Validation of personality and cognitive measures for insurance claims examiners

Claims Examiners are critical for the profitability of large insurance companies. Mistakes in hiring these people can result in improperly processed claims and/or turnover, and this yields negative financial consequences for the company. This paper describes research evaluating the validity of selection procedures for the position of claims examiner at Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Oklahoma. A job analysis indicated that both cognitive skills and personal abilities are necessary for successful performance as a claims examiner. The job analysis also indicated that both subjective and objective criterion measures reflect important aspects of job performance. The criterion data included nine supervisory ratings, employee nominations, average percent of performance, absences, disciplinary actions, and sick leave. In a concurrent validation strategy, we tested a sample of experienced incumbents (N=50) using four cognitive ability tests (Basic Skills Tests: BST) and two measures of personality (Hogan Personality Inventory and PROFILE). Scales from two personality inventories were combined to form the Claims Examiner Inventory (CEI). Scores from the CEI and three of the four cognitive tests correlated significantly with the average percent of performance and six of the supervisory ratings, including the average supervisory rating. In addition to the cognitive measures, the personality measure contributed significantly to the prediction of percent of performance achieved with R=.64. These results are consistent with other research findings that support the use of both personality and cognitive measures as predictors of job performance.     

Vagueness as closeness

This paper presents and defends a definition of vagueness, compares it favourably with alternative definitions, and draws out some consequences of accepting this definition for the project of offering a substantive theory of vagueness. The definition is roughly this: a predicate ‘F’ is vague just in case for any objects a and b, if a and b are very close in respects relevant to the possession of F, then ‘Fa’ and ‘Fb’ are very close in respect of truth. The definition is extended to cover vagueness of many-place predicates, of properties and relations, and of objects. Some of the most important advantages of the definition are that it captures the intuitions which motivate the thought that vague predicates are tolerant, without leading to contradiction, and that it yields a clear understanding of the relationships between higher-order vagueness, sorites susceptibility, blurred boundaries, and borderline cases. The most notable consequence of the definition is that the correct theory of vagueness must countenance degrees of truth.     

Ability-performance relationships in education and employment settings: critical tests of the more-is-better and the good-enough hypotheses

The nature of the relationship between ability and performance is of critical importance for admission decisions in the context of higher education and for personnel selection. Although previous research has supported the more-is-better hypothesis by documenting linearity of ability-performance relationships, such research has not been sensitive enough to detect deviations at the top ends of the score distributions. An alternative position receiving considerable attention is the good-enough hypothesis, which suggests that although higher levels of ability may result in better performance up to a threshold, above this threshold greater ability does not translate to better performance. In this study, the nature of the relationship between cognitive ability and performance was examined throughout the score range in four large-scale data sets. Monotonicity was maintained in all instances. Contrary to the good-enough hypothesis, the ability-performance relationship was commonly stronger at the top end of the score distribution than at the bottom end.