with respect to the first-person pronoun (IEM). In particular, we set out to dispel the view that for a judgment to be IEM it must contain a token of a certain class of predicates. Rather, the importance of the IEM status of certain judgments is that it teaches us about privileged ways of coming to know about ourselves. We then turn to examine how perception, as a state with nonconceptual content, can give rise to judgments that are IEM. On one view, the ‘inheritance model’ of immunity, perception gives rise to such judgments because perception itself is IEM. We argue that this model is misguided, and, instead, suggest and elucidate an alternative view: perception gives rise to judgments that are IEM by virtue of containing implicitly self-related or self-concerning information.     

Attention and interpretation processes and trait anger experience,expression, and control

This study explored attention and interpretation biases in processing facial expressions as correlates of theoretically distinct self-reported anger experience, expression, and control. Non-selected undergraduate students (N?=?101) completed cognitive tasks measuring attention bias, interpretation bias, and Spielberger’s State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI-2). Attention bias toward angry faces was associated with higher trait anger and anger expression and with lower anger control-in and anger control-out. The propensity to quickly interpret ambiguous faces as angry was associated with greater anger expression and its subcomponent of anger expression-out and with lower anger control-out. Interactions between attention and interpretation biases did not contribute to the prediction of any anger component suggesting that attention and interpretation biases may function as distinct mechanisms. Theoretical and possible clinical implications are discussed.     

The representation of negative numbers: exploring the effects of mode of processing and notation

The representation of negative numbers was explored during intentional processing (i.e., when participants performed a numerical comparison task) and during automatic processing (i.e., when participants performed a physical comparison task). Performance in both cases suggested that negative numbers were not represented as a whole but rather their polarity and numerical magnitudes were represented separately. To explore whether this was due to the fact that polarity and magnitude are marked by two spatially separated symbols, participants were trained to mark polarity by colour. In this case there was still evidence for a separate representation of polarity and magnitude. However, when a different set of stimuli was used to refer to positive and negative numbers, and polarity was not marked separately, participants were able to represent polarity and magnitude together when numerical processing was performed intentionally but not when it was conducted automatically. These results suggest that notation is only partly responsible for the components representation of negative numbers and that the concept of negative numbers can be grasped only through that of positive numbers.     

Erratum: Decision anomalies,experimenter assumptions,and participants' comprehension: Revaluating the uncertainty effect

The above article (DOI: 10.1002/bdm.628 ) was published online on 14 November 2008 inWiley InterScience ( www.interscience.wiley.com ). An error was subsequently identified: Page 3, line 22: “certainty effect,” should read “uncertainty effect,”.     

The meaning of indifference in choice behavior: Asymmetries in adjustments embodied in matching

Measuring and assessing people’s preferences is an intricate task that can be realized by different methods. Evidently, the different methods do not necessarily yield consistent results. In the present paper we examine the matching procedure and demonstrate inconsistencies within the method itself. It is shown that the inconsistencies stem from: (1) asymmetry in upward and downward matching (i.e., matching options by increasing or lowering values do not yield the same tradeoffs) and (2) participants’ tendency to match (adjust) the options such that they become more similar, eventually facilitating the choice process. Matching is the most straightforward method of eliciting indifference. Hence, the observed inconsistencies, encapsulated in the matching procedure, have direct implications for the construction of indifference curves (equal-utility contours) that are examined in the final section.     

Negative-based prominence: the role of negative features in matching and choice

Previous research related to the prominence effect (e.g., Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) has mainly focused on the causes and boundary conditions of the effect. This article investigates the determinants of prominence and explores a negative-based prominence effect in which the negative attribute becomes the prominent one. Using a matching-choice procedure, Experiments 1 and 2 show that the negative dimension became the prominent one under two different cover stories, suggesting that the negative feature looms larger in choice than in matching. The robustness of negative-based prominence was further demonstrated in a direct choice task without matching (Experiment 3) and was shown to be resistant to the impact of added positive features (Experiment 4). Finally, Experiments 5 and 6 distinguish between two determinants of prominence: intrinsic prominence caused by attribute importance and negative-based prominence caused by negative attribute values. By lowering the values on the positive dimension and enhancing the values on the negative dimension, one can reverse the prominence effect. The results suggest that, compared to a matching task, choice leads to enhanced sensitivity to negative features. The relations between negative characteristics of an attribute and other factors that determine prominence are discussed in the final section.     

Hemispheric visual atentional imbalance in patients with traumatic brain injury

We find a spatially asymmetric allocation of attention in patients with traumatic brain injury (TBI) despite the lack of obvious asymmetry in neurological indicators. Identification performance was measured for simple spatial patterns presented briefly to a locus 5 degrees into the left or right hemifield, after precuing attention to the same (ipsilateral) or opposite (cross-hemifield) side. Though the cue was non-predictive of target location overall, performance was significantly slower for cross than for ipsilateral trials in both patients and controls. We tested 21 TBI patients without overt focal brain damage and nine control subjects. Only patients demonstrated significantly worse performance for left side presentation in the ipsilateral condition. Furthermore, in the cross-hemifield condition, the left-right difference seen in TBI patients was significantly larger-reflecting a failure in producing a leftward attention shift. Again no significant difference was found in controls. These hemifield effects suggest an asymmetry in the ability of TBI patients in shifting attention to the left hemifield, whether from central fixation or from a cue in the contra-lateral hemifield. The results support basic hypotheses regarding visual attention: Attentional control may be asymmetric and attention may be a distributed, rather than localized cortical function.     

Segment duration as a cue to word boundaries in spoken-word recognition

In two eye-tracking experiments, we examined the degree to which listeners use acoustic cues to word boundaries. Dutch participants listened to ambiguous sentences in which stop-initial words (e.g., pot, jar) were preceded by eens (once); the sentences could thus also refer to cluster-initial words (e.g., een spot, a spotlight). The participants made fewer fixations to target pictures (e.g., ajar) when the target and the preceding [s] were replaced by a recording of the cluster-initial word than when they were spliced from another token of the target-bearing sentence (Experiment 1). Although acoustic analyses revealed several differences between the two recordings, only [s] duration correlated with the participants' fixations (more target fixations for shorter [s]s). Thus, we found that listeners apparently do not use all available acoustic differences equally. In Experiment 2, the participants made more fixations to target pictures when the [s] was shortened than when it was lengthened. Utterance interpretation can therefore be influenced by individual segment duration alone.