Implicit change identification: a replication of Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2003)

Using a simple change detection task involving vertical and horizontal stimuli, I. M. Thornton and D. Fernandez-Duque (2000) showed that the implicit detection of a change in the orientation of an item influences performance in a subsequent orientation judgment task. However, S. R. Mitroff, D. J. Simons, and S. L. Franconeri (2002) were not able to replicate this finding after correcting for confounds and thus attributed Thornton and Fernandez-Duque's results to methodological artifacts. Because Mitroff et al.'s failure to replicate might in turn have stemmed from several methodological differences between their study and those of Thornton and Fernandez-Duque (2000) and Fernandez-Duque and Thornton, the current authors set out to conduct a further replication in which they corrected all known methodological biases identified so far. The results suggest that implicit change detection indeed occurs: People's conscious decisions about the orientation of an item appear to be influenced by previous undetected changes in the orientation of other items in the display. Implications of this finding in light of current theories of visual awareness are discussed.     

Processing abstract sequence structure: learning without knowing, or knowing without learning?

Constant interaction with a dynamic environment—from riding a bicycle to segmenting speech—makes sensitivity to the sequential structure of the world a fundamental dimension of information processing. Accounts of sequence learning vary widely, with some authors arguing that parsing and segmentation processes are central, and others proposing that sequence learning involves mere memorization. In this paper, we argue that sequence knowledge is essentially statistical in nature, and that sequence learning involves simple associative prediction mechanisms. We focus on a choice reaction situation introduced by Lee (1997), in which participants were exposed to material that follows a single abstract rule, namely that stimuli are selected randomly, but never appear more than once in a legal sequence. Perhaps surprisingly, people can learn this rule very well. Or can they? We offer a conceptual replication of the original finding, but a very different interpretation of the results, as well as simulation work that makes it clear how highly abstract dimensions of the stimulus material can in fact be learned based on elementary associative mechanisms. We conclude that, when relevant, memory is optimized to facilitate responding to events that have not occurred recently, and that sequence learning in general always involves sensitivity to repetition distance.     

On noticing transparent states: A compatibilist approach to transparency

According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or “diaphanous”. This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner-awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of strong transparency in favor of weak transparency. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way) to the presented world: that is, they are merely translucent. Here, I first argue that this understanding of transparency is too weak to qualify as a compatibilist view. Drawing on insights from Franz Brentano, I then describe a middle road between strong and weak transparency. The crucial idea is that, although transparent states cannot be attended to, they can be noticed (under suitable conditions). This view, I submit, allows supporters of inner awareness to commit themselves to a more interesting understanding of transparency—moderate transparency—that preserves the initial intuition underlying the transparency metaphor.     

Chunking or not chunking? How do we find words in artificial language learning?

What is the nature of the representations acquired in implicit statistical learning? Recent results in the field of language learning have shown that adults and infants are able to find the words of an artificial language when exposed to a continuous auditory sequence consisting in a random ordering of these words. Such performance can only be based on processing the transitional probabilities between sequence elements. Two different kinds of mechanisms may account for these data: Participants may either parse the sequence into smaller chunks corresponding to the words of the artificial language, or they may become progressively sensitive to the actual values of the transitional probabilities between syllables. The two accounts are difficult to differentiate because they make similar predictions in comparable experimental settings. In this study, we present two experiments that aimed at contrasting these two theories. In these experiments, participants had to learn 2 sets of pseudo-linguistic regularities: Language 1 (L1) and Language 2 (L2) presented in the context of a serial reaction time task. L1 and L2 were either unrelated (none of the syllabic transitions of L1 were present in L2), or partly related (some of the intra-words transitions of L1 were used as inter-words transitions of L2). The two accounts make opposite predictions in these two settings. Our results indicate that the nature of the representations depends on the learning condition. When cues were presented to facilitate parsing of the sequence, participants learned the words of the artificial language. However, when no cues were provided, performance was strongly influenced by the employed transitional probabilities.     

Feedback and intention during motor-skill learning: a connection with prospective memory

The intention to complete an action in the future can improve the learning of this action, but it is unknown whether this effect persists when feedback is manipulated during encoding. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to learn a motor skill with or without intending to reproduce this learning in the future, and feedback on their movements was administrated by self-decision, that is, participants asked for feedback whenever they wanted it. The results showed that intention increased the frequency with which feedback was requested, but did not improve motor performance. In Experiment 2, participants had to learn the task with high or few feedbacks, which they could not control. In these conditions, intention was beneficial in promoting motor learning only for a low feedback schedule. We suggest that the beneficial effect of intention on learning can be overshadowed or emphasised by the feedback processing during encoding. These findings are discussed in light of theories surrounding prospective memory.     

Pliers,not fingers: Tool-action effect in a motor intention paradigm

Tool-use representations have been suggested to be supported by the representation of hand actions and/or by the representation of tool actions. A major issue is to know which one of these two representations is preferentially activated when people intend to use a tool. To address this issue, we developed a paradigm in which, in 20% of trials, participants had to press a button and actually use pliers to move an object in response to a predefined target symbol. Importantly, two masks hiding the symbols performed “opening” or “closing” actions before symbols appeared. In Experiment 1, participants used normal pliers: Hand’s opening actions induced pliers’ opening actions and vice versa for hands’ closing actions. Results indicated a compatibility effect between masks’ actions and pliers’ actions. Participants were faster to press the button in response to the target symbol when opening and closing actions of the masks were congruent with the corresponding actions of the hand. In Experiment 2 participants used inverse pliers: Hand’s opening actions involved pliers’ closing actions and vice versa. In this situation, results showed that the congruency of masks’ actions occurred with pliers’ actions and not hand’s actions. Altogether, these findings demonstrate that intention of use is preferentially based on the representation of tool actions, and have important implications for the domain of neuropsychology of tool use and the theories of goal-directed behavior.     

Occipital gamma activation during Vipassana meditation

Long-term Vipassana meditators sat in meditation vs. a control rest (mind-wandering) state for 21 min in a counterbalanced design with spontaneous EEG recorded. Meditation state dynamics were measured with spectral decomposition of the last 6 min of the eyes-closed silent meditation compared to control state. Meditation was associated with a decrease in frontal delta (1–4 Hz) power, especially pronounced in those participants not reporting drowsiness during meditation. Relative increase in frontal theta (4–8 Hz) power was observed during meditation, as well as significantly increased parieto-occipital gamma (35–45 Hz) power, but no other state effects were found for the theta (4–8 Hz), alpha (8–12 Hz), or beta (12–25 Hz) bands. Alpha power was sensitive to condition order, and more experienced meditators exhibited no tendency toward enhanced alpha during meditation relative to the control task. All participants tended to exhibit decreased alpha in association with reported drowsiness. Cross-experimental session occipital gamma power was the greatest in meditators with a daily practice of 10+ years, and the meditation-related gamma power increase was similarly the strongest in such advanced practitioners. The findings suggest that long-term Vipassana meditation contributes to increased occipital gamma power related to long-term meditational expertise and enhanced sensory awareness.     

Spotting animals in natural scenes: efficiency of humans and monkeys at very low contrasts

The ability of monkeys to categorize objects in visual stimuli such as natural scenes might rely on sets of low-level visual cues without any underlying conceptual abilities. Using a go/no-go rapid animal/non-animal categorization task with briefly flashed achromatic natural scenes, we show that both human and monkey performance is very robust to large variations of stimulus luminance and contrast. When mean luminance was increased or decreased by 25–50%, accuracy and speed impairments were small. The largest impairment was found at the highest luminance value with monkeys being mainly impaired in accuracy (drop of 6% correct vs. <1.5% in humans), whereas humans were mainly impaired in reaction time (20 ms increase in median reaction time vs. 4 ms in monkeys). Contrast reductions induced a large deterioration of image definition, but performance was again remarkably robust. Subjects scored well above chance level, even when the contrast was only 12% of the original photographs (≈81% correct in monkeys; ≈79% correct in humans). Accuracy decreased with contrast reduction but only reached chance level -in both species- for the most extreme condition, when only 3% of the original contrast remained. A progressive reaction time increase was observed that reached 72 ms in monkeys and 66 ms in humans. These results demonstrate the remarkable robustness of the primate visual system in processing objects in natural scenes with large random variations in luminance and contrast. They illustrate the similarity with which performance is impaired in monkeys and humans with such stimulus manipulations. They finally show that in an animal categorization task, the performance of both monkeys and humans is largely independent of cues relying on global luminance or the fine definition of stimuli.     

Intention in motor learning through observation

The purpose of this experiment was to assess whether learning an action through observation is enhanced by the intention to reproduce the observed behaviour. Two groups of participants observed a model practise a timing task and performed a 24-hour delayed retention test. Participants in the first group of observers were explicitly instructed that they would be required to execute the timing task that they had observed as accurately as possible during the delayed retention test. Observers in the second group were instructed that they would be required to describe as accurately as possible the behaviour that they had observed. A control group of participants, who did not observe the model, was also administered the delayed retention test. The results of the retention test indicated that absolute timing (parameterization) was learned by the observers to the same extent with or without intention to reproduce the task. Indeed, on the retention test absolute timing for the two groups of observers was as effective as that for the models. However, observing with an intention to reproduce the task was beneficial for learning the movement's relative timing structure. Results are discussed with respect to a potential mechanism by which intention enhances observation.